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Summary 
This thesis investigates the role that the concept of nature plays in green politics. Nature, in 
the green literature, is usually assumed to refer to the nonhuman environment. But critics of 
this way of thinking about nature argue that humans exist in such interconnected networks 
with their environments that environments cannot be divided into categories of human and 
nonhuman. These criticisms suggest that we should abandon talking about nature and 
concentrate instead on investigating the complex relationships we share with our 
environments. But even in the light of these criticisms the idea of nature does seem to 
articulate something important about green politics which cannot be communicated by just 
investigating the relationships that we share with our environments. I turn to the philosophy 
of Martin Heidegger to make sense of this concept of nature. Heidegger makes numerous 
references to the unfolding of nature and the earth in his works. His philosophy has thus been 
used to make sense of what is at stake in taking care of our environments. In mainstream 
green readings of Heidegger, nature is understood as referring to the spontaneous growth of a 
nonhuman nature. However, I will approach nature in Heidegger’s work differently, 
divorcing these concepts of nature and the earth from descriptions of the material growth of 
nonhuman natural beings. This allows us to understand the importance of the idea of nature in 
green politics. Paying attention to nature is important not because it allows us to address 
environmental crisis, but because it allows us to stop thinking that we can represent things 
through calculations and to think of them as mere resources. This thesis proposes thinking of 
green politics as having two separate goals, the goal of protecting nature and the goal of 
protecting the environment.  
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Introduction   
Apples 
My grandparents live in a house with a big garden in the Finnish countryside. The garden is 
full of apple trees, which I would often wander through in the summer. I enjoyed the 
quietness of the garden, away from noisy cities. I enjoyed seeing the apple trees in bloom and 
watching my grandfather working on his vegetable plot. There was always peace in the 
garden. There was also a sense of expectation there which I felt while I waited for the apples 
to ripen. I would watch the apple trees, hoping for a lot of fruit so that my grandparents could 
bring buckets full of apples to us in October. These were always delicious. They were sour 
the way that apples grown in colder climates are, and I would eat too many of them.  
    Because of these experiences, I feel that these apples, and the garden in which they grow, 
are important, and I think it is important to allow the Finnish countryside to remain such that 
apple trees can continue to grow and flourish. There is, however, a wealth of experiences that 
make the apples important to me, and it is difficult to explain in simple terms why I want to 
protect them. They are important to me partly because I suspect that apples sold in 
supermarkets can never taste as good as my grandparents’. But it is not only the flavours that 
make these apples so important. The whole experience of walking in the garden amidst the 
apple trees plays a part in making the apples important to me. What makes the apples 
important to me are memories of how I would wait for them to grow during the summer, 
hoping that the weather would be good and that it would be a good year for them, and how 
they re-emerge when I eat apples from the garden in winter, defining the present and allowing 
me to reminisce on the past. 
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    It is because of these experiences that I cannot express how I feel about these apples by 
trying to think about them purely from the perspective of environmental protection, by trying 
to communicate the importance of protecting the apples by talking about preserving the 
environment so that it can continue to produce food and stay a place where people can go to 
have a break from the life of the city. This is because these apples are not just resources to be 
consumed by me but the spontaneous growth and flourishing of the apples is more important 
than this. These apples participate in and enrich my life in ways beyond simple nourishment. 
The spontaneous growth of the apples feels to me more like a precious gift than a resource. 
When I try to communicate the importance of these apples, the word that comes to mind is 
‘nature’. The apples are important because they are a part of nature. It is important to protect 
these apples because it is important to protect nature. 
    My feelings about the importance of protecting the apples in my grandparents’ garden echo 
the sentiments of green political thinkers who maintain that we cannot make sense of what is 
at stake in taking care of our environments without talking about the importance of protecting 
nature itself (e.g. Barry, 1999; Dobson, 2007; Eckersley, 1992; Naess, 1989). These feelings I 
have about protecting nature have thus made me interested in green political thinking in an 
attempt to understand how we might be able to better protect nature. Green thinkers maintain 
that to best understand what is at stake in taking care of our environments, we need to pay 
attention to protecting nature. The greens investigate how showing concern for nature begins 
to change the way that we approach politics and the way we design our political structures. 
    But at the same time, doubts about this way of thinking of what I feel in the garden began 
to enter my mind as I examined it in more detail. I began to find it impossible to express why 
nature is so important to me, and what nature really communicates about the importance of 
the apples. These kinds of feelings are common. As illustrated by Kate Soper (1995: 1-2), 
although we use the word ‘nature’ with ease in our everyday conversation, the word remains 
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elusive, making it is difficult to explain what we are talking about when we appeal to this 
concept. Habgood, for example, explores the complexities in talking about nature when 
thinking about protecting the environments as follows:  
 At one extreme, it can include everything that exists, the whole natural world; sometimes this 
“everything” is held to include humanity, sometimes not. In other context it might mean country rather 
than town, or the environment, or the world left to itself in contrast with the world as shaped by humanity. 
It can also describe a force or guiding principle, Nature doing this or that, Mother Nature operating her 
own laws and thus determining the way things are (Habgood, 2002: 2).  
 
My first instinct would be to say that nature here refers to the nonhuman environment. This is 
also how the concept of nature is usually understood in green thinking. But on closer 
examination, it becomes very difficult to think about nature as referring to the nonhuman 
environment. The apples do not grow spontaneously in my grandparents’ garden but have 
been planted and cultivated by humans. The garden itself is taken care of by humans and only 
exists because humans decided to build a house and a garden in that spot. 
    These criticisms have also prompted questions about what green political thinkers are 
protecting when they say that they are protecting nature, and why the concept of nature seems 
to be such an important one for them. The aim of this thesis is to address these concerns in 
more detail, to look at why this concept of nature seems to be so important for the greens, and 
what it really means to say that what makes green political thinking a distinctive approach to 
politics is the concern that they show for nature. 
 
Green Political Thought 
Green political thinking, with its focus on protecting nature, has become a prominent 
approach to political theorising. Dobson (2007: 2) elaborates on the green position by making 
a distinction between green and environmentalist approaches to environmental problems. 
14 
 
More traditional environmentalists investigate environmental problems in terms of resource 
management. For them, addressing environmental crisis is important because the 
environment provides resources that are necessary for human well-being. It provides food 
and energy, as well as opportunities for relaxation and recreation. These kinds of approaches 
to the environment can be seen, for example, in the ideas of Gifford Pinchot, the first chief of 
American Forest Service. Pinchot worked to reform the way that American forests were 
managed so that they could better provide for the needs of man, calling forest management 
part of the ‘one great central problem of the use of the earth for the good of man’ (Pinchot, 
1972: 322). Pinchot often justified his reforms by making an economic case for the 
management of these forests and for him, conservation was about ‘the foresighted utilization, 
preservation, and/or renewal of forests, waters, lands, and minerals, for the greatest good of 
the greatest number for the longest time’ (Pinchot, 1972: 505).  
    Other environmentalist thinkers make the case for protecting nature from the point of view 
of human welfare. Barry Commoner (1971) speaks of the protection of the environment for 
the sake of the well-being of humans. A polluted environment creates ‘foul air, polluted water 
and rubbish heaps’, has detrimental effects on human health, makes it harder to grow food 
and reduces opportunities for recreation (Commoner, 1971: 293). According to Commoner, 
to avoid pollution and degrading the environment, the environment must be treated with 
caution. This is because everything is connected to everything else. We cannot dump waste to 
one part of the earth in the hope that it will disappear: ‘[n]othing “goes away”; it is simply 
transferred from place to place’ (Commoner, 1971: 40).  What is significant in this way of 
arguing is that it justifies the protection of the environment for the sake of human well-being, 
drawing attention to the fragility of ecosystems and to the consequences that disturbing these 
systems can have for human life.  
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    The idea of nature, however, does not play an important part in these environmentalist 
writings. Although the word ‘nature’ can appear in environmentalist writings as a way of 
referring to the environment and to the resources in it, the idea of nature does not become a 
problem for the environmentalists, and referring to the environment as nature does not alter 
the content of the environmentalist inquiry. An environmentalist would look at the apples in 
my grandparents’ garden and say that it is important that the countryside remains a place 
where apples can continue to grow and flourish because it is important for the countryside to 
continue to provide resources such as food, recreation and clean air to allow humans to live 
happy and fulfilling lives. 
   Green political thinkers, however, echo my sentiments that there is something more at stake 
in protecting the environment. What is at stake is not only protecting the environment as a 
resource for human ends but also protecting nature itself. Green thinkers understand nature as 
the nonhuman environment. Unlike environmentalist thinkers, for whom the word ‘nature’ 
seems just a synonym for the environment, green thinkers believe that showing concern for 
nature changes what it means to care for the environment and, therefore, changes the way in 
which greens approach the kind of politics that can best protect nature. Green thinking has its 
roots in the 1960s and the 1970s, when books such as Carson’s Silent Spring (1963), which 
investigates the impact that pollution has on our environment, and Schumacher’s (1993) 
Small is Beautiful and Meadows et al.’s (1972) Limits to Growth, which question the 
principles of growth underpinning the capitalist mode of production, doubting that this model 
can ever provide us with a sustainable mode of consuming goods. These approaches are 
distinctive because they draw attention to the limits that the earth itself poses to our existence, 
and begin to approach the question of environmental politics in terms of the limits posed on it 
by the earth (Dobson, 2007: 15). 
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     Thinking about how our attempts to use nature as a resource have encouraged green 
thinkers to concentrate on the relationships we share with the natural world. Reflecting on 
these relationships leads the majority of green thinkers (e.g. Curry, 2006; Eckersley, 1992; 
Naess, 1989; Devall and Sessions, 1985; Sylvan, 1992) to adopt a doctrine of ecocentrism in 
order to make sense of our duties towards nature. An ecocentric framework differs from the 
anthropocentric one adopted by the environmentalist thinkers because ecocentric thinkers 
believe that it is not only humans who are morally relevant beings, but nonhumans must also 
be acknowledged as belonging to this group (Eckersley: 1992: 49). Ecocentric thinkers 
therefore advocate expanding the moral community to include nonhumans. Those green 
thinkers (e.g. Barry, 1999; Plumwood, 2006) who do not adopt the ecocentric framework still 
continue to pay attention to the interests of nature. They argue that the interests of humans 
and of nature are so intertwined that we do not have to separate human and nonhuman 
interests. Thus, despite differences, the guiding idea in these two approaches remains the 
same: protecting the environment is not only a question of resource management and there is 
more at stake in protecting the environment than is recognised by environmentalist thinkers. 
    This focus on nature is also what makes green thinking a distinct approach to political 
theory. Unlike environmentalist thinkers, who are concerned with reforming our political 
structures so that they can better manage environmental resources, green political thinkers 
maintain that protecting the interests of nature requires that we rethink these structures. This 
rethinking includes arguments for transforming our democratic systems so that they can 
better take the interests of nature into account (Eckersley, 2005), rethinking the way in which 
we organise the economy (Bahro, 1982; Bookchin, 1982; Carter, 1993) and criticising living 
in big cities, advocating a return to smaller, more self-sustaining communities (Bahro, 1982: 
102-5; Sale, 1980) or restructuring the way in which the state and decision-making in it are 
organised (Barry, 1999; de Geus, 1996). 
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    But although the green project feels important and seems like a significant advancement 
over the environmentalist way of framing the issue of environmental degradation, the way in 
which the greens talk about nature remains puzzling. They do not explain what the nonhuman 
nature that they want to protect is. Thus, it is not surprising that the green way of portraying 
nature has been criticised by those who maintain that we cannot talk about nature as the 
nonhuman environment because environments that we conventionally think of as nonhuman 
exist in such interconnected relations with the ones we conventionally think of as human that 
we cannot make these divisions into human and nonhuman environments. What comes to 
count as nature is socially and culturally mediated. Often things that we think of as natural 
are framed as such through political and ideological struggles; through certain people having 
an interest in protecting or developing a piece of land, and thinking that through framing this 
as a part of nature, they can gain support for their cause. It is, therefore, unclear why we 
should label these beings as natural (e.g. Braun, 2002; Castree: 2001b; Cronon, 1996; Latour, 
1993; Smith: 1984; Whatmore, 2002; Whatmore and Thorne, 2000). 
     Although greens have made attempts to address these concerns, their attempts, as I will 
demonstrate in Chapter One, have not been entirely successful. Despite this, the concept of 
nature still seems to continue to play an important role in green politics. Even if the portrayal 
of nature as some nonhuman environment is problematized, this does not mean that we can 
just stop talking about nature. There seems to be something about the importance of 
protecting our environments that cannot be articulated without making references to nature. If 
I try to explain what I feel when I am walking in my grandparents’ garden, looking at the 
apple trees in bloom, waiting for the arrival of the apples in September without talking about 
nature, then something important will be left out of this explanation. The questions of what 
this concept of nature in green thinking refers to and why it seems to be such an important 
concept, then, remains open.  
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Approaches      
As green thinkers have largely ignored the question of nature, the majority of this thesis will 
consist of a philosophical exploration into the idea of nature. I will question the role of the 
concept of nature in green politics by turning to the philosophy of Martin Heidegger. 
Heidegger’s philosophy is famously concerned with the question of Being. Thinking about 
the question of Being is useful for thinking about nature because Heidegger’s questioning, 
particularly the kind of questioning he undertakes in his later writings, contains many 
environmental themes. In these writings, Heidegger is concerned with how people forget to 
ask the question of Being, which results in what he calls technological thinking, a kind of 
thinking that makes demands on the environment. He also describes how, to ask the question 
of Being, we must allow for the unfolding of the earth and the sky and for the unfolding of 
nature. Through an engagement with Heidegger’s work and by thinking about what the ideas 
of the earth, the sky and nature refer to in Heidegger’s vocabulary, I will argue that protecting 
nature does help us solve the environmental crisis because, as I will demonstrate later in the 
thesis, protecting the environment and protecting nature are two different things and 
protecting nature does not necessarily have environmentally friendly outcomes. We should 
therefore start thinking of green politics as consisting of these two different goals. 
    Heidegger’s question of Being is concerned with asking what allows beings to appear to us 
as beings: what is the ‘is’ that allows us to say that beings are, allows us to grasp beings as 
beings. Heidegger wants to answer this question without reducing Being to a being as has 
been done throughout the history of philosophy. This began with Plato, who understood 
Being in terms of his perfect ideas, and continued through to Christianity, which understood 
Being as a God that created beings, through to Descartes for whom beings are grounded in 
the knowing human subject who is able to perceive the objective qualities of these beings. 
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This means that Heidegger is attempting to answer the question of Being by avoiding 
thinking of it as another kind of being, as something that we can describe, explain or 
understand as a thing. Because of this way of questioning Being, Heidegger’s work consists 
of ways of thinking about Being that do not arrive at some firm ground that would allow him 
to articulate a clear and concise definition of Being. In his works Heidegger is also struggling 
to break free of the kind of philosophical language that aims for these kinds of clear 
formulations of things and concludes its inquiry by presenting answers to questions 
formulated at the beginning of the inquiry.  
    On some level, the question of Being is a question of intelligibility, a question of how 
beings can appear to us as something intelligible that we can engage with and understand 
(e.g. Dreyfus, 1991).  However, for Heidegger, the question of Being is not only a question of 
intelligibility but also of unintelligibility. Malpas (2007: 11-12) explains that Heidegger’s 
Being is that which grounds intelligibility and unintelligibility: ‘There is a constant play 
between shadow and light here, between intelligibility and its ground’ (Malpas, 2007: 12). 
Things in the world do not appear to us fully unconcealed and fully intelligible, but always 
partly in concealment. A large part of the investigation into Heidegger’s philosophy 
presented in this thesis is concerned with this unintelligibility and with the question of what 
the source of this unintelligibility is.  
    As will become evident in the thesis, Heidegger’s way of questioning Being also offers a 
useful starting point for my thinking about nature. This is because I feel that the concept of 
nature does have an important role to play in green politics, and that it communicates 
something important about green goals, and yet I have difficulties in trying to explain what 
this concept of nature means and why it is important. The way in which Heidegger 
approaches language helps us listen to this word ‘nature’. Heidegger does not think that we 
are in charge of language, that we use language as a tool to communicate meanings we can 
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understand (WL: 126; WS: 246). For Heidegger, we do not always have a clear sense of what 
the words we use mean. Instead, words themselves speak to us and we must learn to listen to 
them (NL: 75; WS: 168-9). Heidegger’s philosophy, then, allows for listening to the word 
‘nature’, allows the word ‘nature’ to speak to us and through this, helps us gain a better 
understanding of the role that this concept of nature plays in green politics. 
   When I started reading Heidegger, I was drawn, in particular, to his later work, which I 
thought had the most potential for helping me understand green thinking. In these works, 
Heidegger describes how philosophy has forgotten to ask the question of Being and how this 
results in the domination of technological thinking (QCT; FNT; AWP; ZWB). Technological 
thinking is a kind of thinking which attempts to find ways of representing beings, often 
through calculations. It sees beings as resources to be used for the sake of creating more 
resources. Technological thinking, because it is obsessed with manipulating, controlling and 
understanding beings, forgets to ask the question of Being, to ask what allowed these beings 
to appear to us as beings in the first place. It thinks that everything in the world can be 
controlled, mastered and calculated, and does not pay attention to the concealment that 
accompanies beings appearing to us as beings. It also makes demands on our environments 
by reducing these environments to calculable resources.  
     In these later works, Heidegger also offers a way out of technological thinking by 
describing how we can learn to dwell on the earth (BDT; BWD; Thing; Ding). We learn to 
dwell, he explains, when we allow for the unfolding of the fourfold that consists of the earth, 
the sky, the gods and the mortals. To do this, we must allow the earth and the sky to unfold in 
beings, a process which is partly concealed from us and which we cannot control. We can do 
this when we accept our own mortality, our finite grasp of beings and their unfolding. When 
this happens, we allow for the appearance of the gods and things no longer appear to us as 
mere resources. Instead, they appear to us in a richer way. In addition to talking about the 
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earth and the sky, Heidegger also introduces environmental themes to his works by talking 
about phusis, the Greek word for ‘nature’. When beings are revealed to us through phusis, 
they are revealed on their own accord. For example, a flower bursting into bloom reveals 
itself to us through phusis without human interference.  
    Because of these references to the unfolding of the earth and the sky and nature, a number 
of green thinkers have made use of Heidegger’s thinking in order to understand how we 
might best care for our environments (e.g. Holland, 1999; Irwin, 2011; Foltz, 1995; 
Seckinelgin, 2006; Smith: 2007; Zimmerman, 2003; Young, 2002). In these green 
interpretations of Heidegger’s thinking, nature is understood as describing how certain beings 
grow and unfold independently, without human interference. The sky and the earth of the 
fourfold are understood as describing the unfolding of the sky above us and earth on which 
we dwell that allow for the growth of nonhuman beings, and phusis is understood as 
describing the spontaneous, partly concealed flourishing of a nonhuman nature. The question 
of Being is understood here in a way that emphasises the unfolding of the material qualities 
of beings, it is understood as ‘the pre-conceptual coming to presence of material things, in 
which we, human beings, only take part’ (Joronen, 2012: 629, emphasis mine). In this 
reading of Heidegger, things are always partly concealed from us because we cannot 
understand the mysterious unfolding of natural beings. To learn to dwell, to question Being 
and to protect and take care of the environment, we must refrain from manipulating and 
controlling natural beings, and allow them to grow and flourish on their own accord. It might 
seem, therefore, that Heidegger’s thinking does not help us discover what nature is because it 
is still portraying nature as something nonhuman. However, as I will explain in this thesis, I 
came to abandon this way of reading Heidegger. This is because I realised that thinking about 
the unfolding of the earth and the concealment that prevails in the world in this manner still 
leads to technological thinking. So what other ways of thinking about the earth are there?  
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    An interpretation of the earth and the sky, where these terms are not associated with a 
nonhuman nature, has been proposed by Dreyfus and Spinosa (1997; 2003). This account of 
dwelling is based on Dreyfus’ (1992) reading of Heidegger where Being is understood as the 
background practices that allow us to make sense of things but remain implicit. In Dreyfus 
and Spinosa’s accounts of dwelling, the earth and the sky are not understood as parts of a 
nonhuman nature but are understood in terms of these background practices. The sky refers to 
the context in which we deem certain kinds of behaviours to be suitable, and the earth to the 
concealed, implicit background practices that we cannot grasp but that nevertheless make it 
possible for us to make sense of the world. Dreyfus and Spinosa’s accounts of dwelling and 
Being, however, are not free of problems. Others have demonstrated that the background 
practices that Dreyfus equates with Being are not what Heidegger means by Being. Being is 
something prior to these practices; it is that which allows these background practices to 
emerge in the first place (see Keller and Weberman, 1998: 375-6). Dreyfus’ way of reading 
Heidegger, as elaborated by Phillipse (1998: 68-70), is also unable to grasp the mystical 
elements present in Heidegger’s descriptions of the fourfold. So although the argument 
presented in this thesis will, to some extent, draw on Dreyfus’ exposition of Heidegger 
because it can provide a useful starting point for thinking about the earth and the sky, it will 
depart from this way of reading Heidegger and find an alternative way of thinking about the 
earth, the sky and nature. 
    What, then, do the earth and the sky stand for, and what is nature? Unlike the other ways of 
thinking about nature, the earth and the sky I have explored here, my account of these 
concepts will not be able to arrive at a final statement explaining what they stand for. The 
meanings of nature, the earth and the sky are linked very closely to how Heidegger thinks 
about Being and, as elaborated earlier, his thinking about Being always remains a 
questioning, never arriving at an answer. In this thesis, instead of arriving at final definitions 
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of these concepts, I will pay attention to how Heidegger’s philosophy can help us think about 
them. The purpose of this examination of Heidegger’s philosophy, thus, is not to arrive at an 
alternative definition of the word ‘nature’, but rather to follow his thought so that we can find 
ways of thinking about nature. Indeed, this idea of being on the way to thinking was 
important for Heidegger. He wrote his works as he was on a path to thinking about the 
question of Being. He called two of his important collections of essays Wegmarken which is 
translated as Pathmarks, and Holzwege, translated as Woodpaths. Heidegger himself said in 
his later years that his works should be thought of as ‘ways – not works’ (cited in Kisiel, 
1993: p.3). Approaching the concept of nature through Heidegger, then, means that I will not 
be presenting any exact definition of what nature is, and I will not be outlining any kind of 
criteria that can help us decide what is to count as natural in the thesis.  
    My way of thinking about nature also influences the form that my argument takes. Not 
being able to say what nature is makes talking about the concept of nature problematic. Ben-
Dor (2009: 371) describes this problem as ‘[t]he […] dilemma that Heidegger seems to be 
oppressed by, that is, how to say without killing the saying by turning it into a “said”’. So the 
problem which I have is that if I talk and explain too much what nature refers to, then I will 
no longer be on the way to thinking about Heidegger’s nature but I will have started talking 
about something else. To help me deal with this problem, I will use the apples that grow in 
my grandparents’ garden as an example to illustrate how we can start thinking about nature. 
This example will also illustrate my own journey of questioning nature that I have undertaken 
while writing this thesis. 
    Thinking of Being as something which does not describe the unfolding of nonhuman 
beings and of concealment as something which does not reside in a set of natural, nonhuman 
beings themselves will, in the end, allow for a different way of thinking about concealment, 
the earth, nature and the implications that Heidegger’s thinking has for green politics. In the 
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thesis, my engagement with Heidegger’s philosophy will lead me to argue that protecting 
nature has nothing to do with protecting some nonhuman environment or with preventing 
environmental degradation. Instead, it is about resisting technological thinking and about 
learning to dwell. Learning to question the unfolding of nature means to let beings be as they 
are, not seeing them merely as resources that we can learn to manage and regulate. This will 
allow us to live richer and more fulfilling lives. This does not mean that preventing 
environmental degradation is unimportant or something that should not play a part in green 
politics. Instead, it means that green thinking should be thought of as having two different 
goals, the goal of protecting nature and the goal of protecting the environment. These two 
goals together communicate what is at stake in taking care of our environments.  
    As a result of this different way of thinking about the earth, the sky and nature, or what 
Heidegger called by its Greek name phusis, I am also emphasising the significance of 
Heidegger’s earlier work, in particular Being and Time, to understanding his later work. 
Environmentalist readings of Heidegger often downplay this link, noting how environmental 
themes were not prominent in Being and Time (Zimmerman, 1990: 159). There are no 
references to the mysterious unfolding of the earth and the sky in Being and Time, and the 
few references that Heidegger makes to nature here are concerned with nature as a resource 
(Foltz, 1995: 28). But if the earth, the sky and nature do not refer to unfolding of a nonhuman 
nature, the inclusion of phusis and the earth and the sky in Heidegger’s later works does not 
signify a major revision of his earlier work. What changed in Heidegger later works was the 
way that he thought about Being. This reading of Heidegger’s work is justified by the fact 
that he himself insisted that the subject matter of his thinking did not change in his later 
works. Being and Time presented a necessary starting point for Heidegger’s thinking of Being 
and his way of questioning changed later because the language he employed in Being and 
Time was inadequate for grasping how beings appear to us as beings (LH: 250; BH: 159). 
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Because of this, my discussion on Heidegger will begin by examining how he starts to 
explore the question of Being in Being and Time as a way into understanding his later works.  
 
Limits 
Because the thesis focuses on thinking about the concept of nature in green politics, there are 
a number of topics in green politics that the thesis does not touch upon. Some might be 
suspicious of using Heidegger in order to make sense of green goals and of the attempts of 
green thinkers to overcome anthropocentrism by according intrinsic value to nature because 
Heidegger’s critics have argued that he himself was unable to overcome anthropocentrism. 
Heidegger (in)famously claimed in a 1929-30-lecture course Fundamental Concepts of 
Metaphysics that only humans can be thought of as having a world. Here Heidegger (FCM: 
185) claims that “the stone is without the world” and “the animal is poor in the world” 
whereas man is “world-forming”. Humans inhabit a historical community that allows for the 
appearance of the world. The world allows beings to appear to them as beings which they can 
engage with. But animals encounter the world differently. They are captivated by their 
environments. An animal can, through this captivation, encounter other beings, but its mode 
of encounter is different from the human one. The animal can only sense its immediate 
surroundings, its relationship to the world is determined by its instinctual drives, it does not 
have access to the beings themselves and it cannot grasp beings as beings (FCM: 249-50). 
According to Heidegger, then, ‘animal existence is a series of blind, non-conceptually 
mediated, instinctual reactions activated with the animal’s meeting up certain entities in its 
environment’ (Schatzki, 1992: 83). 
    For Heidegger, the animal and the human worlds are separated by an abyss: these two 
worlds do not differ in the degree of their richness of experience of the world but they differ 
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in kind: the world of the human is fundamentally different from the world of the animal 
(Calarco, 2008: 22).  This means that Heidegger draws very rigid dividing lines between the 
human and the animal worlds, he does not investigate the different ways in which different 
species of animals are in the world and the different degrees to which they can make sense of 
the world (Elden, 2006a: 275). In addition, living things which are not part of the animal 
kingdom and non-living beings are not even worthy of investigation in Heidegger’s account. 
This way of thinking about nonhumans seems to be in direct contradiction with green goals. 
Heidegger’s critics argue that the abyss between humans and nonhumans denies that there are 
similarities between animals and humans and makes communication between different 
species impossible (see e.g. Oliver, 2009: 206; Aaltola, 2002). Drawing these boundaries also 
makes possible the arbitrary discrimination of nonhumans because it allows for making 
distinctions between life that is worthy of respect and life that is not (Wolfe, 2003: 70). It 
might, then, seem that using Heidegger to think about nature makes it impossible to grasp the 
significance of the ecocentric arguments.  
    But what I intend to show in this thesis is that the question of whether we should adopt an 
ecocentric framework is a question which is separate from the question of nature. This means 
that whether or not Heidegger gave due consideration to the status of animals and other 
nonhumans is not relevant for the task of thinking about nature. Although Heidegger’s 
treatment of the human and nonhuman worlds is inadequate, because his philosophy is not 
meant to help us answer whether or not nonhumans should be seen as intrinsically valuable 
(see e.g. Foltz: 1992: 88; Smith: 2009: 30-1), this inadequacy in his works does not become a 
problem. So the question of whether it is desirable to extend the moral community to include 
nonhumans is not a part of the question of nature that this thesis is addressing, and using 
Heidegger to think about the concept of nature does not close off any avenues for 
understanding the role of ecocentrism in green thought. On the contrary, as I will demonstrate 
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later, this thesis can offer new tools to others for thinking about ecocentrism and 
anthropocentrism. 
    The second set of debates in green politics which this thesis will not touch upon are 
debates on the kinds of political structures that green politics should endorse. My discussion 
of the concept of nature will not directly inform green politics of the forms of democracy that 
can best protect the environment and it will not discuss the kinds of economic arrangements 
that are the most environmentally friendly or the kinds of communities that we should live in 
order to best protect the environment. In the final chapter, I will briefly discuss what kinds of 
political structures could best protect nature. But this discussion will be undertaken for the 
sake of suggesting new avenues for green thinking and demonstrating how green thinkers 
could approach the question of protecting nature, not for the purpose of providing a rigorous 
examination of these kinds of political structures. The main aim of the thesis is to inform 
these debates by attempting to understand when and how we should be talking about nature 
when thinking about them. 
    Finally, there are limitations in the manner in which the topic of Heidegger and the 
political is investigated in the thesis. There has been a lot of discussion concerning 
Heidegger’s engagements with politics and National Socialism in the 1930s and the role that 
the political plays in Heidegger’s writings throughout his works. Although Heidegger only 
engaged in everyday politics in the 1930s, Heidegger’s political project is seen to permeate 
the whole of his work.  Therefore even his early and later works are now seen as a part of the 
same political project that led him to support National Socialism (e.g. de Beistegui: 1998; 
Gordon, 2013; Polt, 2006: 227-236; Phillips: 2005). 
    The thesis engages with this literature concerning Heidegger’s engagements with politics 
and the role that the political plays in his writings, but it does not aim to discuss the role of 
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the political in Heidegger’s writings as such. This is because the thesis is concerned with 
green politics, and with how Heidegger can guide us in thinking about the everyday practice 
of green politics. The thesis, then, draws on the literature on Heidegger and the political in so 
far as this literature can help in thinking about the way in which Heidegger’s philosophy 
could influence the practice of green politics, and about the dangers in using Heidegger to 
think about this. Therefore, the thesis largely restricts the discussion of Heidegger and 
politics to examine his practical engagements with politics in the 1930s. It does not examine 
the role of the political in Heidegger’s writings as such, or the role of the political in 
Heidegger’s early or later writings. This is not because these writings are deemed apolitical, 
but because this thesis concerns itself instead with Heidegger's engagements in the practice of 
politics in his mid-writings. When thinking about the kind of politics that Heidegger’s 
thinking could guide us towards, the thesis does not aim to think describe any kind of politics 
that Heidegger himself would have agreed with, but think about a kind of politics aligned 
with green goals that Heidegger’s thinking could guide us towards. 
 
Thesis Structure 
The argument of the thesis unfolds in six chapters. Chapter One will begin by looking at 
green political thinking in more detail. This chapter examines what distinguishes green 
thinking from more traditional environmentalist concerns and what makes the concept of 
nature such an important one for green politics. It will identify different ways of approaching 
the question of nature in green politics and investigate how a concern for nature has been 
incorporated into green political theory. Ways in which the green conception of nature has 
been criticised will also be examined, as well as green responses to these criticisms. The 
chapter will conclude by demonstrating how greens have not been able to fully respond to 
their critics and by exploring how the role of nature in green politics remains a puzzle.  
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     Chapter Two will then begin examining Heidegger’s thinking in order to start thinking 
about the question of what the concept of nature refers to in green politics. It begins by 
introducing Heidegger’s thinking and investigates ways in which his thinking is often used to 
make sense of environmental themes. These common green interpretations of Heidegger’s 
thinking concentrate on his examination of phusis, the Greek word for nature, and the 
concealing earth, which plays a role in the happening of truth by always concealing beings 
from us. In these interpretations, nature is understood in a manner similar to more traditional 
green thinking. Phusis and the earth, in Heidegger’s thinking, are seen as referring to the 
spontaneous growth and flourishing of our nonhuman environments, environments that we 
cannot fully control and understand. To protect nature, we must protect the spontaneous 
growing and flourishing of nonhuman natural beings and understand that they are always 
partly concealed by the earth from which they grow, that we can never fully understand how 
they grow and develop. By investigating in more detail Heidegger’s thinking, the chapter 
will, however, demonstrate that this way of interpreting him contradicts his account of the 
happening of truth. It concludes by maintaining that a new way of thinking about nature in 
Heidegger’s work is needed, and suggests that his thinking can have more radical 
implications for thinking about nature than is commonly acknowledged.  
    Chapter Three will then undertake a more detailed examination of Heidegger's thinking on 
phusis and the unfolding of the earth. By examining in more detail how he talked about these 
concepts, the chapter presents a different way of understanding them, a way that no longer 
equates these concepts with the material growth and development of a set of natural beings, 
but now sees them as describing how all beings appear to us as beings. The chapter thus 
argues that the appearance of all beings as beings is the spontaneous growth of nature that 
green thinkers find so important, not the spontaneous growth and development of the 
nonhuman environment. This new way of thinking about nature no longer runs into the same 
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problems and contradictions as the more widespread environmentalist readings of these 
concepts that were encountered in Chapter Two.  
    Chapter Four explores the consequences of this way of thinking about nature further and 
looks at the relationship between practising environmental politics and protecting nature. It 
does this by examining Heidegger’s engagements with politics and by looking at the 
development of his thinking of the polis, the Greek word for city-state. Through these 
investigations, the chapter demonstrates that we can now divorce thinking about nature 
altogether from questions of environmental politics. The chapter will also explore further 
how we can begin to question the unfolding of nature by letting beings be and by learning to 
dwell on the earth and under the sky.  
    Chapter Five will investigate the relationship between dwelling, modern technology and 
tradition. Heidegger often privileged the rural when giving examples of how we might learn 
to question phusis and to allow for the unfolding of the earth. This raises concerns that even 
the way of approaching nature presented in chapters three and four is still subject to the same 
criticisms as the green approach to nature was because it privileges older, traditional ways of 
doing things and environments that we often think of as somehow nonhuman and more 
natural. But by investigating the roles that technology and tradition play in Heidegger’s 
thinking, the chapter demonstrates that we are not restricted to older, traditional ways of 
doing things in order to question and protect nature. We can engage with modern, technical 
devices while still questioning the unfolding of nature, and we can learn to dwell in 
environments that have been shaped by humans. Although Heidegger himself may not have 
recognised it, we can allow for the unfolding of the earth even in crowded urban areas. 
    Chapter Six will then look at how these reflections on the earth and phusis in Heidegger’s 
philosophy allow us to make better sense of the role that the concept of nature plays in green 
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politics. It begins by explaining how these reflections on the concept of nature do not mean 
that green politics should no longer concern itself with questions of environmental politics. 
Instead, green politics should be seen as having two different kinds of goals, the goal of 
protecting nature and the goal of protecting the environment. The chapter will explore how 
these two different goals do not have to be seen as completely separate but they can, in some 
circumstances at least, be mutually reinforcing. It also looks at where in green thinking we 
can locate this concern for nature and when we should and should not be talking about nature 
when discussing green concerns. The chapter concludes by investigating how thinking of 
nature as Heidegger’s phusis can open up new avenues for questioning and protecting nature 
in green politics.  
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Chapter One: Green Politics and Nature  
Introduction  
This chapter begins to explore what is at stake in addressing environmental problems and in 
taking care of our environments. Mainstream accounts of environmental politics maintain that 
addressing environmental problems should be about managing environmental resources. But 
dissenting green voices paint an alternative picture. Green thinkers maintain that thinking of 
environmental politics as resource management renders us unable to articulate what is at 
stake in protecting our environments and that thinking about environmental politics as 
resource management can even destroy what is interesting and important about our 
environments. Thinking of our environments as made up of resources which can be used by 
humans at will sees our environments as objects separate from humans. Greens challenge 
drawing clear distinctions between humans and nonhumans by maintaining that humans exist 
in different kinds of interconnected relations with their environments. If we investigate these 
interconnections, we begin to realise that nonhuman beings share many qualities which were 
previously reserved only for humans and it thus becomes difficult to draw these distinctions 
between humans and nonhumans. Therefore, environments are not just made up of objects 
separate from humans but have their own way of unfolding and flourishing that demand 
respect (e.g. Eckersley, 1992: 49). If we think about environmental politics only in terms of 
environmental management, we begin to destroy the spontaneous unfolding of our 
environments.  
    Green thinkers often express the importance of preserving this independent unfolding and 
flourishing they find in our environments by calling it nature, and explain how resource 
management forgets to look at our relationships with nature, to take care of nonhuman nature 
and to preserve the naturalness of our environments. Nature, however, is a complicated 
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concept that can have many different uses, and it is often difficult to explain what it refers to. 
Because nature is such a complicated concept, it is unclear what it means to investigate our 
relationships with nature and to protect nature. To better understand the arguments that the 
greens are making and what is at stake in protecting our environments, this chapter explores 
the extent to which the idea of nature can guide us to take care of our environments.  
    The chapter is divided into four sections. In the first section, I look at green political 
thought. I explore how showing concern for the relations between humans and nonhumans 
distinguishes green thinking from more mainstream environmentalism, and consider how 
green thinkers argue that investigating these interconnections between humans and the 
environment results in valuing nature for its own sake and in a new way of practising politics. 
In the second section, I go on to explore the idea of nature further, and explain how nature is 
not a nonhuman entity that we can accord intrinsic value to. The third section discusses how 
greens have attempted to grapple with the problems in talking about nature, and how we 
could explore the relationships we share with our environments without talking about nature. 
The final section will conclude by asking if talking about the relationships we share with our 
environments without talking about nature is able to touch upon all that is important in taking 
care of our environments. 
 
Green Thought 
Green political thought, as explained by Dobson (2007), is a distinct approach to political 
theory that explores how looking at our relationships with the environment can change the 
way in which we think about politics. It is often contrasted with environmental thinking. 
Environmentalists, as Dobson (2007: 2) explains, view environmental politics in terms of 
resource management. According to environmentalists, to help protect the environment, we 
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can, for example, change our habits of consumptions. To encourage people to do this, we 
could give private companies more incentives to behave in an environmentally friendly 
fashion and designate more of the resources of the government to managing the environment 
(Dobson, 2007: 2).  
    Greens, however, maintain that the measures proposed by environmentalists are not 
enough and concentrating on managing our environmental resources can even destroy that 
which is important about our environments. Nature, in these green writings, is understood as 
the nonhuman environment. This can be seen, for examples, in Rolston’s (1988: 43) 
description of nature as ‘a vast scene of birth and death, springtime and harvest, permanence 
and change; of budding, flowering, fruiting, and withering away; of processive unfolding; of 
pain and pleasure, of success and failure; of ugliness giving way to beauty and beauty to 
ugliness.’ Greens incorporate nature into their accounts on politics by investigating the 
interconnections that exits between humans and nonhumans, maintaining that humans and 
nonhumans do not exist as separate entities but share many different relations with each 
other. These relations are examined in many different ways (e.g. Barry: 1999; Eckersley, 
1992; Naess 1989; Plumwood, 2006) but what unifies these accounts is demonstrating that 
we should not view our environments solely as resources but should respect their growth and 
flourishing.  
    As Dobson (2007) explains, in addition to paying attention to the importance of nature, 
investigating the relationships between humans and nonhumans leads greens to differ from 
the environmentalist position in another important way: investigating these relationships 
changes the way in which we think about politics. Reforming our political structures is not 
enough if we wish preserve this spontaneous flourishing of our environments but we need 
new kinds of political structures to be able to take care of the environment. Thus, green 
thought can be characterised as a distinct approach to political theory (Dobson, 2007: 3). In 
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summarising the green position, Dobson explains that green thinking ‘holds that a sustainable 
and fulfilling existence presupposes radical changes in our relationship with the nonhuman 
natural world, and in our mode of social and political life (Dobson, 2007: 3).  
    There are many ways in which green thinkers have addressed the question of nature (e.g. 
Benton, 1992; Goodin, 1992; O’Neill, 1993) but in this chapter, I will focus mostly on 
ecocentric accounts of green politics. This is because ecocentrism is the most prominent way 
of using the idea of nature to explain why we should protect our environments. Criticisms 
that are made of ecocentrism here will be applicable to other approaches to nature as well. 
Ecocentrics argue that we need to overcome anthropocentric ways of approaching the 
environment and that we need to start paying greater attention to the interests of nature. 
Anthropocentrism signifies a kind of thinking which does not show concern for nature itself 
but values natural resources only in terms of the value they have for humans. It features 
prominently in the environmentalist approaches to environmental politics which concentrate 
on how we might better manage natural resources. Ecocentrics argue that the anthropocentric 
worldview is problematic because it can only give reasons for protecting nature in so far as it 
serves some purpose for humans and, because of this, it cannot keep any part of nature free 
from human interference (Sylvan, 2010: 98).  It fails to respect the integrity of ecosystems for 
their own sake, and values them only for the sake of the usefulness they have for humans. To 
overcome anthropocentrism, ecocentrics argue that we need to start paying greater attention 
to the interests of nature. This is because, according to ecocentrism, nature has intrinsic value, 
value in itself, irrespective of the usefulness that natural resources have for humans:  
[E]cocentric theorists argue that there is no valid basis to the belief that humans are the pinnacle of 
evolution and the sole locus of value and meaning. Instead, ecocentric theories adopt an ethical position 
that regards all of the various multilayered parts of the biotic community as valuable for their own sake’ 
(Eckersley, 1992: 28, emphasis original). 
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When we begin to recognise the intrinsic value in nature, we begin to treat nature differently 
and begin to protect nature for its own sake.  
    According to an ecocentric worldview, intrinsic value is not only accorded to individual 
nonhuman beings. Instead, ecocentrics adopt a more holistic worldview. They argue that 
attributing intrinsic value only to distinct entities approaches nature too atomistically and is 
unable to protect ecosystems and nature as a whole. For example, if intrinsic value were 
attributed only to individual entities, we would not be able to provide arguments for 
protecting endangered species. This is because we would attribute the same amount of 
intrinsic value to a member of a species that was found in nature in abundance as we would to 
a member of an endangered species (Eckersley, 1992: 47). To avoid these problems, 
ecocentrics attribute intrinsic value not only to individual entities but also to ‘populations, 
species, ecosystems, and the ecosphere’ (Eckersley, 1992: 47, see also Curry, 2006: 63). 
Thus, the aim of ecocentrism is to preserve whole ecosystems and whole species, not only 
specific living creatures in these ecosystems. 
    The ecocentric worldview provides one way of thinking about why I want to protect the 
apples in my grandparents’ garden. According to ecocentrism, my wish to protect the growth 
and flourishing of these apples is not rooted in thinking that they are valuable for humans. 
Instead, this belief has its roots in an intuition that the apples are valuable in themselves, and 
have a right to grow and flourish in their own way. But the details of this ecocentric argument 
still remain unclear. It is not obvious why I would come to think that the apples have value in 
themselves, and what the implications of this are.  
    To answer these questions, I will explore two ways of looking at the relations we share 
with the nonhuman natural world and two ways of outlining the ecocentric argument in more 
detail. I will look at an approach which concentrates on deriving rules by which we come to 
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value nature and at an approach which concentrates on how our experiences of nature guide 
us towards according intrinsic value to nature. Looking only at two approaches will, of 
course, limit my analysis, and will leave out other prominent approaches to ecocentrism such 
as Leopold’s (1987) land-ethic and ecofeminism (e.g. Plumwood, 1991; Mies and Shiva, 
1993). I have chosen to concentrate on these approaches for two reasons. First, they are 
popular approaches. Second, they offer two very different ways of thinking about 
ecocentrism and they thus allow us to explore a wide range of ecocentric arguments, traces of 
which can also be found in other approaches to ecocentrism.  
Rules-based Approach 
I will begin exploring ecocentrism by looking at the approach based on deriving rules for 
valuing nature. I will here rely for the most part on Robyn Eckersley’s outline of ecocentrism 
and on Richard Sylvan’s exposition of Deep Green Theory to make sense of this approach. 
The rules-based approach to ecocentrism attempts to explain ecocentric goals through the 
language of values, and uses logical reasoning to explain why we should begin to accord 
intrinsic value to nature (see e.g. Sylvan and Bennet, 1994: 139). The starting point for rules-
based ecocentrism is to look at our relationships with our environments, to observe that 
humans do not exist in the world as isolated entities but share multiple interconnections with 
the nonhuman world. Eckersley (1992: 49, emphasis original) elaborates by explaining that 
‘[e]cocentrism is based on an ecologically informed philosophy of internal relatedness, 
according to which all organisms are not simply interrelated with their environment, but also 
constituted by those very environmental interrelationships’. Investigating these 
interconnections leads to adopting the ecocentric position because it reveals that we can no 
longer draw simple dividing lines between humans and nonhumans. Eckersley explains this 
as follows: 
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Whatever faculty we choose to underscore our uniqueness of specialness as the basis of our moral 
superiority […], we will invariably find that there are some humans who do not possess this capacity or 
that there are some nonhumans that do (Eckersley, 1992: 49-50, emphasis original). 
 
Because we cannot draw these rigid lines between humans and nonhumans, attributing value 
solely to humans is arbitrary: ‘ [n]o simple species or subspecies, such as humans or 
superhumans, no single feature, such as sentience or life, serves as a reference bench-mark, a 
base class, for determining moral relevance’ (Sylvan and Bennet, 1994: 140). And to avoid 
arbitrarily according intrinsic value only to humans, we need to accord intrinsic value to 
nonhumans. 
    Eckersley goes on to explain that intrinsic value is accorded to all entities having the 
property of autopoesis, the property of ‘self-production’ or ‘self-renewal’ (Eckersley, 1992: 
60). These are entities that have a ‘coherently ordered system of goal-oriented activity that 
has a constant tendency to protect and maintain the organism’s existence’ (Taylor, 1986: 
122). This capability for self-production distinguishes living entities from machines. 
Machines might share some similarities with autopoetic entities because they behave in a 
purposeful manner, but they are different because their end goal is a goal that is external to 
them, their goal is not the renewal or the reproduction of the self (Eckersley, 1992: 60-1). 
Because populations, species and ecosystems can all be thought of as self-producing systems, 
this approach also allows us to accord intrinsic value to whole populations, to different 
species, and to ecosystems, in addition to individual autopoetic entities (see also Katz, 1997: 
ch. 3; Morito, 2003).  
    According intrinsic value to autopoetic entities now helps us move away from the 
anthropocentric worldview and allows us to find a new way of comporting ourselves towards 
the environment. Eckersley (1992: 28) explains that the ecocentric worldview inserts 
elements of empathy and caution into our relationships with nature. When we begin to focus 
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on the interconnections between humans and nonhumans, we begin to understand that nature 
has its own, complicated system of unfolding and flourishing. We recognise that nature is so 
complicated we can never control or regulate it. We also understand that because nature has 
intrinsic value, we should not attempt to control nature even if we could (Board, 2002: 45).  
    So what would thinking about nature in this manner mean for protecting the apples in my 
grandparents’ garden? Because we cannot draw clear dividing lines between the human and 
the natural world, the apple trees now have intrinsic value. The apple trees, as parts of nature 
and as autopoetic entities, are be valuable for their own sake and must be protected 
irrespective of the uses they might have for humans.  
    However, the practical implications of this approach to ecocentrism that tries to establish 
rules by which we can extend our moral community to include nonhumans become 
ambiguous when we begin to think about them in more detail. It is easy to think of a situation 
where our interest would clash with the interest of the apple trees. For example, could we, 
when cold, use the wood from the tree for fire? The practical implications of ecocentrism, 
then, are not self-evident because we cannot always, at all times, accord intrinsic value to all 
natural beings.  
    For ecocentrism to guide us in the way in which we practise politics, we must have some 
means with which to solve these conflicts of interest. To deal with these conflicts, ecocentrics 
often rank beings according to how much intrinsic value they have. Eckersley maintains that 
in order achieve this ranking, ‘the degree of sentience of an organism and its degree of self-
consciousness and capacity for richness of experience are all relevant factors (as distinct from 
exclusive criteria) in any ethical choice situation alongside other factors such as whether a 
particular species is endangered’ (Eckersley: 1992: 57).  
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    Ranking entities in this manner does not mean that we are reverting back to 
anthropocentrism, it does not mean that the interests of humans always trump the interests of 
nature because humans have a higher degree of sentience than nonhumans (Curry, 2006: 64). 
This is because, as Sylvan (1992: 222) explains, although value is distributed irregularly in 
nature, this does not mean that value is accorded to beings solely through an isolatable feature 
such as sentience. Instead, we must take the complex contexts in which beings exist into 
account. Thus, the interests of humans are not automatically valued higher than the interests 
of nature. As a guideline for deciding when we should take the interests of nonhuman nature 
into account and sacrifice our own interests, Eckersley explains that we need ‘to choose the 
course that will minimize […] harm and maximize the opportunity of the widest range of 
organisms and communities – including ourselves – to flourish in their/our own way’ 
(Eckersley, 1992: 57, emphasis original). Or, as outlined by Sylvan and Bennet (1994), what 
is needed is a change in our outlook and perspective and a shift in the burden of proof: 
‘[w]hat is required now is that reasons be given for interfering with the environment rather 
than reasons for not doing so’ (Sylvan and Bennet, 1994: 147). So this means that we can eat 
apples to nourish ourselves, but we must always give good reasons for consuming these 
apples. For example, destroying a large area of a local ecosystem in order to begin growing 
apples for profit would not be allowed.    
    Adopting an ecocentric worldview also has an impact on how we conduct politics. 
Environmental politics must now be able ‘to protect threatened populations, species, habitats 
and ecosystems where-ever situated and irrespective of their use value or importance to 
humans’ (Eckersley, 1992: 46, emphasis original). There are two practical implications that 
arise from this kind of attitude. First, we begin to show more concern for protecting 
wilderness. Ecocentrics support ‘the preservation of large tracts of wilderness as the best 
means of enabling the flourishing of a diverse nonhuman world’ (Eckersley, 1992: 44, see 
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also Mackey, 2004: 88). The reasons ecocentrics give for protecting wilderness areas are 
different from the reasons environmentalists have for protecting these areas. Ecocentrics 
promote the protection of wilderness for the sake of the organisms living in these areas, not 
for the sake of the recreational or economic uses that these areas may have for humans. 
    The second way in which the ecocentric worldview impacts our conduct of politics 
concerns the size of the human population. Reducing the number of humans living on the 
planet is an efficient way of scaling down our levels on consumption and thus, ecocentrics 
often advocate a reduction in human birth-rate (Sylvan and Bennet, 1994: 223-5; see also 
Dobson, 2007: 75-8). Because of this, some have accused ecocentrism of misanthropy. It is 
true that there are some more misanthropic strands of ecocentrism (see e.g. Linkola, 2002), 
but these views are in a minority. A majority of ecocentrics care for the flourishing of 
humans but also argue for a drop in the birth rate of humans in order to allow other species to 
grow and flourish as well: ‘[e]cocentric theorists see each human individual and each human 
culture as just as entitled to live and blossom as any other species, provided they do so in a 
way that is sensitive to the needs of […] other life-forms (Eckersley, 1992: 56, emphasis 
original). So, for example, it is not against the ecocentric principles to kill a wild animal 
attacking a human (Eckersley, 1998). We are only guilty of anthropocentrism if there is a 
possibility of reconciling the interests of humans and nonhumans and we ignore this 
possibility (Eckersley, 1998: 177). 
    Proponents of the rules-based approach to ecocentrism also concentrate on how taking the 
interests of nonhuman nature into account changes the way we conduct politics. Eckersley 
(2002), for example, outlines what a green state that is able to protect the interests of 
nonhumans might look like. These reflections on politics draw on political theory in order to 
understand how political structures could be transformed, and here the rules-based approach 
to ecocentrism itself does not directly inform us of the kinds of political structures that could 
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help us protect wilderness, reduce human birth-rate and protect nature. Ecocentrism can only 
tell us that nature should be protected, and that this goal should feature in the green agenda. I 
will return to discussing the kinds of political structures that have been proposed to help us 
accomplish these ecocentric goals later in the chapter. I will now move on to examine the 
second way of outlining the ecocentric argument, the approach based on our experiences of 
nature.  
Experience-based Approach 
The experience-based approach provides a different way of exploring the relationships we 
share with the nonhuman world, and a different justification for according intrinsic value to 
nonhumans. It does not concentrate on the rules by which we begin to value nature but 
concentrates on how our experiences of nature can lead us to accord intrinsic value to 
nonhumans. This approach features most prominently in the arguments of deep ecologists. 
Deep ecology was first introduced by Arne Naess, and has been developed further by Devall 
and Sessions (1985), and Warwick Fox (1990). My account of deep ecology here will rely on 
the most part on Naess’ influential formulation of deep ecology. 
    Similarly to those who rely on finding rules for valuing nature, the starting point for deep 
ecology’s questioning is to investigate the relationship between the human and the nonhuman 
world. However, deep ecology’s focus on investigating these relationships is different from 
that of the rules-based approach. Instead of attempting to find strict rules for how we should 
value nature, deep ecology focuses more on how the experiences that we have of these 
relationships changes the way in which we relate to nature. Experiences are important 
because deep ecologists do not think that things in the world exist as isolated objects. Instead, 
they are always parts of larger wholes. These larger wholes are something that cannot be 
explained with logical reasoning but are something that we must experience. So what does 
this mean?  
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    As an example of these larger wholes Naess (1989) looks at music, and explains that a note 
in a piece of music is only experienced as something beautiful when it is heard in the context 
of the whole piece. The environment in which we listen to the piece also impacts on how we 
experience it (Naess, 1989: 58). Naess thus maintains that ‘things cannot be separated from 
what surrounds them without smaller or greater arbitrariness’ (Naess, 1985: 45).  Naess wants 
us to start thinking about our environments in a similar manner, as wholes, and wants us to 
start thinking how we only exist as a part of these wholes. Naess explains that ‘A human 
being is not a thing in an environment, but a juncture in a relational system without 
determined boundaries in time and space’ (Naess, 1989: 79). But because these larger wholes 
are complicated, we cannot explain or understand them. Instead, we must experience them. 
Thus, we are a part of our environments, connected to animals, plants and ecosystems, to 
nature, and we can only grasp these larger wholes through our experiences of them (Naess, 
1989: 79).  
    Thinking of ourselves as parts of larger wholes changes the way in which we comport 
ourselves towards the environment. Because we are not atomistic individuals, we can no 
longer think of our interests in terms of narrow self-interests. Through our identification with 
nature, we come to notice how our interests and our satisfaction in life are linked to the 
interests of nature: ‘joy becomes, not my joy, but something joyful of which the I and 
something else are interdependent, non-isolatable fragments’ (Naess, 1989: 60-1, emphasis 
original). As a result of this realisation, we acquire a ‘deep seated respect, even veneration, 
for ways and forms of life’, recognise that humans and nonhumans have ‘an equal right to 
live and blossom’, and begin to accord intrinsic value to nature (Naess, 1973: 95-96). A deep 
ecologist thus ‘cares for and about nature, loves and lives with nonhuman nature, is a person 
in the “earth-household” and “lets beings be”, lets nonhuman nature follow separate 
evolutionary destinies’ (Devall, 1980: 303). 
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    So how does this approach help make sense of why I feel that the apples in my 
grandparents’ garden are important? Focusing on these larger wholes demonstrates that the 
apples are not just fruits with certain colours, weights and nutritional values. Instead, they are 
a part of a larger whole, and what counts is how I experience them in this larger whole. I 
cannot explain why the apples are so important to me through scientific language or through 
the language of values, but I can try to convey this by talking about how I experience them. 
As I take an evening walk in the quiet garden amidst the apple trees, listening to the leaves 
rustling in the wind, looking forward to autumn when the apples can be picked, I experience 
myself as a part of a larger whole, and the apples as a part of me. I want to take care of the 
apples because our interests are the same.  
    But although looking at these experiences of larger wholes tells something about why the 
apples are important to me, similarly to the rules-based approach, the practical implications 
of deep ecology are not self-evident. Experiencing ourselves as a part of a larger whole leads 
quickly to conflicts of interest that are similar to the kinds that the rules-based approach ran 
into. For example, it is unclear if I should use the wood from the tree for firewood and hurt 
the tree, an entity that I experience as being a part of me.  
     Naess does recognise that according intrinsic value to nonhumans can be contradictory, 
and that we cannot always attribute intrinsic value to everything. To solve these conflicts, 
Naess explains that we should accord intrinsic value to all parts of nature in principle while, 
at the same time, recognising that ‘any realistic praxis necessitates some killing, exploitation 
and suppression’ (Naess, 1973: 95). Critics have, however, argued that according intrinsic 
value to natural beings only in principle falls back to the anthropocentric position. It now 
seems that experiencing ourselves as parts of larger wholes is only a general principle and in 
practice we can ignore these experiences and hurt our environments (Humphrey, 2002: 61-4; 
45 
 
Katz, 2000: 36-7; Lee, 2009). So can Naess offer us some code of conduct that would prevent 
this experience-based approach from becoming anthropocentric? 
    Naess does not offer these codes of conduct, but this omission brings us to an important 
point in how Naess thinks our experiences can guide us toward protecting nature. Although 
Naess’ account lacks codes of conduct for valuing nature, his formulation of deep ecology 
does not fall back into an anthropocentric position. Rigid codes of conduct are not needed in 
order for deep ecology to avoid anthropocentrism because, once we experience ourselves as a 
part of the wider environment, these codes will come to us naturally (Fox, 1990: 217). Thus, 
deep ecology’s guidelines for protecting nature are based on our intuitions concerning the 
value inherent in nature, intuitions which we gain when we experience ourselves as a part of 
the wider environment (Rothenberg, 2000: 157; Milton: 2002: 74-6). There are no sets of 
rules that can guide us towards resolving the contradictions arising from according intrinsic 
value to nature. Instead, we rely on our experiences and intuitions to resolve these 
contradictions. So, as Fox (1990: 76) explains, experiencing ourselves as a part of a larger 
whole leads to a different kind of non-anthropocentrism than was discussed in the case of 
Eckersley and Sylvan. This kind of non-anthropocentrism focuses on our own self-
realisation, on learning how we are a part of a larger whole. Through this, instinctively, 
without rules and codes of conduct, we come to value nature for its own sake. So how, then, 
do these experiences guide us towards protecting nature?  
    Naess (1989: 85, emphasis original) maintains that we protect nature when we learn to 
perform what he calls beautiful acts:  
A person acts beautifully when acting benevolently from inclination. Environment is then not felt to be 
something strange or hostile which we must unfortunately adapt ourselves to, but something valuable 
which we are inclined to treat with joy and respect, and the overwhelming richness of which we are 
inclined to use to satisfy our vital needs.  
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Naess illustrates how these beautiful acts are not rooted in logical or scientific arguments by 
looking at the reasons that a conservationist, who has experienced himself as a part of a larger 
whole, and a developer, who still has an anthropocentric worldview, might give for building a 
road through a forest. The conservationist does not want the road to touch the centre of the 
forest but has difficulties explaining what this means to the developer: 
A conservationist sees and experiences a forest as a unity […], and when speaking of the heart of the 
forest, he or she does not speak about the geometrical centre. A developer sees quantities of trees and 
argues that a road through the forest covers very few square kilometres compared to the whole area of 
trees, so why make so much fuss (Naess, 1989: 66, emphasis original)? 
 
Thus, our experiences of nature guide the way in which we perform beautiful acts, and we 
can never coherently express these experiences through the language of values.  
    Developing ourselves and learning to perform beautiful acts also means that we do not 
have to sacrifice our own interests in order to take the interests of nature into account. 
Beautiful acts are undertaken because one is inclined to act in a certain manner, not because 
we feel that we have a moral duty to perform these acts (Naess, 2003: 67). Naess (1989) 
looks at cycling as an example. As we begin to reflect on our larger selves, we might decide 
to take up cycling. But we do not choose to cycle because we decide to give something up in 
order to protect the environment. Instead, we choose to cycle because of the pure joy we 
experience when pushing the pedal, because of the joy of experiencing cycling (Naess, 1989: 
76). This means that to act beautifully in my grandparents’ garden, we can still pick apples to 
nourish ourselves. But have to let our experiences of nature guide the manner in which we 
harvest these apples, we should preserve the heart of the place where the apples grow. Having 
a scientist explain to us how we can harvest apples sustainably does not yet guarantee that we 
are protecting nature and acting beautifully, we must rely on our own experiences of the 
garden for knowledge how to act.  
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   But what kinds of political structures can help us experience ourselves as a part of a larger 
whole? To learn to experience the intrinsic value in nature, we need to live in nature, to 
interact with it in our everyday lives. Naess explains that ‘[t]o only “look at” nature is 
extremely peculiar behaviour. Experiencing of an environment happens by doing something 
in it, by living in it, meditating and acting’ (Naess, 1989: 63). So this means that political 
structures must now be able to encourage these practical, everyday interactions with the 
natural environment that allow us to experience ourselves as a part of a larger whole. Much 
as in the rules-based approach, the protection of wilderness areas is emphasised: wilderness is 
where we can experience the wholeness of nature, it allows for ‘understanding how the 
mountains, the rivers, fish and bear continue on their own actualisation process’ (Devall and 
Sessions, 1985: 110). Deep ecologists also advocate a reduction in the birth-rate of humans 
because this would allow the nonhuman world to flourish in addition to the human world 
(Devall and Sessions, 1985: 72). 
    But these reflections that deep ecologists make on politics go further than the reflections of 
those who advocate a rules-based approach to ecocentrism. Differing from the rules-based 
approach, in the accounts of deep ecologists, our experiences of nature can directly inform us 
of the kinds of political structures that can help us protect nature. Deep ecologists thus go on 
to discuss the kinds of political structures that can help us protect nature. Naess suggests that 
place-based politics is well-suited for realising deep ecological values because it allows for 
more influence in the political decisions which shape our lives, thus allowing for more self-
determination and self-development (Naess, 1989: 142-3). Devall and Sessions (1988) also 
argue that cultivating ecological sensibilities means that politics must be place-based. This is 
because developing intimate connections with the land allows us to experience and learn 
lessons from nature. We can, for example, learn cultural practices from nature: ‘[r]ituals, art 
forms, distinctive ways of living and specialised terminology referring to land forms or 
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weather of relationships with the landscape’ (Devall, 1988: 64). These cultural practices help 
us live in harmony with other humans and with the landscape we inhabit (Devall, 1988: 65). 
Deep ecologists thus argue for developing an identity rooted in particular areas of the land, 
allowing nature to guide us in our decisions concerning what kinds of local communities 
would be most appropriate for us to live in (Callicott, 1997: 179, see also Devall and 
Sessions, 1985: 98; Devall, 1988: 57-69). Naess and Devall and Sessions, however, refrain 
from making any more detailed suggestions over the organisation of politics in these placed-
based communities. Because deep ecology’s emphasis is on our own self-realisation and 
growth, people must reflect on these questions themselves and draw on their own experiences 
of nature to find answers to them (Devall and Sessions, 1985: 158).  
    Although not strictly a deep ecologist, Kirkpatrick Sale (1985) shares a lot with deep 
ecology and has discussed in more detail how our experiences of nature can guide our 
conduct of politics by introducing the idea of bioregionalism. Bioregionalism advocates a 
place-based politics where the places in which we live are divided into different bioregions, 
into areas that are distinctive due to their natural characteristics. Bioregionalism strives to 
organise politics in such a way that we can live in harmony with the surrounding nature. It 
emphasises knowing the land in which we live, becoming  ‘conscious of the birdsongs and 
waterfalls and animal droppings’, gaining a better understanding of the specific location we 
should grow our food in and what resources the area has to offer for us (Sale, 1985: 44). 
Bioregionalism promotes the consumption of local foods and the usage of local materials, and 
is highly suspicious of modern technology. It is an interesting approach to green politics 
because it rests on an idea that we can learn from nature the best way to live in our 
surroundings (Dobson, 2007: 92). As Sale explains it, ‘our best wisdom does not come from 
without, but arises in the soul and is an emanation of the Earth spirit, a voice speaking 
49 
 
directly to us dwellers in this land’ (Sale, 1985: 41). So here, it is primarily our experiences 
of nature that are guiding the way in which we conduct politics. 
   
Social Construction of Nature  
Discursive Mediation of Knowledge 
So far these accounts of the importance of thinking about nature and the relationships we 
share with the natural environment seem reasonable. Ecocentric thinkers argue that the 
richness of the environment can only be preserved by according intrinsic value to nature and 
by recognising that according intrinsic value to nature changes the way in which politics 
should be practised. However, problems surface in these arguments when we begin to explore 
in more detail what the nature that ecocentrics are keen to protect is. The introduction already 
mentioned that nature is a complicated concept. I will here begin to explore some of these 
complexities in more detail and look at the kinds of challenges that these complexities pose to 
ecocentric thinkers. The idea that there is some homogenous nature we can protect has been 
challenged by those who adopt a constructivist approach to thinking about nature and argue 
that nature is not a nonhuman entity which has intrinsic value. Instead, nature is social. As 
Castree (2001a) outlines, there are two ways in which we can think of nature as social. First, 
nature is social because we cannot have neutral representations of nature, because the 
knowledge that we have of nature is socially mediated. And, second, nature is social because 
it has been materially produced by humans. 
     So, how is our knowledge of nature socially constructed? Cronon (1996) famously 
illustrates this by looking at how the notion of wilderness is employed in green thinking. 
Often, as was already seen in deep ecology’s accounts of nature, greens see nature as a place 
of peace and harmony. Cronon, however, demonstrates how this idea of wilderness is socially 
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constructed by looking at American National Parks. The preservation of American National 
Parks was inspired by the idea of a wild, pristine nature which needs to be preserved so that 
people living in urban environments can reconnect with it. But Cronon goes on to explain that 
nature has not always been thought of in this manner.  Wilderness can mean many things for 
us, and in the past it was often seen as something dangerous and undesirable (Cronon, 1996: 
70-1). Only through Romanticism and frontier ideology did wilderness come to be 
understood as untouched nature, as the last place where human civilisation has not yet 
damaged the earth, as the place where humans can live in harmonious relationships with the 
earth (Cronon, 1996: 73-9). Cronon thus suggests that this kind of a representation of nature 
as a place of peace and harmony does not describe nature as it is, but is a culturally mediated 
idea of what nature is like. 
    Thinking about how our knowledge of nature is culturally mediated also allows for a 
different way of thinking about why the apples in my grandparents’ garden are so important 
to me. It suggests that it is not some nonhuman nature that guides me to protect these apples. 
Instead, the apples are important because of socially and culturally mediated understandings 
of what they are. The apples remind me of the numerous pleasant occasions when I visited 
my grandparents in my childhood. The way I see these apples is also influenced by a 
romantic view of the countryside as a place where I can escape the noisy city, experience 
some of the peace and quiet of nature, and return to some older, traditional ways of doing 
things. So it now seems that the apples are not important to me because they are a part of 
nature but they are important because they embody all these different socially mediated 
meanings. 
    Investigating how our knowledge of nature is socially constructed poses problems for the 
ecocentrics who claim to be protecting the interests of nature. It is particularly problematic 
for deep ecologists. As was discussed earlier, deep ecology wants to focus on the experiences 
51 
 
that give us intuitions about nature. These experiences are gained without any mediating 
structures or abstract knowledge that might distort them (Goodwin, 2009: 165). But looking 
at how our knowledge of nature is socially constructed calls into question what the nature that 
deep ecologists experience really is. When deep ecologists are claiming that they are learning 
lessons from nature, is it the non-human nature that teaches these lessons or is it a culturally 
mediated understanding of what nature is that is teaching us?  
    Ignoring how our knowledge of nature is discursively mediated, assuming that we can 
learn lessons from nature, can be problematic and can have adverse effects for the way in 
which we protect the environment. It has, for example, led some green thinkers to assume 
that there exists an automatic link between indigenous practices and between protecting the 
environment (see Sagoff, 1996). Although indigenous populations have often developed 
intimate knowledge of their surroundings and might have some knowledge of what is 
required to take care of their environments, we should not equate sustainability with 
indigenous practices. As Gregory (2001: 90) explains, indigenous populations did not exist in 
perfect ecological equilibrium prior to colonialism: famine, deforestation and environmental 
degradation existed before colonialism. Making the link between indigenous practices and 
protecting the environment becomes even more difficult with contemporary environmental 
problems that have been produced through complex global networks, which transform these 
environments and put new pressures on them (Brown, 2009: 37). There are also challenges in 
determining what counts as local knowledge and how we define something as local (Forsyth, 
2003: 188-186-8). This does not mean that local knowledge is not important, that indigenous 
populations have not developed intimate understandings of how their environments function, 
but it means that having this intimate sense of place does not automatically lead to 
sustainable practices.  
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    Some green thinkers have rejected the ecocentric framework because they think deep 
ecology’s account of nature relies on socially constructed ideas of nature as a place of peace 
and harmony. These greens argue that we cannot derive meanings from nature because nature 
is meaningless, complex and unpredictable. John Barry (1999: 19) elaborates on this and 
explains that instead of nature being a homogenous, harmonious entity, nature is  
characterised by uncertainty, contingency and possible catastrophe, partly as a result of human 
transformative interests and practices, partly because of the limits to human knowledge of the world […] 
and partly because nature itself poses threats to our existence through “natural disasters” . 
 
With the environment being so unpredictable and complex, we can find different qualities 
within it. The environment can sometimes be stable and sometimes changing, sometimes 
unpredictable, causing great suffering, and sometimes peaceful and nurturing. We cannot 
know nature, and any meanings that we do find from it are not lessons that have been taught 
to us by nature but are, in fact, our own social constructions (de-Shalit, 2000: 100). 
Experiencing nature, learning from nature, then, cannot teach us how we should organise our 
lives and how we could learn to exist sustainably (see Taylor, 2000: 281-285).  
    Critics of deep ecology have also argued that deep ecology’s focus on how nature’s 
harmony and stability can guide our actions has meant that deep ecology is unable to make 
itself politically relevant. De-Shalit (2000: 46-7) maintains that deep ecology is not interested 
in protecting the environment at all. This is because it focuses on our experiences of the 
environment and on developing ourselves as a result. Deep ecologists are not seeking to 
address real environmental concerns, problems such as pollution and the extinction of wild 
animals (de-Shalit, 2000: 52).  Barry (1999), in a similar vein, argues that focusing on nature 
as a harmonious entity does not pay attention to the contingent and shifting relationships we 
share with the environment, and to how we could begin to live more sustainable lives today. 
Instead, deep ecologists dream of utopian communities that are able to live in perfect 
harmony with nature in some distant future (Barry, 1999: 19-20).    
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    A rules-based approach to ecocentrism is better equipped to deal with the constructivist 
criticisms. This is because it does not claim to be able to learn lessons from nature but simply 
acknowledges that nature has intrinsic value that should be protected. As Eckersley remarks, 
‘[n]on-human nature knows no human ethics, it simply is’ (Eckersley, 1992: 59, emphasis 
original). This means that, as was explained earlier in the chapter, for the rules-based 
approach, it is up to political theory to think about the kinds of structures which can best 
protect the interests of nature; nature itself cannot guide us in these decisions. This also 
means that constructivist arguments can be incorporated into rules-based ecocentric thinking 
and can even support these arguments. Curry (2008: 7) explains that acknowledging that 
nature has been discursively constructed does not yet mean that nature is only a human 
construct because natural beings can also participate in creating meanings. Therefore, looking 
at these constructed meanings can teach us something about nature itself. Accepting that our 
knowledge of nature is culturally mediated can also encourage us to allow nature to flourish 
in its own way and to treat it with caution:  
Indeed, the acknowledgement that the only nature that we know is a provisional, socially constructed 
“map” that is at best only an approximation of the “real territory” provides the basis of a number of 
cautionary tales as to how the “emancipatory project” might be pursued […] if it is acknowledged that our 
understanding of nature is incomplete and culturally filtered and provisional then we ought to proceed with 
care, caution, and humility rather than with recklessness and arrogance in our interactions with “nature” 
(Eckersley, 2002: 64-5, emphasis original). 
 
Constructivist arguments can guide ecocentrics to be more careful about the kinds of 
knowledge claims they make about nature, and can encourage ecocentrics to listen to a 
plurality of voices when thinking about how to best protect nature. Through this, they can 
provide reasons for paying attention to the complexity of nature and for treating it with 
caution. 
    This would mean that we could continue to protect the apples in my grandparents’ garden 
and accord intrinsic value to them even if our knowledge of the apples is discursively 
mediated. We now have to pay attention to how this knowledge is constructed, learn to listen 
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to different voices about the apples and through this, attempt to get closer to what the apples 
really are. This will allow us to better understand how we can protect them. But looking at 
how our knowledge of nature is discursively mediated is not the only way in which we can 
understand nature as being social. Nature can also be understood as social because it has been 
materially produced by humans. Looking at this aspect of the construction of nature poses 
more serious challenges to rules-based ecocentric thinking.  
The Production of Nature  
So what does it mean to say that humans have materially produced nature?  Neil Smith 
(1984), who explores the question of nature from a Marxist perspective, coined the phrase 
‘the production of nature’. Smith demonstrates how capitalist processes of accumulation 
order and mould our environments in order to incorporate them into capitalist systems of 
production (Smith, 1984: 47-6). Capitalism can transform landscapes in many ways. For 
example, forests are managed so that we can extract timber from them, land is used for 
farming to feed populations, and some areas of the environment are conserved in order to 
attract tourism. Accounts of the material production of nature have gained popularity and 
now extend beyond the Marxist framework. They demonstrate that capitalist processes alone 
are not responsible for producing nature, but scientific knowledge and technological 
innovations, for example, also participate in these processes (Castree, 2001b).  
    Concentrating on the material production of nature reveals that there are, in fact, very few 
places on the earth which have not been shaped by human actions. The national parks 
discussed by Cronon, which are usually thought of as natural, nonhuman environments, have, 
in fact, been constructed and maintained by humans (Cronon, 1996: 81-3). Cronon also 
demonstrates that countryside areas, which are often thought of as being more natural than 
urban areas, have, in fact, been produced and shaped by the same processes which sustain 
cities (Cronon, 1991). These kinds of arguments can be made about almost any entity that we 
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might think of as being natural. Braun (2009: 20, see also Demeritt, 2002; Hinchliffe, 2008) 
explains that entities such as plants and animals, which we conventionally think of as part of 
nature, have evolved and changed by interacting with human societies and technologies. 
Because humans have produced that which they call nature, it no longer makes sense to talk 
of nature as something nonhuman. We can of course argue that there are still areas where 
pristine nature does exist. For example, below the surface of the earth there is matter that has 
not been shaped by humans. But as demonstrated by Smith (1984), this does not undermine 
the production of nature thesis. These pristine areas are pristine only because they are 
inaccessible to humans, humans will never know these pristine environments and ‘have 
produced whatever nature became accessible to them’ (Smith, 1984: 57). This argument 
about the material production of nature is particularly important in the contemporary context 
where, due to advances in technology, humans are now transforming the whole planet, even 
its climate, leading some to postulate that we now live in the era of Anthropocene. 
Disciplines such as ecology and geology can no longer claim to be studying ‘natural’ 
processes but they must also take into account how human technologies and activities shape 
the earth (Crutzen, 2002; Steffen et al., 2011). So what does this mean for the way in which 
we think about nature? 
    Bruce Braun explores how recognising that humans produce nature means that we can take 
the constructivist arguments explored previously further. He argues that because nonhuman 
nature does not exist, our representations of nature are not something that we can strip away 
to reveal what nature really is like. Instead, ideological and cultural representations of nature 
are always needed for us to be able to talk about nature. Braun (2002, see also Braun and 
Wainwright, 2001) illustrates this by looking at how our understandings of rainforests in 
British Columbia have been constructed through historically specific discourses. The forest 
corporation that wants to use these forests for timber is keen to portray itself as practising 
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sustainable forestry. To achieve this, it produces an image of the forests as something wild, 
untouched by humans, which can be known and managed through scientific knowledge 
(Braun, 2002: 36-8). Environmentalists who oppose the forestry rely on a different framing of 
the forests. They frame the forests as a place of wilderness, as pure nature that has not been 
shaped by human culture, and should be left untouched (Braun, 2002: 88-103). But both of 
the depictions of these forests are produced to serve the interests of the parties that made 
them and exclude other ways of thinking about them. In particular, Braun highlights how 
these representations ignore the indigenous populations living in the forests. The framing of 
the forest corporation does this by not addressing these populations at all. The framing of the 
environmentalist groups does this by framing the indigenous populations as a part of nature, 
as a part of wilderness and as something primitive.  
    Because the pristine, natural forests do not exist, Braun argues that the rainforests only 
come into being as rainforests through these different kinds of representations. For the 
rainforests to exist, knowledge of them has to be produced through ideological struggles. 
Thus, Braun concludes that ‘there are many forests, not one; there are myriad ways in which 
the physical worlds of the west coast are imbued with meaning and intelligibility’ (Braun, 
2002: 258-9). We cannot talk about the forests as nature without culturally mediated 
understandings of what these forests are. There are no forests and no nature prior to the 
representations of forests and natures. We should consequently engage in questioning how 
the entities we think of as natural came to be understood as such in the first place, and 
examine the exclusions that these representations inevitably entail (Braun, 2002: 259).  
     Many different ideas are used to produce what we call ‘nature’, but the idea of something 
traditional as a part of nature is so common that it is worth exploring it in some detail. These 
romantic portrayals of nature often contain a yearning for past times and a need to connect 
with past traditions (Soper, 2011: 23). As a consequence, places are often framed as natural, 
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not through representing them as something untouched by humans, but by representing them 
as something old or traditional. As illustrated by Williams (1980: 77-79), environments that 
have been explicitly built and developed by humans come to be labelled by us as traditional, 
natural environments that need to be protected and preserved just as we wish to protect some 
‘nonhuman’ nature. Macnaghten and Urry explain: 
The rows of terraced housing thrown up during nineteenth-century capitalist industrialisation are now 
viewed not as an environmental eyesore, but as quaint, traditional and harbouring patterns of human 
activity well worth preserving. The shifts in reading are even more remarkable in the case of the steam 
engine in Britain, whose belching smoke is now almost universally viewed as natural, as almost part of the 
environment (Macnaghten and Urry, 1998: 19). 
 
Thus, many of the environments that we often think of as being natural are human 
environments framed as natural because they are seen as traditional. 
   This also means that the apples in my grandparents’ garden do not belong to a nonhuman 
nature. These apples have been planted in the garden by humans, the species of apple that 
grow there have been bred by humans and the garden in which the apples grow is taken care 
of by humans. I only think of the apples as a part of nature because of culturally mediated 
understandings of what counts as nature, which allow for thinking about gardens and the 
countryside as a part of nature. Part of the reason why I think of these apples as natural might 
also be because I associate them with particular kinds of traditional ways of existing in the 
countryside.  
    The idea that nature is materially constructed by humans challenges the rules-based 
approach to ecocentrism. Because nature is materially produced, contrary to what Eckersley 
claims, there is no truth of nature that we can get closer to by examining different views of 
what nature is like. Instead, cultural understandings and representations are always needed for 
us to talk about nature. The socially mediated meanings about the apples in my grandparents’ 
garden are not something that can be stripped away. We cannot get closer to what apples, as 
natural beings, really are like by reflecting on different understandings of apples. An apple 
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only is an apple, a part of nature, because of socially mediated understandings of what counts 
as an apple and a natural being. There is nothing about the apple itself that makes it natural. 
    If things that we normally understand as natural have been shaped by humans and if our 
understandings of which beings count as natural are always products of ideological struggles, 
if, as Castree (2005: 35) puts it, what gets labelled as natural is down to human convention, 
then this raises the question of why we should accord intrinsic value to that which we call 
nature. According intrinsic value to entities that we deem natural now seems arbitrary, and 
can pose problems to the way in which we practise environmental politics. Cronon, for 
example, is concerned that focusing on nonhuman nature and on protecting wilderness results 
in shrinking the scope of environmental politics. As we begin to concentrate on protecting 
areas that can be made to appear as natural, we ignore areas that cannot be portrayed in this 
manner. Focusing too much on the idea of nature, then, fails to look at how we should protect 
and care for those environments in which we live that are not part of what we think of as 
nature (Cronon, 1996: 89-90). This would, then, suggest that we should stop talking about 
protecting nature altogether. Timothy Morton (2007; 2010), for example, argues that 
environmental politics should no longer be about protecting nature but it should investigate 
the relationships that humans have with their environments. The concept of nature, for 
Morton, is dangerous, because it is an ideologically motivated concept that obfuscates what 
really is at stake in protecting our environments.  
    There are, however, good reasons for why ecocentrics are unwilling to let go of the idea of 
nature. Many are concerned that if we stop talking about nature and maintain that our 
environments have been produced by humans, we revert back to the environmentalist 
position. We will think that we can manage and mould our environments endlessly at will, 
and we will continue to view the environment as a resource to be consumed (Bailey, 2005; 
Dryzek, 2005: 53-63; Taylor, 1993). Soule (1995: 155-6, see also Proctor, 1998), for 
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example, explains that although humans have modified nature, nature still has its own way of 
unfolding spontaneously, independently of human involvements, and it is important to pay 
attention to this spontaneity if we want to take care of our environments. Sessions (2006), in a 
similar vein, argues that the constructivist arguments do not take into account that there are 
real entities in the world, entities that make up a part of the earth’s life-support system, which 
need to be protected. Humans have shaped nature, but they have not constructed all of it, and 
they cannot fully control and understand it (Sessions, 2006: 137). So although explaining 
what nature is seems difficult, talking about nature is still seen as important by green thinkers 
because it keeps us from reverting back to the anthropocentric view of the environment, and 
reminds us that our environments cannot be used and manipulated by humans without limits. 
So the role that nature plays in green thinking now becomes very puzzling. Nature seems to 
be both a problematic and an important concept, and many greens do not want to stop talking 
about nature because they do not want to think of our environments only as resources that can 
managed and controlled by humans as they wish.  
 
Hybrid Accounts 
Introduction to Hybridity  
But what if there was some way around these problems, what if we could investigate the 
different kinds of relationships we share with our environments and recognise the 
spontaneous flourishing of our environments without talking about nature? What if we could 
recognise that that which we conventionally call nature has been both materially and 
discursively constructed by humans, while, at the same time, recognising that real 
environmental problems exist and we cannot regulate and control nature at will?  I shall next 
investigate how Actor-Network Theory (ANT) offers this kind of approach to looking at 
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environmental problems. In the framework provided by ANT, natural entities do not exist. 
But this approach nevertheless avoids the anthropocentric position, it does not think that we 
can mould our environments at will and it maintains that looking at the relationships we share 
with our environments is important.  
    ANT is perhaps named in a misleading manner because it is not a theory but rather, it 
offers a framework for thinking about relationships between humans and the nonhuman 
world. ANT challenges the idea that entities can be divided into categories of natural and 
social, and wants us to start thinking of objects we encounter in the world as belonging to 
neither of these categories. This is because, according to ANT, entities we conventionally 
understand as natural and as social exist in complex networks with each other. The starting 
point for ANT is, as with ecocentrism, looking at our relationships with the environment and 
at how we exist in interconnected networks with other beings in the world. But ANT takes 
these explorations further than the ecocentrics do. Whereas ecocentrics argue that 
investigating these interconnections means that we need to start according intrinsic value to a 
certain class of entities, ANT claims that there are no stable entities we can accord intrinsic 
value to.  According to ANT, beings are constituted through the relations they share with 
other beings. Therefore, entities can no longer be seen as having certain qualities in 
themselves which would allow us to accord intrinsic value to them (Castree and Macmillan, 
2001: 211). Donna Haraway (1991) elaborates on this idea through the image of a cyborg that 
is ‘a hybrid of machine and organism’ (Haraway, 1991: 149). The image of a cyborg 
challenges the idea that a distinction can be drawn between ‘natural’ life and machines. 
Instead of thinking of the human and the nonhuman as two separate categories, we should 
think of them as always entangled together, thinking of beings as hybrids of things that we 
would normally divide into human and nonhuman categories. 
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    So what does it mean to say that entities are constituted through the relations they share 
with other entities? Whatmore and Thorne (2000; see also Whatmore, 2002) illustrate this by 
looking at elephants as an example. By investigating an elephant living in a zoo and an 
elephant living in the wilderness, they explain that there is no one elephant essence that is 
inserted into these different environments but elephants are only constituted as elephants 
through the relations they share with their surroundings. Elephants living in zoos are different 
animals from their wild counterparts. They ‘become habituated to a more impoverished 
repertoire of sociability, movement, and life skills’ (Whatmore and Thorne, 2000: 202). 
Although elephants in zoos might belong taxonomically to African Elephants, they are 
constituted as elephants through different kinds of relations than wild elephants, they are 
different elephants and could not survive in the wild (Whatmore and Thorne, 2000: 197). 
Whatmore and Thorne thus demonstrate how the properties of elephants are shaped through 
the contexts in which the elephant is situated; there is no stable elephant essence. 
    Looking at how things are relationally constituted has implications for how we think about 
nature. Because entities in the world are constituted through the relations they share with 
other entities, entities do not have any intrinsic qualities which allow them to be classified as 
natural entities. Instead of dividing entities into the categories of natural and social, ANT 
understands beings as hybrids that never belong to either one of these spheres. Latour (1993: 
2) lists forest fires threatening endangered species as one example of these hybrids that 
cannot be labelled as natural or as social. The forest fires have come into being through 
networked relationships with other beings. The forest fires exist as those particular forest fires 
because of the trees that grow in the forests and because of the animals living in those forests. 
But they also exist as those particular forest fires because of different processes that caused 
these fires to break out and because of processes that labelled the species in the forests as 
endangered and as worthy of protecting (Latour, 1993: 2). 
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    So, according to this point of view, it makes no sense to try to decide whether the apples in 
my grandparents’ garden are natural or social because they are made up of a complex 
network of things. The apples are those particular apples because they have grown in the soil 
of that garden, because they have been nourished by the sun and the rain in the garden. The 
apples are also those apples because they belong to a particular species of apple that has been 
cultivated by humans, because apple trees were planted in the garden by humans and because 
the garden is taken care of by humans. The apples only become apples through these 
different, complicated relationships, and they cannot be labelled as natural or social.  
    This approach allows for thinking about our environments as something other than a 
resource, and allows for exploring the different kinds of relationships we can form with our 
environments. This is because understanding beings as constituted through these networks of 
humans and nonhumans allows for recognising that humans cannot shape and mould their 
environments at will. According to ANT, it is not only humans that have a capacity to act in 
these networks but nonhumans possess this capacity as well. For example, an ANT-oriented 
study of a river restoration project undertaken by Eden et al. (2000) does not see this 
restoration in dualistic terms where social actors, the humans restoring the river, act to restore 
a natural entity, the river, back to its rightful, natural state. Instead, it describes the humans 
restoring the river as only constituting a part of the actors who participated in the restoration 
project. The restoration process was not a linear process where the plans of the restorers were 
executed without problems. The river itself had the capacity to act in the restoration process, 
and did not always easily allow for the execution of plans of the restorers (Eden et al. 2000: 
266-7). The machinery used for this restoration also had agency, as well as other 
environmental groups whose support had to be gained in order to make the restoration project 
possible (Eden et al. 2000: 267-8).  
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    Although Latour (2004) suggests that proponents of ANT should start practising 
environmental politics without making any references to nature, this does not imply thinking 
of environmental politics in terms of resource management. Our environments are not just 
resources for us to use as we will but ANT encourages us to treat our environments with 
caution. If it is not only humans who have agency and a capacity to act when an 
environmental policy is executed, then we need to be careful when we interact with our 
environments, and recognise that the way in which we interfere with our environments 
always carries an element of risk (Whiteside, 2006: 101-7, see also Wolfe 2010: 47). Instead 
of attempting to protect a nonhuman nature, we should take responsibility for the production 
of hybrid natures (White and Wilbert, 2009). 
    In addition to guiding us to treat our environments with caution, an ANT perspective can 
also guide us towards a different way of approaching environmental ethics, and offers an 
alternative to the ecocentric accounts of overcoming anthropocentrism by according intrinsic 
value to natural beings. ANT does this by complicating the question of who environmental 
ethics is for (Castree, 2003: 10). As Castree (2003: 10, emphasis original) explains:  
If those things that we conventionally call “environmental”, “natural” or “non-human” in fact exceed those 
categories […] then the question of who or what ethics is for or about becomes very complicated indeed. 
So complicated, in fact, as to defy mastery by abstract or general ethical principles. 
 
Environmental ethics would now be about investigating the complex networks of things that 
exist in the world and about deciding which networks can be accorded moral significance. 
We do not value a set of entities because of qualities that are intrinsic to them, because, for 
example, we deem these entities to be natural, but these valuations arise through an 
investigation into the networks they exist in. So denying that there exists a nonhuman nature 
with intrinsic value does not mean that we should see our environments as lacking moral 
significance (see also Rudy and White, 2013: 251-2).  
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Green Accounts of Hybridity 
Many green thinkers have taken note of these hybrid accounts of the environment, and are 
now moving towards investigating the relations between humans and nonhumans from a 
more ANT-oriented perspective. They are moving away from according intrinsic value to 
nature towards studying how our environments are populated by hybrids and towards 
thinking about how we might take responsibility for these hybrid environments (Dobson, 
2007: 49-51). The purpose of this section is to explore some of these arguments, to look at 
how these accounts make sense of the relations between humans and their environments and 
the kinds of environmental ethics and politics they advocate.  
    Again, the green literature that does not rely on ecocentric valuations of nature is vast, 
including, for example, examinations of political theory and self-interest (Hayward, 1995; 
1998) and pragmatist approaches to green politics which argue that because, on the practical 
level, adopting an ecocentric position does not change the way we conduct environmental 
politics, this ecocentrism/anthropocentrism debate can be side-stepped (e.g. Norton, 1991; 
O’Neill et al., 2008). I do not have the space to discuss all of these approaches here. Instead, I 
will concentrate on Val Plumwood’s account of hybridity and John Barry’s account of 
ecological virtues because they are both good examples of how the ANT-approach to the 
environment can be used to make sense of green politics. 
    Before investigating these green accounts of hybridity, it is worth pausing for a moment to 
look at how talking about taking care of the environment is different from talking about 
taking care of nature. I would like to borrow O’Neill et al.’s (2008: 1, emphasis original) 
definition of the environment to explain how this shift signals a change in the way we 
approach environmental problems:  
There is no such thing as the environment. The environment – singular – does not exist. In its basic sense 
to talk of the environment is to talk of environs or surroundings of some person, being or community. […] 
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In practice talk of the environment is at best a shorthand way of referring to a variety of places, processes 
and objects that matter […] to particular beings and communities. 
 
So here, I use the environment as a shorthand for those different surroundings we have, and 
protecting the environment as referring to different ways of taking care of these surroundings. 
Talking about the environment does not rely on an idea of a homogenous, nonhuman nature, 
but allows for thinking about the variable relationships we share with our hybrid 
environments. So how, then, do greens investigate these interconnections between humans 
and nonhumans, how can we let go of the idea of nature and find different ways of thinking 
about how to live sustainably in our environments? 
    Plumwood (2006: 52) elaborates on this question. She explains that showing concern for 
nature is not at the heart of green thinking, but it is studying these interconnections between 
humans and nonhumans that makes green thinking a distinct approach to politics. She 
identifies two implications that arise from focusing on these hybrid accounts of the 
environment. First, because of the interconnections between humans and nonhumans, it no 
longer makes sense to see the interests of humans and nonhumans as separate, and to divide 
environmental ethics into ecocentric and anthropocentric camps. Instead, we now recognise 
that environmental problems always embody both human and nonhuman concerns, and we 
are always attempting to make sense of both of these when solving environmental problems 
(Plumwood, 2007: 59, see also Humphrey, 2002). And second, focusing on accounts of 
hybridity draws greater attention to the kinds of relationships that humans form with their 
environments and to the kinds of duties born out of these relationships. Plumwood explains 
that if we focus on hybridity, ‘we must take account of context and acknowledge different 
cultures in widely differing ecological contexts, nutritional situations and needs’ (Plumwood, 
2007: 58). Thus, these green hybrid accounts of the environment do not attempt to arrive at 
any over-arching codes of conduct, but they recognise that these codes of conduct are always 
context-specific.  
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    Plumwood explores animal rights as an example of what this kind of thinking would mean 
in practice. Plumwood’s account does not advocate becoming vegan in order to protect the 
intrinsic value of nature but encourages us to recognise that we always use and exploit other 
animals and our environments; simply ceasing to consume animal products is not going to 
change this (Plumwood, 2007: 56). Instead of finding over-arching codes of conduct to 
protect animals, codes for behaviour towards animals are now derived by undertaking a more 
detailed exploration of our relationship with animals. So instead of advocating veganism to 
protect the intrinsic value of nature, Plumwood (2007: 57) proposes a semi-vegetarian 
approach that ‘advocates an end to factory farming and great reductions in first-world meat 
eating, but could still see a place for respectful and mutual forms of use in the food chain.’ 
Deciding when we can consume animal products would require taking into account the 
context in which these products are consumed, acknowledging the needs of different cultures 
in which humans are embedded and their different nutritional needs (2007: 57-9). So beings 
no longer have ethical significance because they are deemed to be natural entities but instead, 
how we value these entities is decided by looking at the contexts in which we encounter 
them.  
    John Barry (1999) approaches environmental ethics in a similar manner. He argues that 
because the interests of humans and nature are interconnected, it makes no sense to separate 
the interests of nature from the interests of humans (Barry, 1999: 35). Barry also argues that 
because nature is not a homogenous entity with which we can live in harmony, we should no 
longer be aiming to provide a reliable, systematic code of conduct to help us protect nature. 
Instead, we should recognise that our relationship with nature is always contingent and 
changing (Barry: 1999: 19). Barry’s focus on these complex and changing relationships leads 
him to argue that we can protect the environment through the development of ecological 
virtues. Developing ecological virtues can help us protect the environment because they are 
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‘related to socio-environmental relations in which human self-interest and well-being are 
fulfilled by modes of interaction which minimize harm to […] the nonhuman world as much 
as possible without sacrificing serious human interests’ (Barry, 1999: 35). Because virtue 
ethics does not concentrate on developing pre-determined ethical norms but looks at the 
processes through which nature is valued, it recognises that there can be many ways of 
thinking about relationships between humans and the environment (Barry, 1999: 34). Virtue 
ethics draws attention to the different relationships that humans have with different parts of 
nature, to how they relate, for example, in different ways to trees and to viruses and how they 
consequently treat different parts of nature in different ways (Barry, 1999: 50).  
    Barry also explains how this focus on developing ecological virtues can influence the way 
in which we think about the kinds of political structures that help us build sustainable 
communities. Barry, for example, sees democracy as playing an important part in realising 
green values. Democracy is important because we cannot know what nature is like. Because 
of this, a sustainable society that is able to protect nature is open to debate, and requires 
collective discussions concerning what counts as a sustainable society (Barry, 1996: 116). 
Barry (1996: 135) argues that democracy has the potential to make processes causing 
environmental degradation more transparent, it ‘makes relations of interdependence more 
transparent and makes processes and agents of decision making more open, public and (in 
theory at least) accountable’. Thus, democracy is proposed as a means of promoting green 
values because we exist in complex networks with nonhumans and because it is difficult to 
identify what the nonhuman nature that we are supposed to protect is. 
    Some of the ecocentric approaches to nature also show sensitivity to accounts of hybridity, 
and could adapt to incorporating hybrid accounts of the environment into their theories. This 
is the case in particular for the rules-based approach to ecocentrism. Similarities to the hybrid 
accounts can already be seen in the manner in which the rules-based approach deals with 
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conflicts of interest. As was explained earlier, there are no strict rules for deciding when to 
favour the interests of humans over the interests of nonhumans but deciding when to do this 
is context-dependent. These commonalities with hybrid approaches become more pronounced 
in Eckersley’s account of green politics as she begins to explore the kinds of political 
structures which can help us protect nature. These were already mentioned briefly earlier in 
the chapter, but it is now time to discuss them in more detail. Although Eckersley talks about 
attributing intrinsic value to nature, her accounts of the kind of politics that is able to 
safeguard the interest of nature is sensitive to many of the arguments made by proponents of 
hybridity. Eckersley’s approach to nature will still remain distinct from those green thinkers 
who maintain that the interests of humans and nonhumans are so intimately linked that their 
interests converge and it makes no sense of talk about human and nonhuman interests 
separately1. This is because Eckersley wants to value nonhumans for their own sake. But the 
manner in which Eckersley explores the kinds of political structures which can help protect 
the interests of nonhumans is similar to how hybrid approaches discuss these topics. This is 
evident in particular in her account of democracy. 
    Eckersley argues that in order to take the interconnections that humans share with 
nonhumans into account in democratic decision-making, we must move away from our 
current model of democracy towards a more inclusive form of democracy. Eckersley calls 
this more inclusive form of democracy ecological democracy. The principle underpinning 
ecological democracy is that all those who are affected by decisions made by the state should 
be able to meaningfully participate in decision-making (Eckersley, 2004: 110). This means 
that democratic processes would extend beyond the territorial boundaries of the nation-state, 
and would also cross species-boundaries. Ecological democracy must not only include those 
capable of communication in the decision-making processes but should extend these 
                                                
1 See Whiteside (2002: 136-7) for a discussion on how an ANT-oriented approach’s stance on this question is 
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processes to include parts of nature (Eckersley, 2004: 112). This inclusion would be 
accomplished through select humans representing the interests of nature in decision-making, 
transforming notions of political trusteeship (Eckersley 2004: 120). Democratic decision-
making would aim to be consensual, based on processes of deliberation and negotiation, 
which would allow participants to understand each other’s points of view (Eckersley, 2004: 
129-130). In this model of democracy, nonhumans would no longer be treated in instrumental 
terms but humans would work towards negotiating mutual understandings about the common 
norms underpinning a sustainable society, inserting empathy and caution into the relationship 
between humans and nature (Eckersley, 2004: 119). Eckersley’s approach to ecological 
democracy shares many similarities with ANT-oriented approaches to taking care of the 
environment. How we show concern for nonhumans is not pre-determined but is dependent 
on processes of deliberation that explore our relationships with the nonhuman world. It 
would, then, be possible for these deliberations to take place without talking about nature: 
instead of exploring our relationships with the nonhuman natural world, we could concentrate 
on exploring our relationships with nonhumans. 
    So how would this kind of account of hybridity, which acknowledges that the apples in my 
grandparents’ garden are neither natural nor social, guide us towards taking care of these 
apples? The apples might be seen as worthy of protecting because they are a part of a certain 
way of living in the Finnish countryside, and upholding this way of living can be important 
for the quality of life for many. We might also feel that we have a responsibility for these 
apples and the environment in which they grow, not because these apples are natural, but 
because we have grown and cultivated them. There are, then, many ways to make green 
arguments and show concern for apples without talking about nature and without labelling 
apples as natural. Anthropocentrism can be overcome not only through the ecocentric 
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approach, but also by investigating the relationships we share with our environments in more 
detail.  
     
Hybridity and Nature 
We can, then, talk about taking care of our environments without appealing to the idea of 
nature. But does this now mean that nature is not a useful concept for green politics at all? 
The fact that even green thinkers who reject the ecocentric framework still frequently refer to 
nonhuman nature and talk about protecting nature suggests that this is not the case. It seems 
that the concept of nature still remains important for green thinkers and communicates 
something about green goals. For example, although Barry does not think that nature is a 
homogenous entity, which can teach us lessons about how we should conduct environmental 
politics, he nevertheless continues to talk about nature. Instead of proposing that we begin to 
explore our relationships with our environments, Barry still wants to explore our relationship 
with a heterogeneous nature. 
   But why does the idea of nature continue to re-appear in green thinking, why does it seem 
to be such an important concept and what does it refer to? This concept seems to 
communicate that there is something more at stake in protecting our environments than can 
be articulated through the language provided by ANT. Tere Vaden (2010) hints at this by 
maintaining that there are two reasons for why we need to act to protect the environment. We 
need to protect it because if environmental degradation continues at the current rate, soon 
there will not be enough resources left for us to exist on the planet. And we also need to 
protect it because we do not want to live in a society which treats the environment as a 
resource. Even if this would allow for perfectly regulating and limiting environmental 
degradation, it would not be a desirable world to live in (Vaden, 2010: 8). And as Sagoff 
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illustrates, protecting nature is not just about fighting environmental degradation but it is also 
about taking care of the places in which we live: ‘[m]uch of what we deplore about the 
human subversion of nature – and fear about the destruction of the environment – has to do 
with the loss of places we keep in shared memory and cherish with instinctive and collective 
loyalty’ (Sagoff, 1996: 249). So it seems, then, that there is something important about the 
concept of nature, that protecting nature goes beyond preventing environmental degradation 
and beyond extending the moral community to include nonhumans. These kinds of feelings 
are expressed well by Mick Smith who writes that:  
Like many interested in developing environmental ethics I want to argue that the natural world does mean 
something to me. Springs do in some sense “speak” to me, they affect me, move me, altering my 
understanding of my relations to my surrounding environment (Smith, 2005: 222, emphasis original).  
 
Nature is not just something we can ignore and replace with ANT-inspired reflections on 
environmental degradation or alternative environmental ethics. 
    Returning to the example of the apple trees in my grandparents’ garden once more, what is 
missing from the hybrid account of apples, what is left out of the account of the apples if we 
do not talk about nature? The hybrid approach can overcome thinking about these apples 
merely as resources, and is able to explore how they can play a part in my life in a multitude 
of ways. But unlike the ecocentric approaches, particularly deep ecology’s accounts of 
nature, which were able to communicate something about the sense of wonder in 
encountering the apples, the hybrid approaches are unable to do so. Talking about nature 
enabled me to communicate something about the experience of encountering these apples that 
is difficult to put into words, but that can nevertheless motivate and inspire me to protect 
them. So, it seems that there is something lacking in the way I think about the apples if I do 
not refer to the idea of nature. 
    But this still does not answer the question of what this thing called ‘nature’ is, and how we 
might talk about it without encountering the problems discussed in this chapter. Because this 
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experience of nature seems to be so difficult to articulate, I do not think that we should be 
looking for any way of strictly defining and explaining what nature is. Part of what makes 
this concept seem so important is that it is mysterious, that we cannot fully explain or 
understand what it is. Curry (2006), for example, explains that the ambiguity of the concept 
of nature is the reason it still plays an important role in green politics. Thinking about how to 
best protect nature, that we cannot fully make sense of, reminds us how the value of our 
environments ‘cannot be fully explained, analysed or justified in terms of other concepts or 
values’ (Curry, 2006: 104). So instead of defining what nature is and explaining what counts 
as nature, I would like to, in this thesis, find tools for starting to think about nature, for 
understanding where we should look to experience nature and how we could go about 
protecting it. 
   To start thinking about this experience of nature, I will, in the next chapter, turn to the 
philosophy of Martin Heidegger. Heidegger is a philosopher who shares many similarities 
with green thinkers. He urges us to let beings be, to allow them to unfold in their own distinct 
ways, to not dominate beings but to care for them as the beings that they are (Zimmerman, 
1992: 249-50). As was already explored in the introduction, the reason why Heidegger’s 
philosophy might be particularly useful in making sense of the concept of nature in green 
politics can be seen in how he thought about language. Heidegger did not think that language 
is an instrument for us, he did not think that when we use words, we know the meaning these 
words have for us. For Heidegger, when we use a particular word, we can never fully explain 
or understand why it was appropriate to use that word in a particular context. Thus, he 
claimed that language speaks to us. So maybe it is the case that even if we cannot say what 
the word ‘nature’ means, this word is speaking to us in green politics. We can, then, use 
Heidegger’s philosophy to begin to listen to this word, and to start thinking about what it 
really is that this word is communicating to us.  
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Conclusion  
This chapter has explored the role that the concept of nature plays in green thought. It began 
by exploring ecocentric arguments seeking an alternative to anthropocentric attitudes towards 
the environment. Ecocentrics attempt to overcome anthropocentrism by maintaining that 
nature has intrinsic value and is worthy of protection for its own sake. The chapter then went 
on to challenge the idea that there exists some nonhuman nature that we can accord intrinsic 
value to. Nature, according to critics, is not nonhuman, but it has been both discursively and 
materially produced by humans. Ecocentric approaches to green politics are unable to grapple 
with these criticisms of the idea of nature. As a result, many greens have started looking at 
the relationships we share with our environments through the idea of hybridity. These hybrid 
accounts are able to explain how we can show care for our environments without referring to 
the idea of nature. But the chapter concluded by looking at how, although these hybrid 
accounts are able to overcome the problems involved in talking about nature, they were 
unable to convey the sense of wonder present in our experiences of our environments. It 
seems, then, that we lose something important when we let go of the idea of nature. It is the 
purpose of the chapters that follow to explore what it means to protect nature if it does not 
mean taking care of a nonhuman environment, and how we can talk about protecting nature 
without encountering the problems that were discussed in this chapter. The next chapter will 
begin this task by starting to explore the philosophy of Martin Heidegger. 
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Chapter Two: Heidegger and Green Politics: An Initial Interpretation   
 
Introduction  
The previous chapter began exploring the role that the concept of nature plays in green 
politics and concluded that this role is a puzzle. Green thinkers separate themselves from 
environmentalists, who aim merely to manage natural resources efficiently to satisfy the 
needs of humans, by concentrating on investigating the relationships we share with our 
environments, often according intrinsic value to nature. However, greens are unable to fully 
respond to the challenges posed by those who maintain that we cannot draw clear distinctions 
between human and nonhuman environments: they are unable to explain what exactly these 
natural beings which they want to protect are, and how they can be distinguished from things 
that are not part of nature. Abandoning the concept of nature does not solve these problems 
because, even if green thinkers are unable to explain what nature is, protecting nature still 
remains an important part of green politics. Talking about nature communicates something 
important about the richness of the environment and about the importance of protecting it, 
which cannot be expressed through the language of environmental politics.  
    To start making sense of what it means to protect nature, this chapter turns to the 
philosophy of Martin Heidegger. Heidegger’s philosophy, that concentrates on asking the 
question of Being, also discusses the unfolding of nature and the sky and the earth, and 
explores how we might start to dwell on the earth. As such, it contains many environmental 
themes. The way in which Heidegger questions Being can help us think about what nature is 
because it suggests that maybe we do not have to clearly define nature to be able to protect it. 
Instead, thinking of nature as something that cannot be fully defined nor understood can bring 
about new ways of thinking about nature and green politics. In this chapter, I will present my 
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initial interpretation of Heidegger’s thought and my initial understanding of how he can help 
us understand the role of nature in green politics. There are two reasons why I am presenting 
only an initial interpretation. First, although the interpretation presented here leaves some 
themes underdeveloped, it serves as a good introduction to Heidegger’s thought and allows us 
to start thinking about the concept of nature. Second, this kind of reading of Heidegger is also 
adopted by many green thinkers themselves and looking at how he has been used in green 
thought aids us in thinking about the concept of nature in green politics. But, as will be 
demonstrated at the end of this chapter, investigating these green accounts in detail also 
reveals problems in this interpretation of Heidegger and highlights a need to move to a 
different way of thinking about his philosophy and about the role of nature in his thought. 
    This chapter is divided into six parts. I first introduce Heidegger’s philosophy and look at 
what it means to question Being. The section that follows then begins to explore Heidegger’s 
thought by looking at how he asks the question of Being in Being and Time. The third section 
looks at how Heidegger questioned the truth of Being in his middle work, and how he 
thought that this truth is revealed to us differently in different historical periods. The fourth 
section explores Heidegger’s later work and looks at how technological thinking dominates 
the revealing of Being in the current age, and the fifth section explores how we can overcome 
technological thinking by learning to dwell in the fourfold of the earth, the sky, the gods and 
the mortals. And finally, in the sixth section, I will look at how Heidegger’s thinking has 
been adopted by green thinkers and explore the problems that these green interpretations run 
into, suggesting that a new way of thinking about the nature in Heidegger’s works is required.  
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Heidegger’s Question of Being  
The central focus of Heidegger’s work is to question Being. The question of Being is the 
question of ‘that which determines entities as entities, that on the basis of which entities are 
already understood’ (BT: 25-26; SZ: 8). It is a question of how the presence of beings occurs, 
why it is that we can encounter beings as beings at all (Sheehan, 2011: 19). Beings, for 
Heidegger, refer to material entities and to immaterial things and concepts that we use to 
make sense of the world. Perhaps the best way into understanding the kind of questioning that 
Heidegger is undertaking is to look at how, according to Heidegger, philosophy has forgotten 
to ask the question of Being. Pre-Socratics were not yet overtaken by the forgetfulness of 
Being, they were struck by the wonder that beings are without explaining their presence by 
referring to other beings. However, philosophy has, since pre-Socratic thinkers, been pre-
occupied with categorising beings, and when it has asked about Being, it has reduced Being 
to another kind of being. It thus has not asked the question of Being in the way that 
Heidegger wishes to ask it.  
    This started with Plato, for whom the eternal forms, certain kinds of beings themselves, 
make beings accessible to us and allow beings to appear as beings. For Plato, beings always 
correspond to their eternal and unchanging form that gives them their essence. In Christian 
theology, Being is understood as another kind of being because beings are understood as 
something created by the eternal God. God, then, becomes the being that is the cause of all 
other beings. Finally, Descartes, in order to explain what allows a being to appear, argues that 
beings have objective qualities, such as colour and weight, and qualities that are determined 
by subjective interpretation. These objective qualities allow beings to be as they are, and it is 
the task of the human subject to separate objective qualities of beings from their subjective 
qualities. All of these accounts explain why beings can appear to us as beings by focusing on 
another kind of being: Plato does this by focusing on the eternal forms, Christian theology by 
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arguing that beings are created by God and Descartes by maintaining that beings have 
objective qualities that can be known by the human subject. Philosophy has thus forgotten to 
ask the question of Being.  
    Questioning Being is therefore an attempt to move away from asking questions about the 
properties of beings. It entails asking what it means to claim that beings are in the first place, 
what grounds their presence, without reducing Being to another kind of being. I have chosen 
to capitalise the word ‘Being’ here although this choice is somewhat controversial. This word 
is capitalised in the original German because in German all nouns are capitalised. Many (e.g. 
Dreyfus, 1991: 11; Zimmerman, 1990: xxii) have, however, argued that this word should not 
be capitalised in English, explaining that it is misleading because a capital B suggests that 
Heidegger’s Being is a being itself.  My purpose in capitalising Being, however, is to 
distinguish it from ‘being’, used as a verb, and not to imply that Being is another kind of 
being (see e.g. Capobianco, 2010: 7-9; Young, 2002: 13). 
    But how can we go about questioning Being? In What is Called Thinking Heidegger 
elaborates on this in the following passage:  
There is a tree in the yard. We state: the tree is well-shaped. It is an apple tree. This year it did not bear 
many apples. The birds like it. The apple-grower still has other things to say about it. The scientific 
botanist who conceives of the tree as a plant, can point out a variety of things about the tree. And finally 
there comes along a strange and curious human being and says: the tree is, it is not so that the tree is not 
(WCT: 173; WHD: 106). 
 
This is the question of Being that Heidegger is asking: ‘what about this “is,” according to 
which it is not so that the tree is not’, why is the apple tree, or any other kind of being, 
present to us as a being (WCT: 173; WHD: 107).  So how does Heidegger inquire about the 
‘is’? It is important to note that the question of Being is not a question of finding some 
essence that is in all beings that allows them to appear as beings and exists independently of 
the attributes of beings. This kind of questioning would approach Being as another kind of 
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being, and is the kind of questioning of Being that has taken place throughout the history of 
philosophy and that Heidegger is critical of. At this point, the final phrase of the passage, 
Heidegger’s addition of ‘it is not so that the tree is not’ may sound peculiar, but I will return 
to exploring the significance of this ‘not’ later on in the thesis. For now, this phrase can be 
thought of as an attempt to further awaken us to question the fact that beings are. 
    This passage demonstrates how questioning Being cannot, in the end, be understood as 
something that is completely separate from questioning beings: Heidegger is asking about 
what makes possible the is, but, at the same time, he maintains that, because Being itself is 
not something, we can only think about Being through our encounters with beings that are 
something. Heidegger thus explains that what is asked is not about ‘what is present as such 
and not Being as such, nor both added together in a synthesis, but: their duality, emerging 
from their unity kept hidden’ (WCT: 242; WHD: 148).  The question of Being is a question 
of how beings appear to us as beings. Asking this question requires us to stay with beings and 
to question them. What it means to stay with beings will become clearer as the argument of 
the thesis progresses. 
    Because Being itself is not another kind of being, we cannot think about Being in a manner 
in which we normally think about beings. Being is not a thing that we can define, or explain: 
‘we cannot apply to Being the concept of “definition” as presented in traditional logic’ (BT: 
23, SZ: 5-6). Being must be questioned in such a way that it is not reduced to another kind of 
being, understood as something that itself is not a being:  
In relating to it, whether theoretically or practically, we are comporting ourselves toward a being. Beyond 
all these beings there is nothing. Perhaps there is no other being beyond what has been enumerated, but 
perhaps, as in the German idiom for ‘there is’ es gibt [literally,‘it gives’], still something else is given. 
Even more. In the end something is given which must be given if we are to be able to make beings 
accessible to us as beings and comport ourselves toward them, something which, to be sure, is not but 
which must be given if we are to experience and understand any beings at all (BPP: 10, GP: 13-14, 
emphasis original). 
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But this does not mean that we cannot inquire about Being. Instead, it means that we need a 
different way of asking about Being. In order to avoid thinking about Being as another kind 
of being, we must learn to question Being or to think about Being. Particularly in Heidegger’s 
later writings, thinking about Being takes a form that is different from how philosophical 
works are conventionally understood. Heidegger talks about the differences between how he 
wants to approach thinking, in terms of thinking about Being, and thinking, as it is 
understood traditionally, when we grapple with scientific problems or everyday practical 
matters as follows:  
1. Thinking does not bring knowledge as do the sciences. 
2. Thinking does not produce usable practical wisdom. 
3. Thinking does not solve cosmic riddles. 
4. Thinking does not endow us directly with the power to act. 
                                                                                          (WCT: 159; WHD: 161). 
 
Thinking about Being is different because it does not attempt to form statements about 
beings. So what does this way of thinking about Being, then, entail? Ben-Dor (2007: 44) 
explains that thinking about Being should not be understood as an attempt to define Being, as 
an attempt to understand Being so that we can bring it under our control. Thinking should, 
instead, be understood as being indebted to Being, it ‘is a process that makes its focused 
concern the contemplation of, responding to, Being’ (Ben-Dor, 2007: 44). Being calls us to 
think so that ‘it can be tended, cared for, husbanded in its own essential nature, by thought’ 
(WCT: 121; WHD: 85). 
    Heidegger’s works, then, instead of being traditional works of philosophy, offer pathways 
into thinking, or questioning, Being. As I begin to explore his works, I will examine in more 
detail how Heidegger thought about Being throughout his works and why this kind of 
thinking is important. It will also become clearer how thinking about Being can help us 
rethink the meaning of nature and the role it plays in green politics. At no point will we find 
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in Heidegger’s work a clear definition of what thinking about Being entails. This is because 
thinking about Being requires us to take a leap into a different way of thinking. Heidegger is 
unable to explain how we are to take this leap and thus, his writings should not be thought of 
as instructions for taking this leap. Instead, they should be thought of as ways that help us 
prepare for this leap (WCT: 12; WHD: 48). In what follows, I will start to make sense of 
what it means to question Being in this manner by looking at how Heidegger inquires after 
Being in his early work, in particular in Being and Time.  
 
Being and Time 
In Being and Time, Heidegger begins answering the question of Being by looking at how 
humans exist in the world in a way that they can encounter beings as beings. Heidegger’s 
inquiry into Being centres around how humans make sense of things because, he argues, 
humans are those beings for whom Being is an issue, those beings who can ask what it means 
for beings to be. In Being and Time, by understanding how humans make sense of things, 
Heidegger hopes to grasp Being itself. Initially, Being and Time was to consist in two parts, 
both with three divisions. However, in the end, Heidegger only finished the first and second 
divisions of Part One. As I will explore further at the end of this chapter, Heidegger felt that 
the language and framework of Being and Time was inadequate for completing his project.  
    The purpose of Division One of Being and Time is to present a preparatory analysis, which 
looks at the everyday engagements that humans have with the world, and on which 
Heidegger can build the analysis he presents in the division that follows. Here Heidegger 
calls humans Dasein. The German word ‘Da’ can be translated as ‘there’ or ‘here’, and when 
‘Dasein’ is translated into English, it is often translated as ‘being-there’ (see e.g Malpas, 
2007: 50). This translation highlights how calling humans Dasein is a way of talking about 
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humans in a way which does not refer to them as conscious subjects that encounter the world 
in terms of distinct objects. Instead, it communicates that humans always exist in the world, 
and the way in which they make sense of the world can only be understood by looking at how 
they are involved with the world. However, it is also important to note that this translation of 
Dasein as being-there misses other connotations of the German word ‘Da’: ‘Da’ does not 
only mean ‘there’, but it can also mean ‘here’. To be Dasein means to be that which first 
makes the there and the here possible (see Ingwood, 1999: 42). Because of these difficulties 
in translation, I have left the term Dasein untranslated in what follows.  
     Heidegger’s focus on Dasein, on the idea that humans always exist in the world and are 
always involved with the world, is at the heart of his questioning of Being. He also introduces 
the term being-in-the-world (In-der-Welt-Sein) to describe Dasein’s way of always being 
involved with the world. For example, Heidegger explains that noise can only be understood 
as noise if it is encountered in a particular context: ‘[w]hat we “first” hear is never noises or 
complexes of sounds, but the creaking waggon, the motorcycle. We hear the column on the 
march, the north wind, the woodpecker tapping, the fire crackling’ (BT: 207; SZ: 217). 
Noise, then, can only appear as noise to Dasein through its involvements with the world. 
    Heidegger calls the sphere, which allows beings to appear as beings, a clearing. The 
clearing is an opening that allows beings to emerge as beings with which humans can engage. 
This clearing, Heidegger maintains, is Dasein itself because it is only through Dasein’s 
interpretative activity and practical engagements that the clearing can emerge and beings can 
appear as beings: ‘Only for an entity which is existentially cleared [lichtet] in this way does 
that which is present-at-hand become accessible in the light or hidden in the dark (BT: 171; 
SZ: 177).  The German word that Heidegger uses for clearing is ‘Lichtung’. The literal 
meaning of ‘Lichtung’ is forest clearing, and the word ‘Lichtung’ also has a relation to light. 
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The use of ‘Lichtung’, then, evokes an image of a thick, dark forest with an opening where 
beings can be lit and can become visible, where beings can appear as beings. 
    This means that beings do not appear as beings outside of this clearing, there are no beings 
that exist as beings prior to the appearance of the clearing. And it also means that beings do 
not appear as beings in Dasein’s mind, outside of Dasein’s involvements and encounters with 
the world. Beings only appear to us as beings when they are lighted up in the clearing that is 
Dasein. Another way of thinking about Heidegger’s questioning of Being, then, is to think 
about it in terms of the clearing, as a questioning of this opening that allows beings to appear 
to us as beings.  
    The apples in my grandparents’ garden, for example, can only appear to me as apples in 
the clearing that lights these apples as beings. And when these apples do appear to me, they 
appear as those particular apples, growing in that particular garden. Although, as I will 
explore later on in this chapter, the focus of Heidegger’s work changes, Dasein continues to 
occupy a special role in his thinking throughout his works. In Heidegger’s later works, 
Dasein still continues to be the clearing, the opening in which beings can appear. Without 
Dasein, matter would still exist but there would not be the clearing that allowed for the 
appearance of beings. 
    Heidegger explores the everyday involvements that humans share with the world by 
looking at how humans engage with a piece of equipment. Ordinarily, we encounter 
equipment as what Heidegger calls ready-to-hand. When we begin working with a piece of 
familiar equipment, we do not explicitly think what the equipment is and how we should use 
it, we already know how to use it. Our interpretation of the equipment ‘is grounded in 
something we have in advance’ (BT: 191; SZ: 200 emphasis original). Instead of 
concentrating on the piece of equipment, we concentrate on working with it. We do not have 
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to think about the equipment we are using but instead, we concentrate on our work: ‘That 
with which our everyday dealings proximally dwell is not the tools themselves. On the 
contrary, that with which we concern ourselves primarily is the work’ (BT: 99; SZ: 94). 
When we start slicing apples in order to bake them into a pie, for example, we do not think of 
each apple as an apple and the knife we use to slice them as a knife. We know how to slice 
apples without paying explicit attention to the knife and to the apples.  The knife and the 
apple disappear from us as we become immersed in making the pie. 
    Only when the equipment no longer works the way we want it to, when it breaks for 
example, do we start to pay attention to it. We now encounter this equipment as what 
Heidegger calls present-at-hand. But, even then, we do not encounter the equipment as some 
kind of a pure object. The equipment only shows up as present-at-hand in a particular 
context, and holds a particular meaning to us because it no longer fulfils its purpose. For 
example, if we encounter a rotten apple when we are slicing apples and stop to inspect this 
apple, the apple becomes present-at-hand for us. But we do not encounter the apple 
independent of the involvements we share with the world. The apple only appears to us as 
rotten, as something spoiled, because we wanted to use the apple for cooking.  
    Heidegger also provides a discussion of how we not only exist in the world amidst other 
beings but also amidst other Dasein. As beings appear to us as beings, they are revealed to us 
in the context of the relations they have to other Dasein: ‘the field shows itself as belonging 
to such-and-such a person, and decently kept by him; the book we have used was bought at 
So-and-so’s shop and given by such-and-such a person, and so forth.’ (BT: 153-4; SZ: 157). 
Being-in-the-world is, then, always also a being-with (Mitsein) (Schatzki, 2005: 234). 
Kockelmans (1965: 65) describes this being-with as sharing a world, taking two people 
examining a painting as an example: ‘When two people admire a painting and are similarly 
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affected by it, this harmony of feelings brings them closer together, it develops a bond 
between them which could become the root of a community.’ 
    Thinking about being-with brings Heidegger to a discussion of das Man. This discussion 
describes how other people influence the way in which we act in the world we live in. It is, 
however, difficult to find a translation for das Man. Many translations have been suggested 
such as the ‘They’ (e.g. Kocklemans, 1965: 61; Mulhall, 1996: 106-108), ‘Anyone’ (e.g. 
Guignon, 1983) or ‘Others’ (e.g. O’Brien, 2011). Maybe the best way of translating it is ‘the 
one’. This choice is able to communicate how the German ‘das Man’ has been derived from 
the German word ‘man’ that is the singular impersonal pronoun (e.g. Carman, 2003; Dreyfus, 
1991: 143; Gomer, 2007: 107; Schatzki, 2005). This is indeed what Heidegger is trying to get 
at, he describes das Man as that ‘which is nothing definitive, and which all are, though not as 
the sum’ (BT: 164; SZ: 169). Referring to das Man as the one, unlike translating it as ‘they’ 
or ‘others’ also emphasises how das Man is not something distinct from ourselves but we are 
always included in das Man as well (Carman, 2003: 138 n. 67).  
    Heidegger maintains that when we are absorbed in the one, we exist in the world in an 
inauthentic manner. The German words for authentic and inauthentic, ‘eigentlich’ and 
‘uneigentlich’ have the root ‘eigen’ which translates as the adjective ‘own’. Authenticity and 
inauthenticity, then, are linked to the idea of owness. An inauthentic existence signifies a way 
of being-in-the-world where Dasein is not his/her own self. Dasein exists in an inauthentic 
way when it is absorbed in the one, when it chooses actions or ways of life according to the 
one, and does not make these choices for him/herself (O’Brien, 2011: 25). 
    So how do our engagements with the one lead us to act inauthentically? Heidegger 
illustrates how we come to be absorbed into the one as follows: 
In utilizing public means of transport and in making use of information services such as the newspaper, 
every other is like the next. This Being-with-one-another dissolves one’s own Dasein completely into the 
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kind of Being of ‘the Others’, in such a way, indeed, that the others, indistinguishable and explicit, vanish 
more and more. In this ifnconspicuousness and unascertainability, the real dictatorship of the one is 
unfolded. We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as one takes pleasure; we read, see, and judge about 
literature as one sees and judges; likewise we shrink back from the ‘great mass’ as one shrinks back; we 
find shocking what one finds shocking (BT: 164; SZ:169, translation modified).  
 
So for example, inspired by a public mood that encourages eating organic locally grown food, 
we could start purchasing organically grown apples straight from the producer every autumn, 
not really reflecting on these actions in more depth but performing them because this is what 
everyone does, because it is fashionable. We might think that we are acting authentically, 
being rooted in traditions because this is what the public opinion tells us is the case. 
However, this behaviour would be, in fact, an example of an inauthentic existence.  
    Heidegger calls engaging with everyday matters, existing inauthentically, fallenness into 
the world. When Dasein is absorbed in the world and engages with beings, Dasein falls away 
from questioning Being. Dasein gets lost in its everyday concern, engaging with beings, 
following cultural norms without reflecting on them further. Heidegger explains how 
fallenness is characterised by idle talk, curiosity and ambiguity. Idle talk refers to 
thoughtlessly chatting about things without paying further attention to their significance, 
without reflecting on them authentically: ‘what is said in the talk gets understood; but what 
the talk is about is understood only approximately and superficially’ (BT: 212; SZ: 223, 
translation modified). Curiosity describes Dasein searching for novel experiences and sources 
for entertainment, engaging with the look of things without thinking about them. Curiosity 
‘discloses everything and anything, yet in such a way that Being-in is everywhere and 
nowhere’ (BT: 221; SZ: 235). Ambiguity refers to the loss of our ability to distinguish 
between meaningless chatter and a more meaningful way of examining things. Through being 
absorbed in the one, through following the public opinion, Dasein thinks that there is no need 
for any more authentic grasp of the world: ‘[T]he supposition of the one that one is leading 
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and sustaining a full and genuine “life”, brings Dasein a tranquillity for which everything is 
“in the best of order’ (BT: 222; SZ: 235-6, translation modified, emphasis original).  
    It is, however, important to note that Heidegger’s description of an inauthentic mode of 
existence is not a criticism of existing with others. He is not encouraging us to find some 
essence of ourselves that exists independently of our engagements with others. We cannot 
completely avoid inauthenticity, we always share the world with others, we share common 
practices, and these allow us to go about our everyday activities. As Keller and Weberman 
(1998: 374-5, emphasis original) demonstrate, Dasein’s way of being-in-the-world is ‘always 
shaped by the everyday social ways of das Man.’ Heidegger’s description of the one, then, 
should not be understood as describing an existence independent of other Dasein but should 
be understood as a criticism of mass-culture, of loss of individuality and the rule of the public 
opinion (O’Brien, 2011: 25). Towards the end of the thesis, I will return to this idea of being-
with, and explore how it can help us make sense of how we can live in such a way that we 
pay attention to Being. 
    To complete the discussion on Dasein’s everyday modes of existence, Heidegger discusses 
the concept of anxiety. This discussion is important because, for Heidegger, anxiety has the 
potential to reveal how Dasein has fallen into the world. Unlike fear, that is always fear of 
something, anxiety is not directed at anything in particular. When Dasein is anxious, Dasein 
does not feel at home in the world. The world slips away from Dasein, and beings no longer 
appear as beings that can be engaged with: 
Nothing which is ready-to-hand or present-at-hand within the world functions as that in the face of which 
anxiety is anxious. Here the totality of involvements of the ready-to-hand and the present-at-hand 
discovered within-the-world is, as such, of no consequences; it collapses into itself; the world has the 
character of completely lacking in significance  (BT: 231; SZ: 247). 
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But anxiety has the potential to lead us away from an inauthentic existence. If we are 
prepared not to flee from anxiety by busying ourselves with beings, we can grasp something 
important about how we are in the world. Beings slipping away from us in anxiety can reveal 
how the appearance of our world is contingent on us engaging with the world and with 
beings: ‘What oppresses us is not this or that, nor is it the summation of everything present-
at-hand; it is rather the possibility of the ready-to-hand in general; that is to say, it is the 
world itself’ (BT; 231; SZ; 248, emphasis original). It demonstrates that the existence of the 
world is not grounded in anything external, such as God or Plato’s ideas, but it is dependent 
on our continued engagement with the world. 
   Heidegger concludes Division One of Being and Time by talking about the care-structure of 
Dasein. The way in which Dasein fundamentally is in the world is care. There are three 
aspects that describe this care-structure. The first two are Being-ahead-of-itself and 
thrownness. Being-ahead-of itself means we are always oriented towards the future, we do 
things for-the-sake-of other things. But this being-ahead-of-itself does not happen in a void. It 
always happens in the context of Dasein’s thrownness into a world. Our actions happen in the 
context of the world into which we are thrown, and this limits our choices and possibilities. 
The world into which we are thrown opens up possibilities for acting in a certain way and, in 
the end, we are the ones who have to project ourselves to this world, we ourselves are free to 
make certain choices about our lives, to act in the world in a certain way. And the third aspect 
is our fallenness into the world discussed above: Dasein is always falling into the world, 
engaging with beings and absorbed by beings. Dasein being ahead of itself and being thrown 
into the world always takes place in the context of the beings that Dasein is engaged with 
(BT: 235-238; SZ: 257-258). This care-structure, then, describes how Dasein is in the world:  
The point is not that Dasein is always caring and concerned, or that failures of sympathy are impossible or 
are to be discouraged, it is rather that as being-in-the-world, Dasein must deal with that world. The world 
and everything in it is something that cannot fail to matter to us (Mulhall, 1996: 111, emphasis original).  
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This care-structure can, for example, be observed in the way of being-in-the-world of 
someone who is thrown into a world where people grow apples for a living, who chooses to 
start growing apples, and who consequently becomes engaged with and concerned for apples 
and apple trees, who falls into the world of the apples. 
    We could stop here and maintain we are now ready to answer Heidegger’s question of 
Being by looking at how Heidegger describes Dasein’s everyday engagements with the 
world. This is done, for example, by Hubert Dreyfus (1992). Dreyfus argues that, based on 
Heidegger’s understanding of Dasein’s everyday practices and the one, Being can now be 
understood as referring to our shared background practices that allow beings to appear to us 
as beings, that allow us to make sense of the things we encounter in the world. This way of 
thinking about Being has, however, been criticised by others. Keller and Weberman (1998: 
376) explain how Dreyfus’ interpretation of Being might be able to make sense of Dasein’s 
everyday ways of being-in-the-world but it ignores the fact that Heidegger’s analysis of 
Dasein’s existence in Being and Time goes beyond these everyday practices when Heidegger 
begins to search for more authentic ways of being-in-the-world in Division Two. As 
Heidegger himself emphasised, the analysis taken in Division One is merely preparatory. It 
discusses Dasein’s inauthentic, everyday existence, but does not yet explore what unifies 
these different everyday ways of being-in-the-world and what grounds Dasein’s everyday 
existence (Gelven, 1970: 112). The question that Heidegger is asking, then, cannot be 
answered by talking about everyday practices. Instead, we must ask what grounds these 
practices, ‘what makes possible this sharable making sense of the world in the first place’ 
(Keller and Weberman, 1998: 378). I will return to Dreyfus’ interpretation of Heidegger and 
to these criticisms of his interpretation later on in the thesis. But now, I shall move on to 
examine how Heidegger continues to question Being in Division Two of Being and Time. 
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    In Division Two of Being and Time, Heidegger moves away from examining Dasein’s 
everyday engagements with the world and begins to look at how Dasein could be in the world 
in an authentic manner. To start exploring this, he introduces the notion of being-towards-
death. Dasein can be towards death because it can anticipate its death, the possibility of its 
not being-in-the-world. When Dasein exists inauthentically in the world, Dasein flees death. 
Heidegger describes this fleeing as follows: 
‘Death’ is encountered as a well-known event occurring within-the-world. As such, it remains in the 
inconspicuousness characteristic of what is encountered in an everyday fashion. The one has already 
stowed away an interpretation for this event. It talks of it in a ‘fugitive’ manner, either expressly or else in 
a way which is mostly inhibited, as if to say ‘One of these days one will die too, in the end; but right now 
it has nothing to do with us’ (BT: 297; SZ: 336, translation modified). 
 
When Dasein exists inauthentically, it is not unaware of its own mortality, but rather, thinks 
of death as something that is ‘not yet present-at-hand for oneself, and is therefore no threat’ 
(BT: 297; SZ: 336, emphasis original). Being-towards-death authentically is different. This 
way of being entails accepting and paying attention to the fact that Dasein’s existence is 
finite. Heidegger thus explains that when existing authentically, Dasein ‘becomes free from 
the entertaining of “incidentals” with – which busy curiosity keeps providing itself – 
primarily from the events of the world’ (BT: 358; SZ: 411). 
    Existing authentically also changes the way we are in the world with others. Authentic 
existence should be thought of as ‘pointing toward the possibility of an authentic social 
existence which is to be preferred, one assumes, to one in which everyone is the other and no 
one is himself where others simply are what they do as mere automatons within the network 
of equipmentality’ (O’Brien, 2011: 58, emphasis original, cf. Carman, 2005). People are no 
longer encountered as just parts of the one but they are encountered in a more authentic 
manner, they are not encountered as equipment but as other Dasein who also exist in the 
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world and make sense of the world in their own ways (Dahlstrom, 2001a: 274). Scott 
describes this as follows: 
Rather than living as though they were fulfilling the manifest destiny of some pre-established goals for all 
mankind, people foresee the world in terms of incomplete possibility. They care for people and things with 
the anticipation that lives will continue to be incomplete, marked by possibility and always in need of care 
[…]. Heidegger intends a way of living in which the ontological meaning of Dasein is apparent in an 
individual’s life such that the incomplete and never fully grasped potentiality of being in the ways people 
live (Scott: 2009: 63). 
 
 
When we exist authentically, we do not treat others as means to accomplish our own goals or 
ideals because we recognise that our goals and ideals are ultimately groundless, we are able 
to consider these aims and goals with a certain degree of distance and not impose them on 
others. Thus, an authentic existence that accepts our finite grasp of the world treats things and 
other Dasein in less instrumental ways. 
    Heidegger explains at the end Division Two that this analysis of death and authentic 
existence reveals that the care-structure is grounded in Dasein’s temporality. The care-
structure has a unity, Dasein’s temporality. All elements of the care-structure can be thought 
of in terms of temporarily: thrownness refers to past, being-ahead-of-itself to the future and 
fallenness to the present (BT: 300-2; SZ; 432-3) So what Heidegger has demonstrated here is 
that that which allows beings to appear as beings is not some stable ground but the way in 
which beings appear as beings is grounded in Dasein’s temporality, in the present, the past 
and the future (de Boer, 2005: 35). We are thrown into the world as finite beings, there is 
nothing stable that grounds our understanding of beings but it is our finite existence that 
allows beings to appear to us: ‘our finitude makes all “as”-taking and “is”-saying possible by 
requiring us to understand things not immediately […], but indirectly’  (Sheehan, 2001: 199).  
    However, Heidegger’s exploration into the meaning of Being is incomplete in Being and 
Time. The analytical language he employed to make sense of the way in which Dasein is in 
the world was not, in the end, enough to describe how beings appear to us as beings, how we 
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are thrown into the world and can encounter beings as beings. As Heidegger himself explains 
in ‘Letter on Humanism’, the later parts of Being and Time, which were supposed to move 
away from the analysis of Dasein and explore the unfolding of Being, were never written 
because he was unable to complete the project with the kind of questioning he adopted in 
Being and Time (LH: 250; BT: 158, see also Kisiel, 2005: 190-3). To continue questioning 
Being, Heidegger, in his later works, needed to adopt a different kind of language. It is to this 
different way of questioning that I will turn to next.  
 
Truth and History 
After Being and Time, Heidegger started to gradually move away from looking at how 
Dasein makes sense of the world. Heidegger began to focus on how the truth of Being 
unfolds and how this unfolding is always historical. The language that Heidegger uses to 
make sense of Being also begins to change and he moves away from the more analytical 
language that is traditionally associated with philosophical works. To start exploring this shift 
in his writings, I will first look at how Heidegger goes on to rethink the notion of truth and 
then move on to examine how he talks about the unfolding of this truth. 
    So why would Heidegger think about truth in great detail, why is this question of truth 
something we should concern ourselves with? Heidegger wants to arrive at a new way of 
approaching truth because he is of the opinion that our current ways of thinking about truth 
do not allow for questioning Being. To be able to question Being, Heidegger wants us to 
move away from thinking of truth as correctness towards thinking about truth as the 
unconcealment, or the revealing, of entities. In an essay called ‘The Essence of Truth’, he 
explains that when we normally talk about truth, we are talking about truth as correctness of 
propositions, as correspondence with a given set of facts. Heidegger elaborates on this by 
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looking at how we talk about gold. We talk about true gold, genuine gold, and distinguish it 
from false gold. It is important for us to make this distinction because false gold only 
resembles gold and it is therefore not real gold. But although the false gold is not real, true 
gold, it is nevertheless an actual thing. So we cannot distinguish true gold from false gold on 
the basis of actuality because genuine and false gold are both actual things. Heidegger 
explains that we understand genuine gold as true gold because it corresponds to what we 
mean when we talk about gold. Similarly, false gold is understood as being false because it 
does not correspond to the idea that we have of gold (ET: 137-8; WW: 74-5). Genuine gold is 
understood as true gold not because it is more actual than false gold, but because it 
corresponds to the idea we have of gold. 
    But, Heidegger explains, understanding truth as correctness is unable to grasp what is 
involved in thinking about the truth of beings, and is unable to question Being. This is 
because to assess whether a given being corresponds to a set of facts, we must first have 
formed an idea of what that being is, the being must have unconcealed itself to us as 
something. He illustrates: 
The entire realm in which this ‘conforming to something’ goes on must already occur as a whole in the 
unconcealed; and this holds equally of that for which the conformity of a proposition to fact becomes 
manifest. With all our correct representations we would get nowhere, we could not even presuppose that 
there already is manifest something to which we can conform ourselves, unless the unconcealedness of 
beings had already exposed us to, placed us in that lighted realm in which every being stands for us and 
from which it withdraws (OWA: 51; UK: 39 emphasis original). 
 
A piece of gold, for example, only shows itself as genuine gold because humans have a 
particular understanding of what genuine gold is. Correct statements, then, do not question 
Being, nor are they universally valid statements of beings. Instead, they only make sense 
when a being appears as a being in a particular clearing. To ask about the truth of beings and 
about their Being requires thinking about how beings are revealed to us as beings in the first 
place. To think about the truth of gold, then, is not to assess whether something corresponds 
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to the idea we have of gold, but it is about thinking about how something appears to us as 
gold in the first place. 
    Heidegger’s criticism of understanding truth as correctness can be elaborated by again 
looking at apples as an example. Different people encounter different kinds of apples in my 
grandparents’ garden. As I walk in the garden in a leisurely fashion, I encounter the apples in 
the garden as something that contribute to the nature of the walk, as something that make up 
the peaceful atmosphere of the garden. But my grandfather, who takes care of the garden, 
encounters these apples as something that should be nurtured and looked after. There is, then, 
no one correct way of describing the apples, forming correct statements about them does not 
explain what they are. 
     One can, of course, object to this by saying that there are certain universally valid, correct 
observations that we can make of apples. We can, for example, split an apple in half and 
describe what it looks like inside. We can also weigh the apple and report its weight. But 
Heidegger would argue that, although we can form these correct statements of the apple, 
these statements are unable to describe why the apple showed up as something to be weighed 
and measured in the first place, what the apple really is. And indeed, Heidegger would 
maintain that, as we focus on producing correct statements of the apple, the truth of the apple, 
the appleness of the apple, slips away from us (see OWA: 46; UK: 33). It is only when we are 
not so willing to form correct statements about beings, when we adopt a more questioning 
attitude, paying attention to how the apple reveals itself to us, that we can grasp the truth of 
the apple. 
    Heidegger goes on provide a detailed account of the happening of truth an essay, ‘Origins 
of the Work of Art’. In this essay, he discusses how truth is unconcealed in the work of art, 
how concealment always plays a role in the happening of truth and how the work of art can 
94 
 
set up different historical worlds. In ‘Origins of the Work of Art’, Heidegger describes the 
interplay between concealment and unconcealment as a strife between the earth and the 
world, and discusses how this strife can manifest itself in the work of art. To make sense of 
Heidegger’s arguments in ‘Origins of the Work of Art’, I will first look at the strife between 
the earth and the world in more detail. I will then turn to investigate how Heidegger 
maintains that this strife between the earth and the world manifests itself in the work of art.  
    Heidegger maintains that the earth in the description of the happening of truth does not 
refer to matter or to an astronomical idea of a planet but is that from which entities emerge as 
beings, it is the ground that makes it possible for beings to appear as beings: ‘The earth is the 
spontaneous forthcoming of that which is continually self-secluding and to that extent 
sheltering and concealing’ (OWA, 47; UK, 35). The earth always conceals beings from us 
and makes it impossible for us to fully comprehend these beings. This means that Being, as it 
allows beings to be revealed to us, at the same time, hides itself. That from which beings 
appear to us as beings remains hidden from us.  
    The world, on the other hand, is the sphere in which humans engage with beings. It is the 
opening of the world that allows for the appearance of beings. Heidegger explains that ‘as the 
world opens up, the rock comes to bear and rest and so first becomes a rock; metals come to 
glitter and shimmer, colours to glow, tones to sing, the words to speak’ (OWA 45; UK, 32). 
Vycinas (1961: 152) elaborates on the meaning of the world by explaining that ‘[w]orld is not 
the sum or framework of all the beings, but is that which enables the beings to be beings. 
World is the openness of Being itself.’ The world is always a historical world: truth unfolds 
differently in different historical periods and we always inhabit different historical worlds. 
Because the world cannot be understood as a framework or as another being, Heidegger does 
not say that the world is, but instead says that the worlds (Sallis, 1990: 176). So, the world 
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worlds, allowing beings to rise into presence. It is thus the opening of the clearing that allows 
entities to emerge as beings we can engage with. 
    To fully understand the nature of the strife between the earth and the world, they cannot be 
understood as separate entities, existing independently of each other. Instead, their 
relationship has to be understood as reciprocal. Heidegger explains:  
World and earth are essentially different from one another and yet are never separated. The world grounds 
itself on the earth, and the earth juts through the world. But the relation between earth and world does not 
wither away into the empty unity of opposites unconcerned with one another. The world, in resting upon 
the earth, strives to surmount it. As self-opening, it cannot endure anything closed. The earth, however, as 
sheltering and concealing, tends always to draw the world into itself and keep it there (OWA, 47: UK, 35).  
 
The world cannot be understood without thinking of the earth, and the earth cannot be 
understood without thinking of the world. Although the world is where beings are revealed to 
humans, the earth, as concealment, still prevails in the world and beings never appear as fully 
unconcealed. Similarly, although the earth is the sphere of concealment, it does not exist 
independently of the world but always as a part of the world. So my grandparents’ garden, 
and the grass, the trees and the apples growing in it, appear to me as beings because of the 
happening of truth that occurs as the world opens up. But when I am taking my evening walk 
in the garden amidst the apples, the truth of these apples remains hidden from me. I cannot 
explain or articulate what they are because the world is always striving with the concealing 
earth. 
    The essay that describes this strife between the earth and the world is called ‘The Origins 
of the Work of Art’ because the work of art plays an important role in this strife. Heidegger 
maintains that the work of art can set up the strife between the earth and the world. This 
happens when the artwork ‘moves the earth itself into the Open of a world and keeps it there. 
The work lets the earth be an earth’ (OWA: 45, UK: 32, emphasis original). Heidegger uses a 
Greek temple as an example of the kind of artwork that can accomplish this. He explains that 
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the temple ‘first fits together and at the same time gathers around itself the unity of those 
paths and relations in which birth and death, disaster and blessing, victory and disgrace, 
endurance and decline acquire the shape of destiny for human being’ (OWA: 43; UK; 30-31).  
As the work of art allows for the happening of truth and allows beings to appear as beings, it 
also allows historical community of people to come together.  
    So how is it that the work of art can set up a strife between the earth and the world? 
Dreyfus (2005: 415) suggests that this means that a work of art has the power to reconfigure a 
community’s sense of themselves and establish new paradigms of understanding beings and 
new practices for a community. This would allow for new ways for beings to appear to us and 
for new ways in which truth can happen. I, however, agree with Young’s (2001: 31-3) 
criticism of this account. Young argues that we cannot think of the work of art as creating 
these meanings because this would contradict Heidegger’s account of Dasein as being always 
thrown into the world. Because of this, the work of art must describe a world that already 
exists. What Heidegger is attempting to describe here, I think, is that the work of art, by being 
able to portray the happening of truth and the strife between the earth and the world, may 
teach us to pay attention to the unfolding of Being. Or, as Young (2001: 52) explains, the 
artwork ‘gathers together an entire culture to bear witness to the luminous salience of world 
which happens in the work’. The work of art can allow us to stop thinking that we can grasp 
beings by forming correct statements about them, and it can help a community to contemplate 
on what it is important for that community. In this sense, we can say that the work of art 
brings beings into unconcealedness.  
    But to fully comprehend Heidegger’s description of the happening of truth, we need to 
think in detail about what the earth refers to and why beings are concealed from us. My 
initial, and as I will explain later, somewhat problematic, understanding was that the earth 
refers to the nonhuman environment. I understood the concealing earth as the mysterious 
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manner in which things unfold and change without humans being involved in this process. I 
will examine this way of thinking about the earth further here because it is a good starting 
point for thinking about the happening of truth and also because it is the interpretation of the 
earth that most environmentalist interpreters adopt (e.g. Holland, 1999: 141-5; Norris, 2011; 
Peters and Irwin, 2002; Schalow, 2006). This interpretation of the earth often draws on 
Heidegger’s example of the happening of truth in the Greek temple. This is how Heidegger 
describes the Greek temple as an example of how a work of art can set up a world:  
Standing there, the building rests on the rocky ground. This resting of the world draws up out of the rock 
the mystery of that rock’s clumsy yet spontaneous support. Standing there, the building holds its ground 
against the storm raging above it and so makes the storm manifest in its violence. The luster and gleam of 
the stone, though itself apparently glowing only by the grace of the sun, yet brings to light the light of day, 
the breath of the sky, the darkness of the night. The temple’s firm towering makes visible the invisible 
space of air. The steadfastness of the work contrasts with the surge of the surf, and its own repose brings 
out the raging of the sea. Tree and grass, eagle and bull, snake and cricket first enter into distinctive shapes 
and thus come to appear as what they are (OWA: 41; UK: 28). 
 
In this example of the temple that Heidegger gives, the earth does seem to refer to the growth 
and development of the earth that surrounds the temple and from which natural, nonhuman 
beings can grow and emerge as beings.  
    So what are the implications of this way of approaching the happening of truth? As 
Zimmerman (2003: 83) illustrates, in this way of thinking about the earth, the concealment of 
the earth emphasises how beings always retain a degree of relative autonomy when they 
emerge into unconcealment. Although a being can only be a being if it is encountered and 
interpreted as a being by Dasein, Dasein alone is not in charge of how the being is revealed. 
This, Zimmerman (2003: 83, emphasis original) explains, is because ‘Dasein does not itself 
create the clearing, but instead is appropriated as it, Dasein is obliged to “care” for beings in 
part by letting them present themselves in ways that accord with their own inherent 
possibilities’.  
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    So, according to this interpretation of the earth, when the apples reveal themselves to me in 
my grandparents’ garden as apples, I must recognise that I will never be able to fully control 
the growth of these apples. My task is to nourish and care for them so that they can continue 
to reveal themselves, and I must try to avoid controlling the growth of these apples. To allow 
for the unfolding of truth it is necessary for me to accept that the apple itself, nourished by 
the concealing earth, has its own way of growing and unfolding that I will never be able to 
fully know and understand. 
    When the earth is interpreted in this manner, then the earth, in the context of the work of 
art that sets up the strife between the earth and the world, is understood as the material that 
the artwork is made of. The reason for the presence of concealment in the work of art lies in 
the fact that we cannot fully make sense of the significance of these materials. Young (2000: 
47-8) explains how we can think of the concealing earth in the work of art:  
We notice the sensuous qualities, the “lustre and gleam”, of the stone temple, the colours of a Van Gogh, 
the sound of the words in a Hölderlin poem. Yet the materials of the artwork are ‘self-secluding’. Colours 
or sounds may be represented in terms of measurable wavelengths, the stone’s weight in terms of numbers, 
yet we know that the colour, sound or weight itself is by no means fully captured in such representations. 
Hence in apprehending the artwork we become aware of the inadequacy of all our ‘projections’ fully to 
capture the nature of the material, aware that there is infinitely more to nature, to beings, than we can ever 
make intelligible to ourselves. 
 
So the work of art is important because it brings into light the unintelligible material qualities 
of beings, demonstrating that even when beings appear to us as beings we cannot fully 
understand them.     
    This discussion on the happening of truth also brings us to another important concept in 
Heidegger’s work that plays important role in green interpretations of Heidegger. This is the 
concept of letting be. In ‘On the Essence of Truth’, Heidegger explains that to encounter 
beings in their truth, we must refrain from attempting to arrive at accurate representations of 
them. Instead, we must let beings be, we must allow them to unconceal themselves to us and 
to always remain partly in concealment (ET: 144-5; WW:  83-4). In Contributions Heidegger 
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elaborates on this by maintaining that when we experience the truth of beings, when we allow 
beings to reveal themselves, we let beings ‘appear in the light of Being as the beings that they 
are’ (LH: 252; BH: 161-162). The German word for appearing that Heidegger uses here is 
‘erscheinen’ which is related to the verb ‘scheinen’, which means to shine. So ‘appearing’ is 
another word related to light and making things visible. It is meant here in the sense of 
making beings visible by the light of Being. As Guignon (2011: 92) puts it, when we let 
beings be, ‘we give things the breathing room they need to unfold in their own proper way, 
[…] without foisting on them an interpretative schema determined by our interests and 
projects’. Thinking about Being, responding to the call of Being would, in this context, be 
about allowing apples to appear to us, respecting the fact that we cannot fully grasp how the 
apples appeared to us as beings. 
    As Heidegger begins to explore the question of truth, he also explores how Being reveals 
itself to us differently in different historical periods and how we have forgotten to question 
truth by reducing the happening of truth to correct statements. This forgetfulness culminates 
in what Heidegger calls technological thinking. I already touched upon the history of Being 
earlier when I looked at how Heidegger thought Western philosophy had forgotten to 
question Being. But having looked at the unfolding of truth, it is now possible to look in more 
detail at what Heidegger has to say about the history of Being. Heidegger starts by exploring 
how pre-Socratic thinkers had not yet fallen into this forgetfulness of Being. They were 
captivated by the mystery of Being, by the wonder of the realisation that beings are. This is 
where Heidegger locates what he calls the first beginning, the beginning of Western history. 
It is where beings first showed up as question-worthy, where men first asked about the truth 
of beings. However, the question of Being is not inquired after explicitly in the first 
beginning. Both beings and Being, for the Greeks, signified those things that are present, that 
rise into unconcealment from concealment, and then sink back into concealment. What this 
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means can, perhaps, be best grasped by paying attention to the role that the Greek gods play 
in the presencing of beings. In the familiar Christian understanding, God, the cause of beings, 
exists beyond beings. But Heidegger argues that for the Greeks, the gods are Being itself, yet 
they exist in beings. The gods shine forth from beings, allowing beings to shine in their Being 
as something extraordinary, pointing towards the truth of these beings (PE: 111; PG: 164-5). 
Being, then, appears as something extraordinary in beings as humans are directed towards 
questioning the truth of these beings.  
    However, already in this Greek experience of Being we can recognise the beginning of 
Western metaphysical thinking. The Greeks answer the question of Being by describing the 
presencing of a being in its truth. Here the question of truth is asked for the sake of beings, 
not for the sake of Being as such. Truth is understood in relation to a being: it is understood 
in relation to the coming to presence of beings as they emerge out of concealment. It was 
sufficient for the Greeks to be claimed by unconcealment, to experience its wonder in the 
face of the mystery of beings. This focus on beings, however, allowed for the transformation 
of the concept of truth from unconcealment into correctness: because the first beginning 
focused on the presencing of beings, it became possible to start thinking about the correctness 
of these present beings (CP: 164; BP 232).  
    The transformation of the meaning of truth already begins in Plato’s writings. For Plato, 
the essence of a being is that which endures. However, he understands this endurance as 
something that endures permanently, persisting no matter what happens. It is through this 
kind of thinking that Plato starts to think of the essences of things in terms of their 
permanently enduring ideas (QCT, 30; FT, 32). With Plato, the Being of beings is no longer 
understood as unconcealment, but it is understood as the eternal idea, as the eternal form. 
These eternal ideas are what allow beings to emerge as visible: 
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Every idea, the visible form of something, provides a look at what a being is in each case. Thus in Greek 
thinking the ideas enable something to appear in its whatness and thus be present in its stability. The ideas 
are what is in everything that is (PDT: 174-175; PLW: 134). 
 
Focusing on the eternal ideas allows for the transformation of the concept of truth. Truth is no 
longer understood as unconcealment but it is transformed into correctness, it now signifies 
correspondence between the idea and a being. Heidegger argues that here ‘the 
correspondence of our gaze in relation to the idea comes to dominate, and determines what is 
true as that which is correct’ (PDT, 176- 181; PLW, 136-141). What counts is if we see 
beings correctly, in accordance with their idea. Plato’s philosophy, however, is still different 
from Western representational thinking, and not a complete departure from pre-Socratic 
thought. Heidegger explains:  
[I]n a certain way Plato has to hold on to "truth" as still a characteristic of beings, because a being, as 
something present, has being precisely by appearing, and being brings unhiddenness with it. But at the 
same time, the inquiry into what is unhidden shifts in the direction of the appearing of the visible form, 
and consequently toward the act of seeing that is ordered to the visible form, and toward what is correct 
and toward the correctness of seeing.  For this reason there is a necessary ambiguity in Plato's doctrine 
(PDT, 177; PLW, 137). 
  
Because for Plato, a being can be true because it is present, because it appears from 
unhiddenness, Plato’s thinking does not signify a complete turning away from the pre-
Socratic experience of Being as unconcealment. Nevertheless, Plato takes the first step 
towards the forgetfulness of Being by understanding truth as correctness. 
    In the Middle Ages, truth continues to be understood as correctness. Something is correct 
only insofar as it corresponds to the idea of a particular being. But the idea is now understood 
differently to Plato, the idea is understood as something preconceived in the mind of God. In 
Christianity, another shift also takes place: beings are starting to be understood in terms of 
cause and effect, as something caused by the creator, and Being now comes to denote that 
being which is the cause of other beings (CP: 88; BP: 126-7). To be something now means to 
be created by God, the being that is the cause of other beings. In the Enlightenment period 
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this idea is taken further. The idea of creation is replaced by the capacity of objects to be 
ordered by human reason. Here, ‘to be’ something means to be an object understood by the 
rational human subject. Beings no longer emerge from unconcealment but they are something 
that humans organise, order and represent (CP: 77; BT: 110). Being is now transformed into 
what is most common to all beings. Its meaning also becomes empty, to the point that we can 
no longer say what it means to say that a being is (IM: 87; EM: 56).  This signals the start of 
a technological way of revealing beings that I will investigate in the next section of the 
chapter. 
    Through his thinking of Being, Heidegger wants to prepare a way for another beginning 
that is able to again think about the question of Being. However, he is not advocating a return 
to the Greek way of thinking Being that so easily allowed the transformation of truth into 
correctness. Unlike in the first beginning, where truth was a characteristic of beings, in the 
other beginning, the question of Being will not be asked for the sake of beings but the truth of 
Being itself will be questioned and it will be recognised that ‘being-present is, even where it 
is encountered in constancy, the most fleeting for the original projecting open of the truth of 
Being’ (CP: 181; BP: 257).  
 
Technological Thinking 
Heidegger’s later work concentrates on how the forgetting of Being culminates in 
technological thinking, on the consequences that technological thinking has for us and on 
how we might overcome this technological thinking. Heidegger’s criticism of technological 
thinking was also a response to the industrialisation taking place in Germany, to the 
disappearance of smaller villages and communities with local cultures and to the growth of 
big cities. He maintained that new, industrial modes of production encourage ways of 
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engaging with beings that transform the manner in which we encounter beings. In his 
writings on technological thinking, Heidegger writes how, in the modern world, we are no 
longer engaging with beings in a way that allows them to appear in their truth. This is 
because a technological way of revealing which aims to find correct ways of representing 
beings begins to dominate the revealing of entities. Heidegger’s criticism on technological 
thinking, as demonstrated by O’Brien (2011: 165), can also already be observed in a nascent 
form in Being and Time, in Heidegger’s discussion of inauthenticity and in his descriptions of 
Dasein’s everyday engagements with the world.  
    Heidegger discusses how we forget the question of Being already in Contributions where 
he identifies three interconnected ways in which this abandonment of Being shows itself. It 
shows itself in calculation, massiveness and acceleration. Calculation is grounded in the 
mathematical, which allows for arriving at exact definitions of entities and is able to use these 
definitions to efficiently order and organise entities. As a consequence, a lack of questioning 
takes hold and man comes to think that he can understand and represent beings through 
numbers. Everything must now be calculated, must ‘be adjusted to the existing state of 
calculation’ (CP: 84; BP: 120). That which is incalculable is simply that which cannot yet be 
calculated. For example, mass-produced apples in supermarkets are evaluated according to 
their shape and size, and those apples that do not conform to set sizes are discarded. The 
apples are marketed to the public as a measurable component of a healthy diet (as ‘one of 
your five-a-day’), and some packs of apples even record the number of calories they contain.  
    Acceleration and massiveness describe the consequences of seeing the world in these 
calculable terms. Acceleration refers to our inability to bear stillness and listen to that which 
is concealed from us, to ‘the stillness of hidden growth and awaiting’ (CP: 84; BP: 121). 
Instead of listening to stillness, we become obsessed with immediate experiences. Thus, 
acceleration describes ‘the mania for what is surprising, for what immediately sweeps away 
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and impresses’ (CP: 84; BP: 121). Apples are able to provide us with excitement only when 
newly cultivated species of apples are being introduced in supermarkets. Quiet walks in the 
garden amidst the apple trees are able to satisfy us less and less, and our holidays are filled 
with trips to far-away lands in search of immediate experiences. We forget these experiences 
easily and are constantly looking for new ones to thrill us and occupy our time. Massiveness 
describes how things are now evaluated according to their quantity, and how quantity 
becomes a quality. The qualities of things are represented through calculations, and things are 
no longer experienced in their truth. The quality of our holiday, for example, is measured by 
how far we went, how many days we were gone and how many rhinos we were able to spot 
on our safari. As these three factors contribute to loss of meaning in the world, they also 
disguise this loss of meaning in a multitude of superficial lived experiences, hiding it from 
man (CP: 85-6; BP: 121-3). 
    Through calculation, acceleration and massiveness, the world is revealed to us differently, 
and this is what Heidegger, in his later works, called technological thinking. Technological 
thinking relies on calculations and mathematical representations of objects in order to achieve 
certainty that these representations are correct (AWP: 127; ZWB: 87). Thus, the truth of 
Being cannot unfold in beings, and we no longer respond to the call of Being. Manufacturing 
processes in a factory, for example, do not allow for things to reveal their truths to us but 
challenge objects forth. Factory workers do not work carefully with a given material in order 
to make unique works of handicraft but produce objects according to strictly defined 
requirements (QCT: 14-15; FT: 15). Things are ordered and produced for the sake of greater 
productivity. For example, apple jam sold in supermarkets is produced by machines in 
factories according to standardised recipes that attempt to minimize the amount of apple in 
the jam in search for higher profit margins. Resulting from this, things come to be seen as 
resources, they become mass-produced and uniform. But as I will demonstrate in more detail 
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later on the thesis, Heidegger here is not criticising all of our attempts to measure things, and 
he does not think that we should abandon technological thinking altogether. His concern is 
that technological thinking has now come to dominate the revealing of beings too much and 
he is worried that it might end up being the only way of revealing beings in the future. 
    Technological thinking, then, transforms the way in which we engage with the world and 
the role that we see ourselves playing in the world. As man focuses on ordering and 
organising objects, they no longer encounter these objects as the things that they are. Instead, 
they are encountered as resources, or as Heidegger calls it, standing-reserve. When things are 
understood as standing reserve, ‘everywhere, everything is ordered to stand by, to be 
immediately at hand, indeed to stand there just so that it may be on call for further ordering.’ 
(QCT: 17). They are thus encountered as something we can represent through numbers, and 
as resources that can be used and exploited. Things are understood only in relation to the 
usefulness they have for humans. But it is not only the things that man makes that come to be 
seen as standing-reserve:  
As soon as what it unconcealed no longer concerns man even as an object, but does so, rather, exclusively 
as standing reserve, then he comes to the very brink of a precipitous fall; that is, he comes to the point 
where he himself will have to be taken as standing-reserve. Meanwhile, man, precisely as the one so 
threatened exalts himself to the posture of lord of the earth. In this way the impression comes to prevail 
that everything man encounters exists only insofar as it is his construct (QCT: 26-7; FT: 27-8). 
 
Man is now understood as standing-reserve as well, as a resource that can order and 
manufacture entities. But man fails to notice how he, too, has been reduced to standing-
reserve, and thinks that his position has been elevated because he is now able to efficiently 
order and represent beings (QCT: 18; FT: 18). This is illustrated, for example, by the copious 
newspaper articles discussing how we should best spend our holidays during the summer so 
that these holidays can provide us with the maximum amount of rest and so that we can again 
work through the autumn and winter as efficiently as possible. The experiences of far-away 
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lands and cultures that we chase on our holidays are often chased for the sake of refreshing 
ourselves so that we can be more productive at work, function better as a resource. Even 
gardening and growing apples can be seen as a resource, as something that allows us to rest, 
to take a break, and become more productive workers.  
   So how could we overcome technological thinking and arrive at a different way of relating 
to beings? In ‘Question Concerning Technology’ Heidegger introduces the concept of poesis 
in order to explain how humans can engage with things in a way that allows them to be 
revealed not as resources but as the beings that they are. He argues that when humans engage 
with the world through poesis, they understand that they alone are not in control of how 
entities emerge into unconcealment. This happens, for example, when things are made and 
revealed through crafts and arts. Poeisis plays a role when a carpenter is working with wood 
to make a table. The carpenter understands that he alone is not in control of the 
manufacturing process but the wood also participates in it, as well as culturally mediated 
ideas of what a table should look like and what a table should be used for. The craftsman 
cannot know in advance exactly what the end product will be because in each manufacturing 
process, (s)he brings the different elements, that are part of the bringing the thing into 
appearance, together in different and unique ways. The craftsman thus works in harmony 
with the thing being manufactured. Poeisis, then, is a way of revealing that allows for the 
unfolding of Being and for the happening of truth (QCT: 10; FT: 12). It allows things to show 
up as they are, without imposing definitions and representations on them.  
    In addition to discussing poesis, Heidegger also recognises that not every being emerging 
into the world has been made by humans. He emphasises this by introducing phusis as a 
special case of poeisis. In ‘Question Concerning Technology’, phusis describes a thing 
emerging into unconcealment on its own accord, without human involvement. Heidegger 
maintains that phusis is poeisis in the highest sense: ‘[f]or what presences by means of phusis 
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has the bursting open belonging to bringing-forth, e.g., the bursting of a blossom into bloom, 
in itself’ (QCT: 10-11; FT 12). Phusis is also the Greek word for nature, and it will be an 
important concept when thinking about Heidegger and green politics in this thesis. Common 
green ways of thinking about phusis refer to it as the spontaneous growth and development of 
a particular set of nonhuman natural things in a similar way to the green interpretations of the 
earth. I will adopt this way of thinking about phusis for now, and will return to discussing this 
concept at the end of this chapter. The next section of the chapter will now move on to look at 
how we can resist technological thinking in more depth by investigating how Heidegger 
introduces the idea of dwelling in the fourforld of the earth, the sky, the gods and the mortals 
as something that can help us overcome technological thinking. 
 
Dwelling  
We can now see how, in Heidegger’s later work, the question of Being is no longer only a 
question of how humans make sense of the world. It now becomes about explaining how 
humans learn to let beings be when they do not try to represent beings, but instead, allow 
beings to appear as the beings that they are, in their concealment. This understanding of the 
happening of truth already began touching on some environmental themes through an 
exploration of how the earth participates in the happening of truth. These themes become 
even more prevalent in Heidegger’s later writings where he explores further how we can 
learn to question Being and overcome technological thinking. Heidegger does this by 
developing a concept of dwelling in two lectures, ‘Building Dwelling Thinking’ and ‘The 
Thing’. In these lectures, he describes how humans learn to dwell when they allow what he 
calls a fourfold, consisting of the earth, the sky, the divinities and the mortals, to enter into 
things. Because Heidegger does not discuss the meaning of the four elements of the fourfold 
in great detail, understanding what he says requires careful interpretation of his words and 
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knowledge of these themes in Heidegger’s other works. It is to this task of making sense of 
the fourfold that I will now turn. 
   The easiest way to start thinking about the different elements of the fourfold is to start with 
the earth and the sky. The concept of the earth, that was already present in Heidegger’s 
account on the happening of truth, now re-appears in his works on dwelling. However, in 
Heidegger’s later works, the way in which he talks about the earth changes. Maybe the 
biggest change that takes place in how Heidegger talks about the earth is that the earth no 
longer strives with the world, but it now becomes a part of the world, it describes the 
concealment of entities as we encounter them in the world (Fell, 1979: 200). When Heidegger 
is talking about the earth as one member of the fourfold, he also pairs the earth with the sky: 
to dwell on the worlded earth now means to simultaneously dwell under the sky. However, as 
Dastur (1999: 141n.2, c.f. Kockelmans, 1984: 105-11) explains, although the way in which 
Heidegger talks about the earth changes and references to the sky are missing from ‘Origins 
of the Work of Art’, this does not mark a radical shift in the way in which Heidegger thinks 
about the earth. Heidegger is now using both the sky and the earth to describe how the 
concealing earth of ‘Origins of the Work of Art’ emerges into the world.  
    The earth, Heidegger explains in ‘Building Dwelling Thinking’, is the ground on which we 
learn to dwell. It ‘is the serving bearer, blossoming and fruiting, spreading out in rock and 
water, rising up into plant and animal’ (BDT: 147; BWD: 151). And the sky, he explains, is 
‘the vaulting path of the sun, the course of the changing moon, the wandering glitter of the 
stars, the year’s seasons and their changes, the light and dusk of day, the gloom and glow of 
night, the clemency and the inclemency of the weather’ (BDT: 147; BWD: 151). Due to the 
imagery that Heidegger employs here, I initially interpreted the earth and the sky in a similar 
manner as I understood the earth in ‘Origins of the Work of Art’. I understood the sky and the 
earth as referring literally to the sky and to the earth, as elements which allow for the growth 
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of nonhuman natural beings. As Mark Wrathall (2011: 205, emphasis original) elaborates, 
according to this popular interpretation ‘[t]he earth is the earth beneath our feet, the earth that 
spreads out all around us as mountains and in trees, in rivers and streams. The sky is the sky 
above our heads, the starts and constellations, the sun and the moon, the shifting weather that 
brings changing seasons.’ I will return to these interpretations of the sky and the earth 
towards the end of the chapter, and explore some of the contradictions that arise from this 
literal way of understanding the sky and the earth. But despite their problems, these 
interpretations can serve as good initial introductions to dwelling and the fourfold. Even if we 
end up concluding that Heidegger is not referring to sky and the earth in a literal sense, 
because of the descriptions that he uses to illustrate the meaning of dwelling, this is at least 
where Heidegger wants us to begin our journey of thinking about the meaning of dwelling.  
    So how can we learn to dwell on the earth and under the sky? Heidegger explains that 
humans dwell when they ‘receive the sky as sky. They leave to sun and the moon their 
journey, to the stars their courses, to the seasons their blessings and their inclemency; they do 
not turn night into day nor day into harassed unrest’ (BDT: 148; BWD: 152). If the earth and 
the sky are understood in a literal sense, then this means that if we want to learn to dwell, we 
should adopt a similar non-interfering attitude towards the earth and the sky as was already 
discussed when the concealing earth in ‘Origins of the Work of Art’ was being explored: we 
should recognise that the earth and the sky have their own autonomous ways of unfolding and 
revealing themselves. By letting the sky be a sky and the earth be an earth, we respect this 
autonomy of the sky and the earth, and allow them to unfold in their own distinct ways. 
   What Heidegger means by mortals and gods is harder to grasp. By mortals, Heidegger 
refers to humans. Humans are called mortals because they ‘can die. To die means to be 
capable of death as death. Only man dies, and indeed continually, as long as he remains on 
earth, under the sky, before divinities’ (BDT: 148; BWD: 152). Heidegger does not spend 
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long explaining why he chooses to call humans mortals here, but the finite existence of 
humans is not a new theme in his work. This theme was already present in Being and Time. 
As was explored earlier in this chapter, in Being and Time Heidegger explained how Dasein 
attempts to forget his/her finite existence, the fact that there is no supreme being, such as the 
Christian God or Descartes’ knowing subject, that allows for forming objective truths about 
beings and allows for securely grounding our knowledge of the world. Humans attempt to 
forget this by busying themselves in everyday activities, by forgetting themselves amidst 
beings. But by coming to terms with his/her own finite existence, humans can learn to 
question Being and, in the end, attain a more fulfilling life (BT: 230-234; ZT: 247-250). 
Thus, this focus on mortals highlights that Being is unconcealed to humans in many different 
ways and that humans, as temporal beings, can never find any universally valid, correct ways 
of defining and explaining beings (Dastur, 2000: 130). 
    Heidegger has even less to say about the meaning of the gods. He explains that gods are 
the ‘beckoning messengers of the godhead. Out of the holy sway of the godhead, the god 
appears in his presence or withdraws into his concealment’ (BDT: 148; BWD: 151). He does 
not go further into detail when explaining what these gods are, but clues to what they might 
refer to can be found in Heidegger’s other writings. Julian Young (2002: 95-8) explains that 
in ‘Question Concerning Technology’ Heidegger talks about the gods in reference to ‘divine 
destinings’ that give people their laws and customs, and he equates the gods with our 
heritage, which communicates how we are in the world. In Contributions to Philosophy 
Heidegger talks about the gods in a similar manner. He explains that the there in which 
Dasein dwells is the between of men that ground history and the gods that are historical (CP: 
219; BP: 311-312). It is, however, difficult to find a way of clearly explaining what these 
gods are without moving to talk about something else. The gods, simply put, allow us to 
overcome technological thinking, thinking of the truth of beings in terms of correctness, and 
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allow for the unfolding of the concealing earth. As Kovacs (1990: 186) explains, gods give 
guidance for mortals for living rich and fulfilling lives by ‘providing poetic insight into the 
“place” of human living “between heaven and earth”’.  
    Heidegger maintains that mortals learn to dwell when they await for the appearance of the 
gods: 
They wait for intimations of their coming and do not mistake the signs of their absence. They do not make 
their gods for themselves and do not worship idols. In the very depth of misfortune they wait for the weal 
that has been withdrawn (BDT: 148; BWD: 152).  
 
He emphasises waiting for gods here because humans are mortal and they can only have a 
finite understanding of the world. This means that mortals can never fully explain what these 
gods are, how they appear to us and allow us to dwell. Instead, mortals can only await for 
their appearance (see e.g. Fell, 1985). 
    However, it is important not to focus too much on attempting to gain an understanding of 
what the elements of the fourfold refer to and what role they play in allowing us to dwell. 
This is what Heidegger has to say about how we should think about the fourfold in ‘The 
Thing’:  
As soon as human cognition here calls for an explanation, it fails to transcend the world’s nature, and it 
falls short of it. The human will to explain just does not reach to the simpleness of the simple onefold of 
worlding. The united four are already entangled in their essential nature when we think of them only as 
separate realities, which are to be grounded in and explained by one another (Thing, 177-8; Ding: 181).  
 
So this means that the descriptions of the earth, the sky, the divinities and the mortals that 
Heidegger offers are not meant to be separate elements and exact definitions of the 
functioning of the fourfold. Instead, they are poetic descriptions of the fourfold that allow us 
to start thinking of the fourfold without ever being able to explicitly state what this fourfold 
is.  
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    Heidegger elaborates on this in an essay called ‘…Poetically Man Dwells…’ where he 
explores the relationship between poetry and learning to dwell. Here Heidegger maintains 
that poetry is the nature of dwelling. This is because poetry is measure-taking. But poetry is 
not measuring in the sense of using measuring rods to calculate and mathematically represent 
things. Instead, it takes measure in a more mysterious sense. Poetry gives mortals their 
dwelling place by taking measure of the earth and the sky, allowing mortals to exist on the 
earth, under the skies by showing the gods as gods (PMD: 220-221; DWM: 203). Instead of 
relying on exact calculations and measurements, poetry allows for this measure-taking by 
making mysterious images that allow the gods to be seen (see also Elden, 2001: 83). 
Heidegger explains that these images are ‘not mere fantasies and illusions but imaginings that 
are visible inclusions of the alien in the familiar. The poetic saying of images gathers the 
brightness and sound of the heavenly appearances into one with the darkness and silence of 
what is alien.’ (PMD: 223-224; DWM: 204-205, translation modified). Poetic language, then, 
helps us think about what it means to question Being. 
    Thinking of poetry as making these mysterious images helps make sense of the poetic 
language that Heidegger uses to describe the fourfold. Poetry is not measure-taking with 
measuring rods, and to poetically describe the fourfold does not mean that we should attempt 
to give precise definitions of each of its four elements. Rather, Heidegger’s aim is to paint a 
mysterious picture of the fourfold that allows us to start thinking about our dwelling place on 
the earth and under the sky, amidst our gods. This description of the fourfold guides us in our 
attempts to start thinking of dwelling, while, at the same time, preserving the fourfold in its 
mystery, never attempting to fully represent it.  
    Heidegger, then, is only using this description of the fourfold in a poetic sense, not as 
something that can be explained and categorised, but as a guide for us to learn to think about 
Being. In the end, the elements of the fourfold are not separate elements at all: ‘[e]ach of the 
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four mirrors in its own way the presence of others. Each therewith reflects itself in its own 
way into its own, within the simpleness of the four’ (Thing: 177; Ding: 180). The earth, the 
sky, the divinities and the mortals always exist together, mirroring each other. In this 
mirroring, each of the elements of the fourfold are reflected as separate but they nevertheless 
belong together, exist in a unity. 
    Now that we have some idea of the meaning of the fourfold, we can start looking at what it 
means to dwell and to let the fourfold into things, and how learning to dwell can help us think 
about Being. Heidegger gives a number of concrete examples that illustrate how humans can 
learn to dwell on the earth, how we can refrain from controlling our environments and how 
things can come to matter to us. In these examples, dwelling is about engaging with our 
environments in such a way that the fourfold can be allowed to enter into things (BDT: 149: 
BWD: 155). In ‘The Thing’ Heidegger describes a clay jug to explain how we can experience 
beings as the beings that they are, and how the mysterious fourfold can be experienced in 
things. He explains that we can try to describe the jug in scientifically correct terms. The jug 
is a container, and we can measure its dimensions. But although these descriptions of the jug 
may be correct, they are unable to describe the truth of the jug. We understand the jug as a 
thing only if we allow the fourfold to enter into the jug. Heidegger explains how the fourfold 
is gathered together when water is poured from the jug. The earth and sky are present in the 
water that is being poured:  
The spring stays on in the water of the gift. In the spring the rock dwells, and in the rock dwells the dark 
slumber of the earth, which receives the rain and the dew of the sky. In the water of the spring dwells the 
marriage of sky and earth.[…] But the gift of the outpouring is what makes the jug a jug. In the jugness of 
the jug, sky and earth dwell (Thing: 170; Ding: 174). 
 
Thus, the jug, and the water in the jug, are not made only by humans, but the sky and the 
earth play a part in the revealing of the jug, and are always present in the gift of the 
outpouring.  
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    The gods and the mortals are also present in the outpouring: ‘[t]he gift of the pouring is a 
gift for mortals. It quenches their thirst. It refreshes their leisure. It enlivens their 
conviviality’ (Thing, 170; Ding:  174). Mortals do not only pour water from the jug because 
they are thirsty, but this pouring always happens in a particular context and has meaning 
beyond quenching thirst. We might be sharing the jug of water with our friends, the water can 
refresh us, helping us enjoy the gathering with friends. The gods are the ones whose 
appearance can make this outpouring an extraordinary event for us. The jug, which from a 
scientific viewpoint was only a container with certain geometric dimensions that can be filled 
with liquid, now acquires new meanings:  
In the gift of the outpouring, mortals and divinities each dwell in their different ways. Earth and sky dwell 
in the gift of the outpouring. In the gift of the outpouring earth and sky, divinities and mortals dwell 
together at once. These four, at one because of what they themselves are, belong together. Preceding 
everything that is present, they are enfolded in a single fourfold (Thing: 170; Ding: 174).  
 
The jug, then, is no longer a mere container with certain geometric dimensions. As the 
fourfold is experienced in the jug, the jug becomes something different and extraordinary.  
    Technological thinking, concentrating on representing beings, makes it harder to stay with 
things. Heidegger explains how in the modern age we are no longer able to remain near to 
things: 
Man now reaches overnight, by plane, places which formerly took weeks and months of travel. He now 
receives instant information, by radio, of events which he formerly learned about only years later, if at all. 
The germination and growth of plants, which remained hidden throughout the seasons, is now exhibited 
publicly in a minute, on film. Distant sites of most ancient cultures are shown on film as if they stood this 
moment amidst today’s street traffic. Moreover, the film attests to what it shows by presenting also the 
camera and its operators at work. The peak of this abolition of every possibility of remoteness is reached 
by television, which will soon pervade and dominate the whole machinery of communication (Thing: 163; 
Ding: 167). 
 
So here Heidegger explains how modern technology has abolished physical distances and 
made things more accessible. But when we become pre-occupied with abolishing physical 
distances and representing beings, we lose the ability to bring the fourfold into things, to stay 
with beings and to be near them. While the accelerated pace of our lives might allow us to 
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travel more and farther, to see more of the world, the immediate experiences which we have 
of things nevertheless does not ensure that we stay with things, experience them in their 
nearness. These experiences remain just experiences that are forgotten quickly as we hurry 
onwards in search of new experiences.  
    What is interesting in the account of dwelling is the focus on how we can learn to dwell 
when we stay with particular things. Unlike in ‘Origins of the Work of Art’, Heidegger is no 
longer describing how great works of art can help a community reflect on what is important 
for that community. In these later works on dwelling, he is more interested in how we can 
learn to dwell when we learn to stay with everyday things. Indeed, there can be no fourfold 
without the existence of the things which can gather the fourfold (Mitchell, 2010: 215). 
Heidegger elaborates on this by explaining that ‘staying with things, however, is not 
something attached to this fourfold as a fifth something. On the contrary: staying with things 
is the one way in which the fourfold stay within the fourfold is accomplished at any time in 
simple unity’ (BDT: 149; BWD: 153). So it is through staying with everyday things that we 
can allow for the unfolding of the fourfold. Heidegger’s description of how we can let the 
fourfold unfold in the jug was an example of this kind of staying. Furthermore, the focus here 
is no longer how a community of people can gain a sense of what is important for that 
community but the focus is now on how staying with things can help us on our own personal 
journeys of dwelling. 
    I can also think of the fourfold as something that gathers together as I learn to dwell in my 
grandparents’ garden and stay with the trees that grow there. When I do this, I learn to pay 
attention to the earth as the soil from which the apple trees grow and to the sky as that which 
nourishes the trees, providing sunshine and water, allowing the trees to burst into bloom as 
spring arrives. I can learn to dwell in the garden as a mortal if I learn to pay attention to the 
flourishing of the sky and the earth and to my own finite understanding of them, and I can 
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allow for the presence of the gods if I allow the apple trees to appear as apple trees, 
contemplating them without trying to explain what they are, allowing them to bloom and bear 
fruit without regulating this process too much. I can also dwell with the apples in the autumn 
when I bake a pie and share it with friends, if I pay attention to how the earth and the sky, 
which have unfolded in the growth of the apples, contribute to their distinctive flavour, to 
how the apples taste a certain way because of the soil and the climate that allowed them to 
grow. The gods are present in the baking of the pie, allowing apples to be revealed as fruit 
that can be baked into a pie. The gods are also present as mortals gather together to eat the 
pie, they can bring back memories of the warm summers which allow apples to grow and of 
past cold autumns spent in the warm indoors eating apple pies. When this happens, we learn 
to stop thinking of the apple pie as a resource, and begin to allow for the unfolding of the 
fourfold in this gathering, we learn to stay with the apple pie and begin to dwell. 
 
Heidegger and Green Thinking   
Heidegger’s descriptions of the role of the earth in the strife between the earth and the sky 
and his description of the roles that the earth and the sky play in dwelling in the fourfold have 
prompted many green thinkers to investigate how Heidegger’s thinking could help us find an 
alternative way of thinking about green politics. Some environmental themes in Heidegger’s 
thinking were already hinted at when the roles the earth and the earth and the sky play in the 
happening of truth and in dwelling were explored. Heidegger makes even more links with 
green thinking as he discusses the meaning of phusis, the Greek word for nature, in ‘Question 
Concerning Technology’. Nature, here, as that which emerges into appearance on its own 
accord, is introduced as something that should not be controlled and manipulated according 
to the will of man. Instead, we must allow natural beings to reveal themselves to us as they 
are. Smith elaborates these sentiments as follows: 
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[T]he monsoon does not become meaningful simply because certain social practices ascribe meaning to it. 
It is meaningful because it too is party to a particular ‘form of life’. It is because the effects it produces 
make an impression on that mode of being in the world that they are carried over into its linguistic 
tradition. This impression is the monsoon’s message (Smith, 2001: 69). 
 
Nature, then, for Heidegger, seems to be something that we should not try to control and 
regulate. Instead, we should allow it to grow and unfold on its own accord. 
    Heidegger also explicitly discusses how technological thinking has an impact on the 
environment. With technological thinking, the environment is not understood in its own terms 
but it is understood as an object for science that organises and manipulates nature in the name 
of efficiency (CP: 349; BP:  349). In ‘Question Concerning Technology’ Heidegger explains 
that when technological thinking dominates, man makes demands on the environment: the 
environment is shaped according to human will, organised and manipulated to ensure an 
efficient extraction of resources from it. Heidegger uses energy production as an example of 
this. He maintains that technology ‘puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply 
energy which can be extracted and stored as such’ (QCT: 14; FT: 15). The hydroelectric plant 
on the river Rhine, for example, does not reveal the Rhine as the river that it is but makes 
demands on the river. It sets the Rhine to provide pressure to turn turbines, forcing the river 
appear as something that is under human command. The river is no longer a river, but a 
supplier of power (QCT: 16; FT: 16). In a similar manner, industrial farming methods no 
longer allow apples to be apples. They do not allow apples to emerge into unconcealment on 
their own accord, in a variety of different shapes and flavours. Instead, apples are challenged 
forth as uniformly shaped apples are produced as efficiently as possible. They lose their 
distinctive flavour because the earth is no longer able to strife with the world in the apples. 
Technological thinking no longer allows for questioning how natural entities rise into 
unconcealment on their own accord, how the concealment of the earth always remains a part 
of these entities and how humans can never fully know the truth of beings. According to this 
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way of reading Heidegger, then, to protect nature, we must resist technological thinking and 
allow natural things to grow and unfold on their own; we must learn to question the unfolding 
of phusis. 
       So how have Heidegger’s ideas been used to make sense of environmental degradation 
and the aims of green politics?  This kind of a reading of phusis allows for diagnosing the 
root causes of environmental degradation. Irwin (2011, see also Hodge, 1995;  Joronen, 2011, 
Skocz: 2009), for example, provides a detailed account of how Heidegger’s philosophy 
reveals that the illusion that we can calculate and control the unfolding of the earth is the root 
cause of current environmental problems. Heidegger’s philosophy demonstrates that attempts 
to control pollution and regulate climate change are in vain because we can never calculate 
and model the unfolding of nature nor can we mathematically represent the different ways in 
which the truth of nature unfolds. 
    Heidegger’s thinking also suggests new ways of thinking about how to confront 
environmental degradation. The solution to environmental problems is not to find more 
efficient ways of controlling and regulating the environment but to find an altogether new 
way of relating to nature, one that does not attempt to find correct ways of representing it but 
allows nature to unfold in its own way, no longer reducing nature to a resource (Padrutt, 
2009: 33-4). This can happen when humans learn to question Being. Foltz (1995: 136) 
elaborates on this as follows:  
Paying attention to phusis as self-emergence helps to understand why using nature efficiently as a resource 
is unable to unconceal the truth of nature. Natural entities are not there only to be utilised and researched, 
but they have their own autonomy and their own mystery, they come forth and linger of their own accord 
(Foltz, 1995: 127).  
  
Dwelling in the fourfold can also be understood as an act of protecting the environment. To 
take care of the environment, we should concentrate on allowing the earth to remain the earth 
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and on allowing the sky to remain a sky. As Smith (2007: 188) explains, ‘if we are to 
preserve the sky as a sky, we cannot negate the effects of night and day, of summer and 
winter. Man cannot live as human in a temperature- and light- controlled terrarium’. Wrathall 
(2011: 206) also explains how we learn to dwell when we ‘incorporate into our practices the 
particular features of the environment around us’, when we incorporate ‘the peculiar features 
of the temporal cycles of the heavens, the day and the night, the seasons and the weather’ 
(Wrathall, 2011: 206-7).  In short, we learn to dwell when we adapt to our environments, 
without trying to control and regulate how things appear to us. We must allow the sky to be a 
sky, accept the changing weather and the changing seasons, and learn to live with the sky 
instead of trying to control and regulate it. Similarly, we must allow the earth to be an earth 
by allowing things to grow and reveal themselves in their own distinct ways. It is only if we 
allow phusis to unfold in its own way, allow the earth and the sky to enter into fourfold, that 
we can protect nature.  
    Many environmental actions, that are understood from a more conventional environmental 
politics perspective as resource management, gain new meanings when they are considered 
from the perspective of questioning and protecting Being. Foltz explains: 
[C]omposting can only be saving the earth’s own nourishment, which grants to it its darkness, heaviness, 
pungency, and pace. Recycling can be a reminder that even the aluminium can bear the pliant yet 
sustaining character of the earth itself – and hence can be a saving of that character along with the metal. 
And wilderness areas may be genuinely saved as those places of the earth where the mystery of self-
seclusion consorts in splendour with the wonder of self-emergence (Foltz, 1995: 166).  
 
Dwelling, thus, can help think about environmental actions in a different way. Although 
similar in their practical consequences, Foltz maintains that these approaches to protecting 
the environment differ from conventional environmental politics because they are not 
undertaken for the sake of efficiently regulating natural resources. Instead, they are 
undertaken for the sake of protecting earth, for the sake of dwelling on earth, and for the sake 
of feeling homely (Foltz, 1995: 166, see also Maly, 2009: 52-3). In a similar manner, Young 
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(2002: 104) explains that dwelling on the earth means to experience and question Being, to 
allow the fact there is a world and that there are beings to fill us with wonder. This wonder 
guides us to care for the earth. We can care for the earth, for example, through organic 
farming that ‘cultivates crops that bring forth the potentialities of the local soil’ (Young, 
2002: 108), and by building houses in a way that conserves the landscape in which they are 
built (Young, 2002: 109). These actions are not performed in order to efficiently manage 
beings but they are aimed at allowing us to question Being, at resisting technological thinking 
and allowing the earth to unfold on its own accord. Young also emphasises that what is 
important about Heidegger’s writings is not that he has some ideas in regards to how the earth 
can be made a dwelling place for humans, but that ‘these attractive ideas are grounded, 
grounded in his philosophy of [B]eing’ (Young, 2002: 121, emphasis original). Thus, 
environmental actions are undertaken for the sake of dwelling and for the sake of questioning 
Being. 
    Allowing for this unfolding of nature and allowing the fourfold to enter into things can 
lead to concrete environmental actions. For example, giving thought to how apples reveal 
themselves to me can allow me to learn how to take care of the apples in my grandparents’ 
garden, how to grow apples in a way that does not harm the surrounding environment. It can 
also encourage me to act in an environmentally friendly way even when I am not in the 
countryside. Paying attention to how the apple reveals itself in the fourfold can remind me of 
the changing seasons of the sky and encourage me to consume locally produced apples in the 
autumn when they are in season. It might also result in remembering the autonomy of the 
earth and in not wanting to buy uniformly shaped apples, choosing instead to purchase apples 
from a small producer who takes better care of the earth from which the apples grow and 
allows them to appear in different shapes and sizes. 
121 
 
    Initially, I found these kinds of readings of Heidegger and green politics attractive because 
they seemed to answer many of the questions I had in regards to how we might think about 
nature, and how thinking about nature can impact environmental practices. They allow for 
articulating why nature seems to be so important for us, what is important about the concept 
of nature that cannot be articulated through the language provided by ANT. Paying attention 
to nature, letting go of technological thinking and allowing beings to unfold to us as the 
beings that they are, is important because it allows us to overcome thinking of things in terms 
of resources and allows us to live richer and more fulfilling lives. This is why it is important 
for green politics to not just focus on preventing environmental degradation but to focus on 
protecting the unfolding of nature.  
    Heidegger’s philosophy can also be used to respond to some of the critics of the idea of 
nature. His thinking allows us to recognise that nature is complex, and that we cannot explain 
exactly what we mean when we say that something is a part of nature. His criticism of truth 
and his description of the unfolding of phusis mean that we cannot understand the unfolding 
of nature and that we cannot explain what nature is. As Seckinelgin (2006) explains, although 
there can be no objective truths about nature, this does not mean that we can have no 
knowledge of nature. We need to recognise that nature can reveal itself to us in many 
different ways, and that any knowledge we have of nature can never be a final, definitive way 
of understanding nature. We can now start thinking of nature as something that emerges out 
of unconcealment on its own accord, and reveals itself to humans in different ways 
(Seckinelgin, 2006: 109; see also DeLuca, 2005). Natural entities, then, are no longer things 
that we can represent and control, but things that we engage with and give meaning to, while 
still allowing them retain their own autonomy and to reveal themselves to us in their own 
distinct ways  
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    This way of thinking about nature has also been used to provide an answer to those who 
maintain that we cannot talk about nature because the natural and the social are so 
intertwined that we cannot separate these two from each other. It is true that thinking of 
Heidegger’s phusis does not change radically the set of entities to which nature refers. For 
Foltz, for example, self-emergence can be seen in those processes that we conventionally 
understand as natural. Foltz (1995: 126) maintains that phusis can be seen ‘in the rising sun, 
and in the emergence of the grain of seed sunk deep into the earth, the sprouting of the young 
shoot, the emerging and unfolding of the blossom’. Foltz recognises that self-emergence can 
also occur in entities that are not normally understood as nature. Nevertheless, he maintains 
that phusis applies primarily to natural processes because in these things of nature ‘the self-
emergent character of being is most manifest’ (Foltz, 1995: 126-7). An apple, for example, 
reveals itself through phusis as it grows from a flower and turns into a fruit. But this still does 
not mean that an apple can be an apple independently of humans. Human activity is required 
for beings to appear as beings. Although the apple can unconceal itself without direct human 
involvement, it becomes a being only when it is revealed to humans as an apple, and when 
humans engage with the apple in a way that allows it to be an apple. 
    Heidegger’s description of the fourfold as the interplay of the earth, the sky, the divinities 
and the mortals also demonstrates that nature can never be unconcealed to us as something 
purely nonhuman but it can only be revealed when mortals interact with the sky and the earth. 
In the interpretation of Heidegger presented here, the fourfold is the meeting place of nature 
and culture, where mortals always measure and interpret the earth and the sky with the gods 
as a guide (Cloke and Jones, 2007: 651). Thus, as Malpas (2006: 237) explains, the gathering 
of the fourfold into a thing ‘is not merely “natural” such that it occurs apart from the made. 
Instead their character as things is a testament to the way in which the natural and the made 
grow together in and thought them.’ For example, we cannot say that the apple belongs to the 
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sky and the earth or to the gods and the mortals because it is always a part of both. It is also 
important to note that Heidegger is not advocating any kind of attitude of non-interference 
towards nature. Letting the sky be a sky and the earth an earth does not mean that mortals 
should leave the sky and the earth untouched. Rather, the earth and sky are preserved when 
mortals engage with their environments in a way that allows the fourfold to enter into things 
(Young, 2002).  
   However, a closer examination of these green interpretations of nature reveals some 
problems in them. Firstly, it reveals that these Heideggerian interpretations of green politics 
are not able to fully respond to challenges posed by those who maintain that we cannot draw 
clear distinctions between human and nonhuman environments. Although this way of 
thinking about nature as phusis, or as the earth and the sky, overcomes some of the problems 
associated with thinking about nature, this approach to nature remains problematic. It still 
does not explain what the unfolding of natural beings, that takes place independently of 
human involvements, is. Can we talk about this unfolding as something that happens 
independently of humans? The environmental conditions that allow for the growth of apples, 
for example, are largely created by humans. There are very few places on the earth where an 
apple tree could grow and develop without humans being somehow involved in shaping the 
environment in which the tree grows. 
     But if this is the case, why am I still trying to use Heidegger to make sense of nature, why 
do I still think that he could be helpful in making sense of the role of the concept of nature in 
green politics? This is because there is also an internal contradiction in the way that green 
thinkers approach Heidegger’s work. This suggests that the initial understanding of what 
Heideggerian green politics looks like presented in this chapter is not entirely accurate and 
that there are better ways of thinking about the role of nature in Heidegger’s work. To 
understand why this way of approaching Heidegger is problematic, I am going to look in 
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more detail at how we might allow for the unfolding of the earth. As an example, to allow the 
earth to unfold in the growth of apple trees, we might decide to adopt organic farming 
methods to start growing apples. Organic farming, as was explored above, is a popular 
example given by Heideggerian green thinkers of the kind of behaviour that allows for the 
unfolding of the earth because it does not aim to regulate this unfolding, but allows the earth 
to grow and develop on its own accord. A closer examination of what organic farming 
entails, however, reveals problems in this way of reading Heidegger. Beginning to grow 
apples organically does not mean that we just throw some apple seeds in the garden. Instead, 
we have to be quite involved in this process. Only certain kinds of apples are resistant enough 
to pests to be farmed organically and therefore, we have to be careful about the species of 
apples we grow. We also need to choose good organic fertilisers, and we need a way of 
dealing with pests; we can do this by attracting predator species to eat the pests or we can use 
organic pesticides. So the idea behind organic farming might be to interfere less with our 
environments, but the details of how this should happen is based on scientific knowledge and 
research, it is reliant on making correct evaluations of what allows apples to grow and what 
does not. A closer examination, then, reveals that this way of thinking about the unfolding of 
the concealing earth is still reliant on making correct statements about what allows things to 
grow out of the earth and what does not. And this is problematic because, as I explained 
earlier, Heidegger claimed that forming these kinds of correct statements about beings does 
not help us make sense of what allows beings to appear to us as beings, and it cannot help us 
in thinking about how we might allow for the unfolding of phusis. 
    It is the focus on finding ways of addressing environmental problems that seems to be the 
problem here. These green interpreters of Heidegger do explain that they are not attempting 
to find solutions to specific environmental problems but are proposing fostering a different 
kind of attitude towards the nonhuman environment that lets go of thinking about protecting 
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nature in terms of problems and solutions (e.g. Foltz, 1995: 166; Holland 1999; Young, 2002: 
121). But proposing a shift in our attitudes towards nature as a response to environmental 
crisis already is a kind of a solution: it requires making certain correct judgements about the 
way in which the earth unfolds and still remains a part of technological thinking. 
    So if this is the case, if we cannot make sense of unfolding earth through these kinds of 
scientific investigations into environmentally friendly actions, then how could Heidegger’s 
thinking help us avoid environmental degradation? Dreyfus (1997: 99) argues that for 
Heidegger, the threat posed by technological thinking is not the threat of environmental 
destruction but this threat is found from the way in which technological thinking affects the 
way we see the world, the way it restricts our understanding of Being (see also Vaden, 2006: 
25). Heidegger, indeed, seems to state this explicitly in ‘The Thing’:  
Man stares at what the explosion of the atom bomb could bring with it. He does not see that the atom 
bomb and its explosion are the mere final emission of what has long since taken place, has already 
happened […] What is it that unsettles and thus terrifies? It shows itself and hides itself in the way in 
which everything presences, namely, in the fact that despite all conquest of distances the nearness of 
things remains absent (Thing: 164; Ding: 168, emphasis original).  
 
 
Thus, it is not the disappearance of life on earth that concerns Heidegger but the fact that 
humans have lost the ability to experience things in their nearness. But if Heidegger’s main 
concern was not to prevent environmental degradation, then we need a different way of 
thinking about phusis, the earth and the sky in his works. These terms can no longer be 
equated with the growth of a set of supposedly nonhuman natural beings. To address these 
concerns, the next chapter of the thesis will go on to propose an alternative way of thinking 
about these concepts. 
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Conclusion  
This chapter has begun answering the question of the role that nature plays in green politics, 
of how we should think about this concept that seems to be so difficult to explain but 
nevertheless seems to communicate something important about green goals. It has done this 
by exploring how Heidegger’s philosophy can offer new avenues for thinking about nature 
and green politics. Heidegger’s account of the clearing, of truth as an interplay between 
revealing and concealing, and his description of the fourfold are all important starting points 
for thinking about nature as they highlight that nature is not something that can be defined 
and explained. However, it seems that the many attempts to try to elaborate the consequences 
that Heidegger’s philosophy has for thinking about green politics have not been entirely 
successful. They take an important first step in thinking about nature as something that 
cannot be thought about in terms of correct statements, but they still understand nature as 
something that applies to a particular set of beings, and interpret the earth and the sky of the 
fourfold literally. As a consequence, they are still attempting to find best possible ways of 
preserving natural beings. Although these green accounts of Heidegger begin by investigating 
how he questions Being, when they move to explore in more concrete terms what a 
Heideggerian green politics could look like, they begin to focus on how to ensure the survival 
of natural beings. Heidegger’s task of questioning Being, questioning what allows these 
beings to appear as beings in the first place, seems to be forgotten.  
    Because of these problems, I concluded that nature in Heidegger’s philosophy cannot refer 
to a set of nonhuman natural beings, and the sky and the earth in his work cannot be 
understood in a literal sense. In the next chapter, I will begin developing a different way of 
understanding Heidegger’s thinking of nature, the earth and the sky, a way that does not try 
so hard to explain what exactly these concepts refer to. This allows for an alternative account 
of nature of Heidegger’s thought, and for an alternative way of questioning nature. The 
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chapter that follows will then go on to explore how we can question and protect the unfolding 
of nature. 
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Chapter Three: Heidegger’s Nature  
Introduction  
The previous chapter discussed how the way Heidegger questions Being could be used to 
think about the role that the concept of nature plays in green thinking. The idea of nature in 
green thought is puzzling because, as demonstrated in Chapter One, it seems to help green 
thinkers to articulate something important about their goals. However, its meaning is difficult 
to explain. Green thinkers often seem to assume that the concept of nature describes the 
spontaneous unfolding of nonhuman environments without explaining how we can talk about 
certain environments as being nonhuman when humans have shaped environments on Earth 
to a large extent. To start thinking about nature, the previous chapter turned to Heidegger’s 
philosophy. The chapter focused on how Heidegger’s questioning of Being can change the 
way in which we think about the truth of beings. For Heidegger, questioning the truth of a 
being is about questioning the opening that allows beings to appear to us as beings. This truth 
is not something that can be clearly articulated by formulating correct descriptions of beings 
but it is something that can never be fully grasped. A being will always appear to us as partly 
concealed because that which allows beings to appear as beings remains hidden from us. 
Heidegger thus argues that to question the truth of beings, we should allow beings to 
unconceal themselves to us in ways that we cannot fully understand. 
    The chapter then explored how Heidegger’s philosophy leads to a different way of thinking 
about nature. Two concepts in Heidegger’s work in particular provide clues for thinking 
about nature: phusis and the earth. Phusis, Heidegger maintains, is the Greek meaning of 
nature that we, pre-occupied with thinking of nature as a resource, as something that is to be 
managed and controlled, have forgotten. To understand how Heidegger thought about phusis, 
the chapter investigated popular green interpretations of phusis. Clues to thinking about 
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phusis were found in Heidegger’s essay ‘Question Concerning Technology’ where he 
employs the Greek understanding of phusis to rethink nature (QCT: 10-11; FT 12). For the 
Greeks, explains Heidegger, phusis referred to those things that emerge into unconcealment 
on their own accord, to things that grow instead of being made by humans. The earth is also 
related to this happening of phusis. The earth is the concealment that always participates in 
the happening of truth. In the previous chapter, the earth was taken to refer to the growth and 
development of the earth that conceals and nourishes entities that grow out of the it, 
describing how the way in which natural beings unfold through phusis always remains partly 
concealed from us. These two concepts, phusis and the earth, guided us towards a different 
way of thinking about nature. Encountering things in their truth, as the beings that they are, 
requires allowing natural beings to unfold in their own distinct ways, to understand that 
humans cannot fully control the manner in which these natural entities grow out of the 
concealing earth. Nature is no longer something that should be controlled and regulated, but it 
is now something that humans cannot fully comprehend.  
    However, as the chapter investigated the implications of this way of thinking about nature, 
it also identified some problems with the green way of understanding phusis and the earth. If 
nature refers to a distinct set of beings, to those that rise out of unconcealment on their own 
accord, then the question of protecting nature becomes a question of how we might protect 
natural beings so that they can continue to unfold in their own distinct ways. But Heidegger’s 
insistence that we should allow beings to reveal their truth to us does not sit easily with 
attempting to find ways of ensuring the survival of a particular set of beings. This kind of 
questioning is reliant on forming correct statements about the impact that human action has 
for the survival of these beings, it requires asking what kinds of ways of interacting with our 
environments allow natural beings to thrive, and what kinds of actions exploit them. This 
means that there is something problematic in the way that Heidegger’s work was interpreted 
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in the previous chapter. So while the chapter took important first steps in thinking about 
Heidegger’s work, the problems that the chapter encountered suggest that the way in which it 
approached these topics was incomplete. 
    The purpose of this chapter is to formulate an alternative way of thinking about nature in 
Heidegger’s work, and to revise the conclusions reached in the last chapter. It concentrates on 
rethinking the meaning of phusis and the earth in Heidegger’s work by investigating the pre-
Socratic understanding of phusis. This rethinking allows us to revisit the themes in 
Heidegger’s work that were already discussed in the last chapter. The chapter will also look 
closely at Heidegger’s conception of truth, what it means for beings to reveal their truth to us, 
why beings are always partly concealed by the earth and how we can learn to dwell on the 
earth and under the sky.  
    This chapter is divided into five parts. The first section looks at the role that language plays 
in Heidegger’s work, and why this kind of thinking about nature can shed some light into the 
role of nature in green thinking. The next section investigates the concept of phusis closely, 
and demonstrates how phusis is a more complex concept than was recognised in the previous 
chapter. The third section will then move on to think about the concealing earth, about how 
the earth participates in the unfolding of phusis and what the earth can tell us about phusis. 
The fourth section will then examine how this rethinking of phusis and the earth changes the 
way in which we think about protecting nature and about learning to dwell on the earth. The 
chapter concludes by looking at the important role that place plays in Heidegger’s thinking 
and how this emphasis on place can, in part, explain why Heidegger makes so many 
references to things conventionally understood as a part of a nonhuman nature when 
discussing dwelling. 
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Language  
Before going on to rethink the meaning of the concept of nature, I want to pause here for a 
moment and think about why this kind of exercise might be useful for thinking about green 
politics. Is there not a danger that, as we focus on what Heidegger had to say about nature and 
begin to think about nature as something other than the spontaneously unfolding nonhuman 
environment, we are no longer talking about the meaning that nature has for green thinkers 
but begin to talk about something else? We can answer this question by examining in more 
detail the role that language plays in Heidegger’s work. 
    As already explored in the introduction, Heidegger adopts a non-instrumental view of 
language. He distinguishes words from mere terms that ‘are like buckets or kegs out which 
we can scoop sense’, that we can define in dictionaries, and that become meaningful to us as 
we consult these dictionaries (WCT: 129; WHD: 88). Words and language are important for 
Heidegger because it is only when we can speak about beings that they appear to us as 
beings. Language, then, plays a part in the unconcealment of beings. Any kind of saying, 
Heidegger argues, is a showing that allows beings to appear as beings: ‘Saying pervades and 
structures the openness of that clearing which every appearance must seek out and every 
disappearance must leave behind, and in which every present or absent being must show, say, 
announce itself’ (WL: 126; WS: 246). And this is why humans themselves can never be in 
charge of language. Because the concealing earth always participates in the happening of 
truth, we can never fully know and grasp beings, and we can never express what these beings 
are through language: ‘[L]anguage is always ahead of us. Our speaking merely follows 
language constantly. Thus we are continually lagging behind what we first ought to have 
overtaken and taken up in order to speak about it’ (NL: 75; WS: 168-9). So we cannot use 
language as an instrument, and we cannot use it to arrive at exact representations and 
definitions of things. Instead of using language to explain what we are attempting to say, we 
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should listen to language and allow language to reveal its meanings to us, accepting that we 
can never explicitly say what a word means. We can never fully articulate the meanings that 
things have for us, and instead of trying to explain them, we must ponder about the mystery 
of language, allowing words to speak to us. Speaking is not about explaining and describing 
what we see before us, but speaking is always a listening:  
Speaking is listening to the language that we speak. Thus, it is a listening not while but before we are 
speaking. This listening to language also comes before all other kinds of listening that we know, in a most 
inconspicuous manner. We do not merely speak the language – we speak by way of it (WL: 124; WZS: 
243, emphasis original). 
 
  
When we listen to language in this way, we allow language speak to us. Thus, instead of 
thinking of words as kegs or buckets from which we can scoop content from, Heidegger 
likens words to wellsprings, ‘that are found and dug up in the telling, wellsprings that must be 
found and dug up again and again’ (WCT: 130; WHD: 89). Thus, he explains that ‘whenever 
we are listening to something, we are letting something be said to us’ (WL: 124; WS: 243, 
emphasis original). 
    We can now understand why listening to this word ‘nature’ might be useful, and might be 
able to tell us something about nature in green thinking. This kind of questioning is an 
attempt to go beyond those meanings that the word has for us that we can explicitly articulate 
and explain. Indeed, Heidegger explicitly states that the pre-Socratic meaning of phusis is 
important because the way in which we understand nature today is an echo of phusis, and it is 
this pre-Socratic nature that we are trying to get at when we are talking about nature. This is 
what he has to say:   
And a much weaker, much harder-to-hear echo of the original phusis that was projected as the being of 
beings, is still left for us when we speak of the “nature” of things, the nature of the “state,” and the 
“nature” of the human being by which we do not mean the natural “foundations” (thought of as physical, 
chemical, or biological) but rather the pure and simple being and essence of those beings (EP: 229; WP: 
370). 
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Listening to the word ‘nature’, then, can be useful because it can allow for new ways of 
approaching this word, for listening to ways of thinking about nature that might play a role in 
how we use the word but that we have nevertheless forgotten. 
 
Heidegger on Phusis and Nature 
I will begin the task of listening to the word ‘nature’ by taking a closer look at how 
Heidegger understood phusis, the Greek word for nature, and by looking at how the meaning 
of Heidegger’s phusis is not as clear is seemed to be at first. Although Heidegger seems to 
provide a clear definition of phusis in ‘Question Concerning Technology’, this is not the only 
definition of phusis that he gives. Haar (1993: 11) explains that Heidegger, in fact, provided 
three different definitions of phusis. In ‘Question Concerning Technology’ (10; FT: 12) 
Heidegger maintains that phusis refers to a set of entities that rise out of unconcealment on 
their own accord. It describes, for example, a flower that bursts into bloom. However, in 
Introduction to Metaphysics he maintains that phusis is Being itself (IM: 138; EM: 100). And 
in ‘Origins of the Work of Art’, Heidegger maintains that phusis is the concealing earth that 
participates in the happening of truth (OWA: 41; UK: 28). It is difficult to see how these 
different definitions describe the same phusis, and it thus seems that understanding 
Heidegger’s conception of phusis is not as straightforward as it seemed to be in the previous 
chapter. To start investigating what Heidegger means when he talks about phusis, I will first 
take a closer look at the relationship between his and the Greek understandings of phusis. I 
will do this by looking at Heidegger’s essay ‘On the Essence and Concept of Phusis in 
Aristotle’s Physics B, 1’, where he provides a detailed discussion of Aristotle’s conception of 
phusis. Here Heidegger discusses in more detail why it is important to question the pre-
Socratic notion of nature, and to what extent Aristotle’s understanding of phusis can help in 
this task.  
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    Heidegger begins this essay by explaining how his questioning of phusis takes place in a 
wider context of attempting to understand the meaning that nature has for us. Although nature 
is now commonly understood as a resource to be controlled and calculated, the meaning of 
nature continues to puzzle Heidegger. This is because nature seems to have other meanings to 
us. Nature is often used to talk about how things are, and it is understood as something that 
grounds our existence. Christian thinkers, for example, talk about the natural state of humans, 
the way that humans existed in the time of creation, and more secular thinkers talk about 
nature as the natural drives and passions of humans (EP: 183-5; WP: 309-11). Heidegger then 
proceeds to investigate Aristotle’s understanding of phusis in order to find out what this thing 
we call ‘nature’, which we seem to think of as something that grounds our existence, is. 
    Heidegger explains how Aristotle understood phusis as referring to a particular set of 
entities, to those entities which rise into unconcealment on their own accord. Phusis, for 
example, allows the flower to grow into a flower from the earth (EP: 191; WP: 320). Thus, 
Heidegger explains that, for Aristotle, phusis refers to one of the ways in which beings can be 
in this world: some beings are made by humans, the reason for why they appear in the world 
is found from the maker of that being, whereas other beings are in the world because they 
emerge into the world on their own accord. Nature, in Aristotle’s account, can be understood 
as grounding human existence in the sense that it allows those growing things that nourish 
humans to emerge into unconcealment in ways humans cannot control (Holland, 1999: 415).  
    So far, it seems that Heidegger understood phusis as describing how a particular set of 
natural beings unfold without human involvement. But this is not the whole story regarding 
what Heidegger says about Aristotle’s phusis. He concludes the essay by explaining that 
although we can use Aristotle’s conception of phusis to start thinking about what phusis 
might mean, Aristotle’s phusis is unable to completely explain what this thing we call 
‘nature’, which grounds our existence, is. This is because Aristotle understands phusis as 
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referring to a distinct set of beings, to those beings that emerge from unconcealment on their 
own accord. Because of this, it fails to explain the sense in which nature can ground our 
existence as a whole. So, although Aristotle’s understanding of phusis can guide us towards 
thinking about nature, Heidegger nevertheless ends up rejecting Aristotle’s phusis. This 
becomes evident at the end of this essay where he explains that Aristotle’s phusis is, in fact, 
the last echo of the Greek way of understanding nature that manifests itself in its most 
original form in pre-Socratic thinking: 
But Aristotle is far from intending to say that the essence of being in general is, properly speaking, of the 
same kind as the phusis which, a little later, he explicitly characterizes as only one branch of being among 
others. Rather, […]  [Aristotle’s conception of phusis] is an echo of the great beginning of Greek 
philosophy, the first beginning of Western philosophy. In this beginning, Being was thought as phusis, 
such that the phusis that Aristotle conceptualized can be only a late derivative of originary phusis (EP: 
229; WP:  369-70). 
 
Heidegger argues that Aristotle’s phusis, that only describes the unfolding of particular kinds 
of entities, set the stage for understanding nature as something non-human, and eventually 
evolved into the Western conception of nature as something that can be researched and used 
as a resource (EP: 229; WP: 269). So this means that phusis, for Heidegger, cannot refer to a 
distinct set of natural beings which grow and unfold on their own accord.  
    Indeed, elsewhere Heidegger states explicitly that we cannot think of phusis in terms of the 
biological growth and development of beings. In an essay on the Anaximander fragment, he 
explains that we cannot think of the phenomenon of beings emerging into the world in a 
biological sense, as a process of something growing and developing into a being (AF: 30; SA: 
342). Similarly, in Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger explains that phusis can be 
experienced in those things that we usually understand as natural, but it is not limited to these 
processes. He explains:  
Phusis as emergence can be experienced everywhere: for example, in celestial processes (the rising of the 
sun), in the surging of the sea, in the growth of plants, in the coming forth of animals and human beings 
from the womb. But phusis, the emerging sway, is not synonymous with these processes, which we still 
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today count as part of “nature”. This emerging and standing-out-in-itself-from- itself may not be taken as 
just one process among others that we observe in beings. Phusis is Being itself, by virtue of which beings 
first become and remain observable (IM: 15; EM: 12-13). 
 
Phusis, here, is not limited to describing the appearing of natural entities which rise into 
unconcealment on their own accord. Instead, phusis now describes the unconcealment of all 
entities; it is what allows beings to appear as beings, what allows us to encounter beings in 
their truth. We can find it not only from those things we conventionally think of as natural, 
but also from the spheres of history and customs. And, in Introduction to Metaphysics, 
Heidegger maintains that the Greeks did not primarily experience phusis in natural processes 
but they first experienced phusis through poetry that reveals beings to us in their truth. Only 
after Being had been disclosed through poetry could the Greeks come to see how phusis is 
also present in “natural” processes (IM: 15-6; EM: 11).  
    These examinations of Heidegger’s understanding of phusis help us make sense of one of 
the ways in which Heidegger talked about phusis, of how he talked about phusis in ‘Question 
Concerning Technology’, and to put this into context. In ‘Question Concerning Technology’ 
Heidegger does not provide an extensive discussion of phusis, and he only uses three 
sentences to describe how phusis is that which allows certain beings to grow and develop on 
their own accord. This is because the purpose of this discussion is to prepare a way of 
thinking about how the Greeks thought about unconcealment, not to provide a detailed 
discussion of how to think about phusis. This suggests that what Heidegger says about phusis 
in ‘Question Concerning Technology’ does not contradict what he said about Aristotle’s 
phusis being only an echo of the pre-Socratic understanding of phusis in his other works. It 
now seems that in ‘Question Concerning Technology’ Heidegger is only talking about the 
way in which Aristotle understood phusis, he is using Aristotle’s phusis as guidance for 
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thinking about phusis and this is not the final word on how it should be thought of. So how, 
then, should we proceed in thinking about phusis? 
    In the essay on Aristotle’s conception of phusis, Heidegger states that for the pre-Socratics, 
nature signified ‘the pure and simple Being and essence of […] beings’ (EP; 229; WP: 270). 
Here Heidegger begins to talk about phusis in the second sense identified by Haar; he is 
referring to phusis as Being itself, as something that is related to how all beings emerge into 
unconcealment. But what this statement about phusis referring to the Being and essence of 
beings means is still unclear. Heidegger elaborates on this pre-Socratic understanding of 
phusis in the essay on the Anaximander fragment where he discusses what it meant for the 
pre-Socratics for something to be unconcealed to us, to emerge into the world as a being 
through the unfolding of phusis. Instead of thinking of this process in terms of the biological 
growth of beings, Heidegger wants to think of this emerging into the world as ‘ways of 
luminous rising and wasting away’ (AF: 30: SA: 342). So what does this mean and how is it 
different from the biological growth of beings? As was explained in the last chapter, 
Heidegger’s references to visibility and lighting are related to allowing beings to appear to us 
as beings, related to that which allows us to grasp beings as beings. So luminous rising does 
not refer to biological processes because it has to do with how beings appear as beings to 
humans. Heidegger elaborates on this in an important, but puzzling, passage where he 
explains that rising into unconcealment is ‘the gathering which clears and shelters, which in 
turn is thought and designated as the logos. The logos is experienced through aletheia, the 
sheltering which reveals thing’ (AF: 39; SA: 352). So what does this passage tell us about 
phusis?  
    Heidegger talks in more detail about the meanings of logos and aletheia in Introduction to 
Metaphysics. He explains how the Greek word logos has many different meanings, but it 
most commonly refers to speech, word or reasoning. However, he argues that all these 
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translations miss what logos meant for the pre-Socratic thinkers, and explains that logos is, in 
fact, another word for phusis. Heidegger elaborates on this by looking at the meaning that 
logos had for Heraclitus. Heraclitus’ logos meant gathering: ‘[l]ogos is constant gathering, 
the gatheredness of beings that stands in itself, that is, Being’ (IM: 138; EM: 100). The 
German word for constant is ‘ständig’, which also means something permanent, something 
established, and it has a relation to the verb ‘stehen’, which means to stand. Logos, then, 
refers to establishing beings, allowing them to occupy a place in the world. Through logos, 
beings are able to take a stand in the world, and they can appear as beings (Dahlstrom, 2001b: 
91). So phusis does not describe the growth and development of natural beings, but it 
describes how beings appear to humans as beings in the world. 
    So phusis and logos describe how beings emerge into unconcealment, become beings. This 
cannot be thought of in terms of physical growth of natural beings into beings. Instead, this 
happens when a clearing appears that lights up beings. Phusis, as Heidegger puts it in 
Introduction to Metaphysics, describes ‘the overwhelming coming-to-presence that has not 
yet been surmounted in thinking, and within which that which comes to presence essentially 
unfolds as beings’ (IM: 64; EM: 47). Before this happening of phusis, beings do not exist, 
there are no beings that we can think or talk about. As Schoenbohm (2001: 151) illustrates, 
Heidegger’s phusis ‘originally names […] not-yet-anything, so that “it” (which is not yet 
even an “it”) becomes something, becomes determinate’. Nature, then, is the clearing, the 
lighting that allows beings to appear to us as beings (Ward, 1995: 231-233). Phusis does not 
only describe how certain kinds of entities rise into unconcealment, but it now becomes one 
of the central concepts of Heidegger’s work: it describes one aspect of the unfolding of 
Being, it describes beings rising into presence as beings.  
     Looking at Heidegger’s discussion of logos explains how phusis lights up beings, 
allowing them to appear through gathering and sheltering. But what about the second part of 
139 
 
the passage concerning the pre-Socratic meaning of phusis in Heidegger’s essay on the 
Anaximander fragment where he explains that logos is experienced through aletheia that 
shelters and reveals? Aletheia was the Greek word for unconcealment and for truth. So here, 
Heidegger is equating the happening of phusis with the happening of truth. This means that, 
for Heidegger, we allow beings to be revealed to us in their truth when beings are made 
visible. This is why he, in the essay on Aristotle’s phusis argued that for the pre-Socratics, 
phusis meant the Being and essence of beings. Phusis allows us to grasp beings in their truth; 
it allows us to grasp their essences.  
    But equating the unfolding of phusis with the happening of truth and with the essences of 
beings may, at first, seem puzzling. Why would Heidegger claim that through the unfolding 
of phusis and logos we encounter beings as the beings that they are, in their truth? Is it not, 
rather, the opposite, that phusis only allows us to encounter beings as they appear to us, and 
never as they really are? If phusis describes how beings appear to us as beings, is it not the 
case that we can never grasp what these beings really are, but we can only grasp them as they 
seem to be for us? To understand how the happening of truth and the unfolding of phusis are 
linked, I am going to look at how Heidegger understood these essences of beings, and how 
aletheia and phusis are both linked to his thinking of essences. 
    In Contributions to Philosophy Heidegger calls the process whereby things appear to us 
beings as the swaying of Being. The meaning of ‘swaying’ may seem unclear at first, but 
turning to the original German text helps make sense of it. The German word that Heidegger 
uses is ‘wesen’ which means ‘to last’, ‘to endure’, ‘to sway’. The connotations ‘wesen’ has in 
German are, however, more complex than revealed by a dictionary translation. Importantly, 
there is a noun ‘Wesen’ in German, which means ‘essence’. Heidegger is here playing with 
the different meanings of ‘wesen’ and ‘Wesen’. The verb ‘wesen’, in the way that Heidegger 
uses it, refers to a kind of enduring that grants a being its essence, allows a being to endure as 
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a being. The swaying of Being, then, is what allows beings to endure in their essence that has 
been granted to them by Being. So essences, for Heidegger, do not pre-exist human 
interpretative activity, but they are something that are created by phusis as phusis allows 
beings to rise into presence as beings. Or as Ben-Dor (2003: 73) explains, essences are the 
unfolding of Being in beings. For Heidegger, beings have no essence in themselves prior to 
them appearing in the clearing and prior to them rising into presence as beings. This is why 
the happening of phusis can be equated with the happening of truth. 
    Let us now return to the example of the apple that has been used in the thesis as a way of 
illustrating how Heidegger’s philosophy can change the way in which we approach the 
question of nature. How can we now think of phusis as something which allows for the 
appearance of apples in my grandparents’ garden? We can no longer think of phusis as 
describing how the apple grows into an apple on its own accord. Instead, phusis now refers to 
the phenomenon of the apple appearing to us as a being. It is only through the happening of 
phusis that apples can appear to me in the garden as beings, as something that I can engage 
with. And similarly, it is because of the happening of phusis that anything can appear to me 
in the garden as a being or that the garden can appear as a being. Phusis does not unconceal 
the apple because it allows the apple to grow into an apple but because it allows the apple to 
appear to us as a being. Phusis shelters beings by allowing them to appear to us as beings, 
and allows beings to appear to us in their truth, as the beings that they are. This also means 
that there is no one true essence of the fruit apple that exists irrespective of time and place. 
The essence is given to the apple by phusis that allows the apple to appear, and phusis always 
unfolds in different ways. Letting the apple reveal its truths to us, then, is not about allowing 
the apple to reveal some truth that exists in the apple before it is unconcealed as a being by 
phusis. 
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    This way of thinking about phusis may seem somewhat unsatisfying. The green 
Heideggerians were able to clearly articulate the meaning of phusis and talk about it in 
concrete terms whereas here phusis has been described in quite vague terms: phusis is merely 
described as beings rising into presence as beings. This way of talking about phusis lacks an 
explanation of what it is that allows for the appearance of beings, the unfolding of phusis is 
partly concealed from us. This is something that I warned about already at the beginning of 
the thesis. My way of inquiring about nature will not provide an answer to the question of 
what nature is, but it will point us towards a path of questioning nature. As the thesis 
progresses, I will illustrate more closely how Heidegger goes about questioning and thinking 
about Being, and it will hopefully become clearer how we could find our own paths of 
questioning Being. 
    Talking about this concealment brings us to the third aspect of phusis that was identified 
by Haar: phusis as the concealing earth. This concealing earth is something that was already 
discussed in the last chapter. Here the concealing earth was equated with growth and 
flourishing of our environments. It is now time to revisit this understanding of the earth. In 
the next section, I will take a closer look at this concealing earth, and investigate whether we 
really can equate the earth with the growth of our environments, or if our new understanding 
of phusis means that we now have to start thinking of the earth in a different manner. I will 
then explore how Heidegger’s conception of the earth is linked to dwelling and how we can 
learn to question Being by dwelling on the earth.   
 
Heidegger and the Earth 
In this section, I will re-examine the role that the earth plays in Heidegger’s writings. 
Heidegger never explicitly states what meaning the earth holds for him. Adding to the 
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difficulties posed by the ambiguities in the way that Heidegger talks about the earth, the way 
in which he uses the word changes throughout his works. As was explored in the previous 
chapter, Heidegger initially talks about the earth as something that strives with the world, but 
towards the end of his work, the earth becomes a part of the world in which humans learn to 
dwell, and the unfolding of this earth is also paired with the sky. To make sense of these 
different ways of talking about the earth, I will begin by looking at how Heidegger talks 
about the earth in his mid-work where, as discussed in the previous chapter, he describes the 
work of art as a strife between the earth and the world. I will then move on to look at the role 
that the earth plays in Heidegger’s description of dwelling in the fourfold of the earth, the 
sky, the gods and the mortals. 
    The previous chapter interpreted the earth as describing the unfolding of earth from which 
beings grow and develop. It relied heavily on Heidegger’s example of the temple as a work of 
art that reveals its surroundings, the rocky ground on which the temple rests, the storms that 
rage above, trees, grass and the surrounding animals as beings. But as I thought more closely 
about this role of the earth in Heidegger’s thought, I realised that if I revised my 
understanding of phusis, I would also have to rethink my interpretation of Heidegger’s earth. 
This is because understanding the earth as that which allows for the biological growth of 
beings contradicts understanding phusis as something that allows beings to emerge into 
unconcealment as they are granted their essences by Being. If the earth were understood as 
that which nourishes and conceals nonhuman natural beings, then the source of concealment 
in the world would be the fact that we cannot fully explain and comprehend material beings. 
If this were what Heidegger was attempting to get at when describing the concealment of the 
earth, then material beings would have to have some meaning prior to us encountering them, 
they would have to hold in themselves some meaning that can only be revealed to humans in 
part, some essence that exists prior to humans engaging with these beings. This contradicts 
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Heidegger’s way of thinking about phusis and his view of essences as something that only 
come about in the clearing, as something given to beings by Being itself only when beings 
appear as beings through the happening of phusis.  
    I am going to illustrate this by, again, taking the apple as an example. If the earth that 
conceals the apple did refer to the biological unfolding of the earth from which the apple 
grows, then an apple would hold a particular meaning to me because of the way it has been 
nourished by the earth. If I understood the meaning of the earth in this way, I could think of 
the event of me eating the apple as the moment the apple reveals the meanings given to it by 
the earth from which it has emerged, and by the sky under which it has grown. So, if I ate an 
apple that has been grown in Finland, the apple would reveal to me a particularly sour taste, 
typical of apples grown in colder climates. But this account of the apple revealing its 
meanings ignores how the sour taste is without meaning before human interpretative activity. 
The apple may taste sour, but to understand what that sour taste means to us, the apple must 
present itself in the clearing. Only this will give the sour taste of the apple some kind of 
significance, maybe bringing back memories of other occasions where we have encountered 
this taste. So that which allows the apple to appear to us as a being cannot be understood as 
the ground that nourishes the apple and allows for its biological growth. The earth, then, in 
Heidegger’s work, must have another kind of meaning. I am going to begin looking at what 
the earth might refer to by revisiting Heidegger’s understanding of the earth in ‘Origins of the 
Work of Art’. Reinterpreting the meaning of the earth in ‘Origins of the Work of Art’ helps 
us rethink how concealment participates in the unfolding of phusis, and it will also, in the 
end, guide us towards a different way of thinking about the roles of the sky and the earth in 
dwelling in the fourfold. 
    Iain Thomson (2011) presents another way of interpreting the earth in ‘Origins of the Work 
of Art’, one that does not think of the earth as the spontaneous growth of nonhuman, natural 
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beings. In the previous chapter, I looked at how green Heideggerian thinkers often draw on 
Heidegger’s account of the happening of truth in the Greek temple in order to explain how 
the earth refers to the ground the nourishes natural beings around the temple and allows for 
their growth and development. However, Thomson argues that the temple is supposed to only 
serve as an introductory, motivating example of how the work of art can create a world of 
shared meanings around it (Thomson, 2011: 67). To really grasp how the earth strives with 
the world, we must look at Heidegger’s account of Van Gogh’s painting of a pair of shoes. 
This painting is of a pair of dirty shoes which Heidegger assumes belong to a peasant woman. 
The painting is important for Heidegger because he maintains that it allows us to start 
thinking about the daily activities of the peasant and about how the strife between the earth 
and the world manifests itself. Heidegger explains that the painting helps us think about how 
‘[i]n the stiffy rugged heaviness of the shoes there is the accumulated tenacity of her slow 
trudge through the far-spreading and ever-uniform furrows of the field swept by a raw wind’ 
(OWA: 33; UK: 19).    
    It would be easy to think that the concealing earth in this painting could be found from the 
soil on which the peasant woman dwells during her daily activities. But Thomson wants to 
start thinking about the role of the earth in the painting differently. Thomson (2011: 85) 
explains that when Heidegger looks to Van Gogh’s painting in order to describe the strife 
between the earth and the world, Heidegger emphasises that ‘[t]here is nothing surrounding 
this pair of farmer’s shoes in or to which they might belong – only an undefined space’ 
(OWA: 33; UK: 18-9).  So here Thomson draws our attention to the fact that Heidegger 
claims that these shoes are not surrounded by the muddy earth on which the woman dwells, 
but instead, they are surrounded by nothing. Thomson also explains that in Introduction to 
Metaphysics (37-8; EM: 27), Heidegger goes further and maintains that the painting does not 
even represent shoes but it represent nothing. So if the shoes in the painting are surrounded 
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by nothing, and if the painting itself represents nothing, then to understand this painting, to 
grasp what the painting is telling us about the farmer’s shoes and about the earth, we need to 
pay attention to this nothing.  
    But how can we start paying attention to nothing? For Heidegger, the nothing is not just 
mere nothing, but it plays an important role in his philosophy. This nothing describes that 
which is not yet a being but from which beings nevertheless emerge as beings. The 
significance of the nothing was already briefly mentioned in the last chapter. When 
introducing Heidegger’s thought, I explained how, in the context of asking about an apple 
tree, Heidegger was interested in asking how it is that ‘the tree is, it is not so that the tree is 
not’ (WCT: 173; WHD: 106). At that point, asking about why the tree is not may have 
sounded confusing, but we are now ready to explore this statement further. Asking about how 
the tree is not is a significant question because it asks the question of the nothing. 
    We cannot articulate the meaning of this nothing. If we were able to explain the meaning 
of nothing, then we would again be thinking of this nothing as something, as an object that 
we can understand. Therefore, to think about nothing means to think in a way that is different 
from how thinking is understood traditionally: ‘we cannot begin to think about Being and 
Nothingness by thinking about them directly (or finally, “about” them at all)’ (Rosen, 1978: 
131, emphasis original). Heidegger explores this question of the nothing in detail in an essay 
called ‘What is Metaphysics?’. Here Heidegger explains that the nothing is encountered when 
we experience anxiety. Anxiety, as Heidegger already illustrated in Being and Time, is 
different from fear. When we are fearful, we are always afraid of something, but anxiety has 
no object. We cannot explain what we are feeling when we are feeling anxious, we cannot 
explain what we are anxious about. It is this experience of anxiety that Heidegger maintains 
reveals the nothing: 
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All things and we ourselves sink into indifference. This, however, not in the sense of mere disappearance. 
Rather, in their very receding, things turn toward us. This receding of beings as a whole, closing in on us 
in anxiety, oppresses us. We can get no hold on things. In the slipping away of beings only this “no hold 
on things” comes over us and remains (WM: 88; WIM: 13). 
  
When we are anxious, the world as a whole slips away from us. Those things which we 
usually engage with begin to slip away from us, we no longer feel at home in the world. And 
Thomson explains the Van Gogh’s painting, by being a painting of nothing, is in fact a 
painting of how beings can appear to us as beings from nothing. 
    So how is Van Gogh’s painting a painting about beings appearing to us as beings? To 
explain, Thomson (2011: 87) draws attention to background in this painting and points out 
that when we concentrate on this background, we can see shapes emerging from it which we 
cannot quite make sense of. So, Thomson (2011: 89) explains that what might at first seem as 
just nothing, just the background of the painting, ‘continues to tantalizingly offer itself to our 
understanding while also receding from our attempts to order what it offers us into any firm, 
settled meaning.’ If we concentrate on the brush strokes that make up the background of the 
painting, we can recognise a figure of the peasant on the field emerging from the background. 
When we begin to pay closer attention to the painting ‘we notice and carefully attend to the 
way these shoes take shape on and against an inconspicuously dynamic background […], a 
background that turns out not to be nothing at all but, rather, to both support and overflow the 
world that emerges from it’ (Thomson, 2011: 98). And the nothing that conceals itself is the 
earth itself. Thomson (2011: 93) thus argues that what Heidegger’s painting reveals to us, is 
that  
[O]ur intelligible worlds are shaped by what we take from and make of a dynamic phenomenological 
abundance that we can never fully grasp or finally master. By partly informing and yet always also partly 
eluding our attempts to order those elements the earth offers to our understanding into a single, final 
historical “world”, the abundant earth preserves itself for future orderings, for worlds still yet to be 
disclosed. 
 
So here, the concealing earth can be observed in the shoes themselves, not only in the mud 
surrounding them. The earth describes the material qualities of all beings, and it describes 
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how we can never fully make sense of these qualities. Thomson thus explains that ‘“Earth”, 
in other words, is an inherently dynamic dimension of intelligibility that simultaneously 
offers itself to and resists being brought fully into the light of our “worlds” of meaning and 
permanently stabilized therein, despite our best efforts’ (Thomson, 2011: 89). 
    Thomson’s account of the earth is now different from the environmentalist accounts 
explored earlier. Thomson’s focus on what Heidegger says about Van Gogh’s shoes allows 
him to move away from thinking of the earth as the ground from which things grow and 
develop, and allows him to think about it differently. The earth does not refer to natural 
beings which grow out of the earth on their own accord, but it now refers to the materiality of 
all beings. Beings always remain partly in concealment because we can never fully make 
sense of all of their material qualities. Being itself remains in concealment because we cannot 
fully comprehend how these material qualities allow beings to appear to us as beings. 
    But although Thomson presents a different interpretation of the concealing earth, his 
interpretation of the earth does not yet fully overcome the problems in the environmentalist 
accounts of the earth discussed earlier. For Thomson, the earth as the nothing refers to matter 
that has not yet appeared to us as a being. The concealing earth strives with the world as it 
‘offers previously unglimpsed aspects of itself to our understanding and yet also withdraws 
from our attempts to order those aspects into a single, fixed meaning’ (Thomson, 2011: 93) 
But if the earth refers to the materiality of beings, and if this material unfolding of the earth 
participates in the way we make sense of the world, then we are still able to form correct 
propositions about the unfolding of the earth, and use these correct propositions to allow for 
the happening of truth. So, for example, the measured weight of the apple would tell us 
something about the apple itself because it would play a part in allowing the apple to appear 
to us as an apple.  
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    But Thomson’s account is nevertheless useful because it allows for divorcing Heidegger’s 
earth from that which allows for the biological development of a set of supposedly natural 
beings, and it brings us to another possible way of thinking about the earth. If the earth does 
not describe the ground from which things grow out of and develop, then it does not have to 
refer to the material qualities of beings at all. So how, then, should we start thinking about the 
concealing earth? Dreyfus suggests thinking of the earth as referring to how the background 
practices, which allow beings to be revealed to us as beings, always remain partly in 
concealment. He explains how the artwork, understood as a paradigm that helps us make 
sense of the world, is always partly concealed from us:  
[T]he artwork […] resists rationalization. Any paradigm could be paraphrased and rationalized only if the 
concrete thing, which served as an exemplar, symbolized or represented an underlying system of beliefs or 
values that could be abstracted from the particular exemplar. But the whole of needing an exemplar is that 
there is no such system, there are only shared practices. Therefore the style resists rationalization and can 
only be displayed (Dreyfus, 2008: 411). 
 
 Dreyfus’ interpretation of the earth equates the earth with our implicit background practices 
which allow us to make sense of things. This interpretation stems from Dreyfus’ reading of 
Heidegger that was examined in the previous chapter. Dreyfus’ understanding of Being was 
found lacking because it did not address the question of what allows for the emergence of 
background practices in the first place. A similar criticism can be made of Dreyfus’ 
interpretation of the earth: this interpretation talks about implicit background practices 
without asking what gave rise to them. But Dreyfus’ interpretation of the earth can still aid us 
in making sense of this concept. Instead of thinking about the earth as our implicit 
background practices that allow us to make sense of things, we could start thinking about the 
earth as that which allows for these background practices in the first place. The earth, then, 
should be thought of as describing the heritage into which we are thrown that allows for the 
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emergence of the world and for the appearance of beings. We can, thus, start thinking of the 
earth independently of the material existence of beings.  
    But as was the case with phusis, there can never be an answer to the question of what the 
earth really is. If it were easy to name the earth, to explain how things emerge from the earth 
as beings, then Heidegger would not have had to resort to such obscure language in order to 
start thinking about the earth. The earth, as the concealment that strives with the world, is 
self-secluding, it hides itself and this means that we cannot explain or understand it. There 
can, then, only be avenues for thinking about and questioning the earth, and no final answers 
to the question of what the earth is. 
    This new way of approaching the nothing and the earth now allows for a new way of 
thinking about the strife between the earth and the world. The basic idea of this interpretation 
is the same as that of the interpretation offered by the greens: the concealing earth striving 
with the world means that beings, that appear to us in the world, are always partly concealed 
from us, that we can never quite grasp what beings are, what allowed them to appear to us as 
beings. But the explanation for why things are concealed is now different. Things are not 
concealed because their material qualities remain partly hidden from us but because Being is 
concealed from us, because Being, as that which allows beings to appear to us as beings, 
hides itself from us. 
     So what kinds of criticisms have been levelled against the idea of divorcing the earth from 
the concealed material growth and development of beings, and how could we respond to 
them? Thomson wanted to avoid interpreting this manner because he worries that divorcing 
the notion of the earth from the materiality of beings means that truth ‘would just be a 
frictionless subjective projection of hallucination’ rather than being able to find ‘a genuinely 
creative way to be grounded in and genuinely responsive to the ways things show 
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themselves’ (Thomson, 2011: 102; see also Zimmerman, 1990: 226). But the interpretation of 
the nothing presented in this chapter is not a subjective hallucination. A singular human is not 
free to create beings according to his/her will, and cannot control how beings emerge as 
beings. Phusis always unfolds and beings appear in a world into which we are thrown, not in 
a world we create. 
    Polt (2011: 37-8) presents another possible objection to this argument and maintains that 
the concealment of entities must refer to their material qualities that have yet to be discovered 
because the way in which these material qualities are revealed to us influences the way we 
make sense of the world. So for example, apples would not appear to us as something that 
can be eaten if it they were poisonous. But by saying that the earth does not refer to the 
material growth and development of beings, I am not suggesting that the way in which we 
make sense of the world is not dependent on the existence of the material world. The 
existence of the material world is a precondition for our existence and sense-making. And the 
manner in which material entities grow and develop can, of course, have some impact on the 
way in which we make sense of the world.  But the point is that how an entity appears to us 
as a being is not determined by these material properties. There is no meaning inherent in 
beings that would always show up in a particular way in different historical worlds.  
    For example, we can imagine a rural village that has a lot of apple trees. The apple trees 
have become an important part of the lives of the people living in the village: picking apples 
in the autumn gives the villagers a sense of rhythm and regularity, shared gatherings 
involving freshly baked apple pies also allow the apples to be thought of as something that 
bring people together. The material existence of these apples creates the pre-conditions for 
the apples to appear in this way. If the apple trees did not bear fruit annually or if the fruit 
from the trees were not edible, the apples would appear to us differently. But this does not 
mean that the appearance of the apples as apples was somehow determined by the materiality 
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of the apples. An apple as an edible, annual fruit can appear to us in many different ways. 
The fact that there are years when apple trees do not bear much fruit means that apples do not 
have to remind us of rhythm and regularity. Instead, the fact that apple trees bear different 
quantities of fruit each year could come to remind us of irregularity and precariousness. The 
fact that apples are edible does not mean that eating them has to be culturally acceptable: 
there could also be a taboo on eating apples in the village. Instead of apples being things that 
gather people together, they could come to signify something that we must stay away from. 
 
Dwelling in the Fourfold 
Re-thinking the meaning of Heidegger’s phusis and the concealing earth also requires 
revisiting his account of what it means to dwell in the fourfold. As was already explored in 
the previous chapter, the way in which Heidegger talks about the worlded earth and the sky 
when discussing dwelling also seems to indicate that he is referring to the earth and the sky in 
a literal sense. In ‘Building Dwelling Thinking’ (BDT), Heidegger talks about the earth as 
‘spreading out in rock and water, rising up into plant and animal’ (BDT: 147; BWD: 151) and 
in ‘The Thing’, he explains how the earth nourishes grapevines, allowing them to grow and 
bear fruit (Thing, 170; Ding 174). Similarly, in BWD Heidegger explains that the sky is the 
‘vaulting path of the sun, the course of the changing moon, the wandering glitter of the stars, 
the years seasons and their changes’ (BDT: 147; BWD: 151). In ‘The Thing’ he also explains 
how the sky participates in the growing of the grapevine, in it ‘the earth’s nourishing and the 
sky’s sun are betrothed to one another’ (Thing, 170; Ding: 174). In all of these examples, 
Heidegger refers to the earth as that which provides the ground for the growth of plants and 
animals, and to the sky that allows for the growth of these beings through sunshine and rain. 
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    These literal interpretations of the earth and the sky were employed in the last chapter to 
make sense of what it means to dwell and of how we can learn to question Being. The 
fourfold was understood as describing how the natural and the cultural always exist together 
in a unity as the mortals encounter the earth and the sky. According to this interpretation, an 
apple in my grandparents’ garden would appear to me as a being because I encountered it in 
the intersection of nature and culture. The apple, as a natural being, emerged from the earth 
into the world on its own accord, but it was experienced as a being by the mortals who 
allowed for the appearance of the gods by adopting a questioning attitude towards the apple. 
Although the natural, the earth and the sky, and the cultural, the gods and the mortals, are 
always experienced together in things, we could, in this interpretation of the fourfold, 
nevertheless think of them as originating from two separate spheres that are united as we 
experience the world. 
    But having re-examined the role of the concealing earth in Heidegger’s writings and 
having rethought the meaning of his questioning of Being, thinking about the four elements 
of the fourfold in the manner presented in last chapter becomes difficult. Because the 
concealing earth in ‘Origins of the Work of Art’ does not refer to the earth that allows for the 
biological growth of beings, neither can the earth and the sky of the fourfold be understood in 
these terms. Indeed, in other passages, where Heidegger describes dwelling in the fourfold, 
he seems to state that the earth and the sky must be understood as referring to something else. 
For example, in the ‘The Thing’ Heidegger describes the way that the fourfold gathers into 
things in the following way:  
Things, each thinging from time to time in its own way, are heron and roe, deer, horse and bull. Things, 
each thinging and each staying in its own way, are mirror and clasp, book and picture, crown and cross 
(Thing: 180; Ding: 184). 
 
Heidegger begins the passage by listing things that we would conventionally consider as 
natural, but ends it by listing things that are made by humans. Thus, it becomes evident from 
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this passage that the fourfold can be gathered together in any kind of being, in something 
made by humans as well as in those things that are conventionally understood as natural. So 
what, then, could an alternative way of approaching the fourfold and dwelling look like? 
    Dreyfus and Spinosa (2003) provide one answer to this question by presenting a way of 
understanding the role of the sky and the earth in the fourfold that avoids thinking of the earth 
and the sky in terms of allowing for the biological unfolding beings. For Dreyfus and 
Spinosa, the earth is what participates in our sense-making. The earth refers to those ‘taken-
for-granted practices that ground situations and make them matter to us’ (2003: 345). Dreyfus 
and Spinosa use the example of the family meal to illustrate this. In the context of a family 
meal, the earth refers to those practices that ground the nuclear family, such as shared family 
meals. Dreyfus and Spinosa also explain how we could think about the sky in the fourfold 
without referring to the literal sky, and how the sky also participates in our sense-making. 
The sky refers ‘to the stable possibilities for action’, to things that happen that we feel are 
appropriate to a given situation and that condition our understanding of beings. This sky also 
plays a role in making the family meal important to us and in allowing beings to unconceal 
themselves to us in a particular way during the family meal. For example, during a family 
dinner, the sky ‘manifests itself in people reminiscing and asking warm questions, but 
arguments, private jokes and brooding silence is discouraged’ (Dreyfus and Spinosa, 2003: 
345).  
    The sky and the earth, then, signify our everyday practices that we cannot fully make 
explicit nor understand, but that nevertheless ground our existence and allow for the 
appearance of the world. The role of the gods and the mortals in Dreyfus and Spinosa’s 
account remains similar to the roles that were identified in the previous chapter. The gods 
allow us to grasp beings in richer rather than in an ordinary way, and referring to humans as 
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mortals reminds us of our finite existence and of the finite knowledge that we have of the 
world (Dreyfus and Spinosa, 2003: 345).  
    Dreyfus and Spinosa’s description of the fourfold, again, rests on thinking of Being as the 
implicit background practices that help us make sense of things without asking about that 
which grounds these practices in the first place. The earth and the sky are both thought of in 
terms of these background practices. But despite these problems, I think that Dreyfus and 
Spinosa’s interpretation of the fourfold can, again, serve as an important starting point for 
thinking about the sky and the earth. This is because it guides us towards examining what 
allowed for the emergence of these implicit background practices and for the possibilities for 
acting in different ways in particular circumstances in the first place.  
    So what, then, do these elements of the fourfold refer to? The earth could now be thought 
of as that which allows for the emergence of our background practices and the sky as that 
which allows for the possibilities of action. Together they describe the mysterious opening of 
the historical world in which beings can rise into presence. But as Ingold (2008: 1802) 
explains, and as was already discussed in the previous chapter, it might be more helpful not to 
think of these elements of the fourfold as separate at all but rather as ‘manifolds of movement 
that are directly implicated in one another’. Heidegger’s poetic descriptions of the fourfold 
can help us get on the way of thinking about dwelling, provided that we do not get too caught 
up in trying to find exact definitions for the different elements of the fourfold. Instead of 
looking for definitions, we should listen to how Heidegger is attempting to describe the 
fourfold. 
    So this is how we should start questioning the happening of nature and the happening of 
phusis. The unfolding of phusis no longer describes the spontaneous growth unfolding of a 
certain set of natural beings but it now describes how all beings appear to us as beings in 
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ways that we cannot fully understand nor grasp. Caring for nature means to pay attention to 
this happening, staying with beings, learning to dwell without attempting to represent beings 
or explain what they mean for us. Learning to dwell allows us to live richer lives because we 
are no longer solely engaged with manipulating beings, oriented towards the future, filled 
with anxieties concerning how things may go wrong and how our plans might fail (King, 
2009: 92). Learning to stay with beings allows us to let go of these plans and allows us to let 
go of the need to manipulate beings. 
 
Homeland and Dwelling Ground  
But what has not been fully explored here is why Heidegger uses these literal examples of 
phusis, the earth and the sky so often if phusis is not meant to describe the unfolding of a 
nonhuman nature. Why does he talk about the sky as the sun and the moon, why does he talk 
about the earth as that from which animals and plants grow if the sky and the earth are not 
meant to be understood in a literal sense? I will explore this question here by looking at the 
role that place plays in Heidegger’s work and how the earth provides the ground for our 
dwelling. 
    Although in ‘Origins of the Work of Art’ Heidegger is mainly concerned with thinking 
about the earth as the concealment that strives with the world, here he also begins to elaborate 
on how we might think about the earth in terms of the ground on which we dwell as well. In 
‘Origins of the Work of Art’, Heidegger talks about the earth as our dwelling ground in two 
different ways. In his first reference to the earth as a dwelling ground, Heidegger explains 
that with the happening of the strife between the earth and the world, the earth, as that which 
illuminates beings and allows them to appear as beings is ‘that on which and in which man 
bases his dwelling’ (OWA: 41; UK: 28).  So here it seems that thinking of the earth as a 
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dwelling ground leads to a similar interpretation of the earth that was outlined earlier in this 
chapter. Heidegger is talking about the earth as something which grounds our existence 
because the earth is that which allows beings to appear to us as beings. 
    But on the same page, there is also a second sense in which Heidegger thinks of the earth 
as our dwelling ground. Here Heidegger goes on to describe how the Greek temple provides a 
dwelling ground for humans. As he begins to talk about this temple, he seems to be referring 
to the earth in a different sense. Heidegger explains how the Greek temple is an example of 
the kind of artwork which allows for the appearance of the world: it opens up the world by 
allowing for the strife between the earth and the world. He explains that when this happens, 
the earth becomes our dwelling ground: ‘The temple-work, standing there, opens up a world 
and at the same time sets this world back again on earth, which itself only this emerges as 
native ground’ (OWA: 41; UK: 28). The earth no longer refers to that which allows for the 
appearance of the world, but it is meant in the sense of providing the ground for our dwelling, 
by providing our native ground. 
    So what is happening here? The German word ‘grund’, like the English ‘ground’, has two 
possible meanings: it can mean the reason for why we understand that things are in a certain 
way, and it can mean the physical ground on which we live. Heidegger seems to equate these 
two meanings: as the earth grounds our understanding of beings, it also provides the physical 
ground for our dwelling by providing us our native dwelling ground. So, the use of the word 
‘ground’ here seems puzzling. As the earth grounds the way we understand the world, it also 
creates our physical dwelling ground, our native ground. The earth, as that which allows for 
the appearance of the world, then, seems to be somehow linked to the physical earth. In what 
follows, I shall explore this link by looking closer at the role that native ground plays in 
Heidegger’s work, and at the importance of place in his work. 
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   Heidegger does not explore the idea of the dwelling ground in more detail in ‘Origins of the 
Work of Art’, and does not explain why these two meanings of the word ‘ground’ are linked. 
To understand how the earth can also provide us the ground on which we dwell, I will next 
look at what Heidegger has to say about finding our native ground in two lecture courses that 
he delivered on Hölderlin’s river poetry, Hölderlin’s Hymns ‘Germania’ and ‘Rhine’ 
delivered in 1934/5 and Hölderlin’s Hymn ‘The Ister’ (Ister refers to the river Danube), 
delivered seven years later. Here Heidegger explores the question of the native ground by 
discussing how we can begin to journey towards our homeland. As Heidegger explores the 
importance and the significance of the rivers in Hölderlin’s poetry in these lectures, he also 
elaborates on how the rivers are linked to our dwelling ground, both in the sense of the 
physical ground on which we dwell, and in the sense of allowing beings to appear to us as 
beings. 
     But before going on to look in more detail at Heidegger’s reading of Hölderlin’s river 
poetry, I want to investigate more closely the roles that the native ground and the homeland 
play in his writings. It is important to note that these concepts are not meant to be thought of 
in a geographical sense. In Hölderlin’s Hymns ‘Germania’ and ‘Rhine’, Heidegger discusses 
how the homeland cannot be understood in a geographical sense, as space that has been set 
apart by clearly definable boundaries (GR: 104). Instead, the homeland is meant in terms of 
Being itself (GR: 100). In ‘Letter on Humanism’ Heidegger explains that he wants to think of 
native land ‘in an essential sense, not patriotically or nationalistically, but in terms of the 
history of Being’ (LH: 257; BH: 168). Looking at the German words Heidegger uses can help 
us better understand how he approaches this question of the homeland. As Haar (1993: 62) 
explains, the German word for native ground, ‘Heimat’, is closely associated with ‘Heim’, 
which means home and a place of habitation. The word ‘Heim’, again, is associated with 
adjectives ‘heimisch’, meaning familiar and ‘heimlich’, meaning secret and intimate. So the 
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homeland is not to be understood in geographical terms, but it is to be understood in terms of 
finding our dwelling ground, in terms of learning to dwell near Being.2 
    So how should we think about the homeland? How are secrecy and intimacy related, and 
how can they, together, describe the homeland? For us who have forgotten to ask the question 
of Being and are homeless, the homeland remains initially a secret. Thus, for Heidegger, the 
search for the homeland entails a journey into what is hidden and foreign to us. A similar 
kind of emphasis on encountering the foreign was already present in Being and Time when 
Heidegger describes anxiety: when we are feeling anxious, beings slip away from us and we 
no longer feel that we can engage with them, we feel like we are not at home in the world. 
But if we venture into the foreign and question Being, we can overcome these feelings, we 
can become homely and learn to exist in the nearness of Being. The homeland, thus, is 
understood in opposition to the alienating tendencies of modern technology where we no 
longer stay with things but attempt to control and master them (McNeill, 1999: 328).  Finding 
our homeland, learning to dwell, means to exist in nearness of Being, in the intimacy of 
Being. The sense of secrecy, however, will never be completely erased and the homeland will 
always remain partly hidden to us. This is because the unfolding of Being is always partly 
concealed, we can never fully understand this homeland or represent it. If we are to find our 
homeland, we must allow the concealing earth to unfold in its concealment. Becoming 
homely is to exist near to things that we can never fully understand nor grasp. 
    So how can these readings of Hölderlin’s poetry help us think about the homeland? These 
interpretations of Hölderlin’s poetry were central to the development of Heidegger’s later 
philosophy. Heidegger saw Hölderlin as a poet who was able to think about the truth of Being 
                                                
2 It is also important to question Heidegger’s thinking on the homeland in relation to his engagements with 
National Socialism. Because this chapter is questioning the homeland in order to better understand the 
references that Heidegger makes to the sky and the earth, I will not discuss it here. This topic will, however, be 
explored in more detail in the next chapter. 
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in his poetry. He found Hölderlin’s river poetry particularly important because these poems 
tell about how the German people can come to know their homeland, their native ground, and 
become homely. To grasp the significance of the homeland, examining Hölderlin’s Hymns 
‘Germania’ and ‘Rhine’ and Hölderlin’s Hymn ‘The Ister’ together is important because they 
present slightly different, but complementary, ways of understanding the homeland. In the 
lecture course on ‘Germania’ and ‘Rhine’, Heidegger aims to find a unified destiny for the 
German people, and he sees Hölderlin as a poet who can reveal the truth of Being to the 
German people through his poetry. It is here that Heidegger first begins to think about the 
idea of the homeland and about its relationship to dwelling and to the earth. Thus, this lecture 
course serves as an important starting point for thinking about how Heidegger approaches the 
idea of the homeland and its relationship to our dwelling ground. But as Young (2011: 76) 
demonstrates, when Heidegger delivered Hölderlin’s Hymn ‘The Ister’ his views on the 
native ground and homeland had developed. Heidegger now presents a different view of how 
we can find our homeland. The poet no longer founds the homeland, but he can help us find 
the mood that guides us towards questioning Being. Heidegger is now emphasising our own 
personal journeys towards our homeland. I will return to examine these differences in the 
next chapter. For now, I will concentrate on the significance of the rivers for Heidegger. 
    So how does Heidegger see the rivers in Hölderlin’s river poetry, and how are they related 
to finding our dwelling ground and homeland? In the lecture course on ‘Germania’ and 
Rhine’, he talks about the rivers and their relationship to the earth as follows:  
[T]he rivers are not simply ‘pictures’ for something, but are meant themselves, and with them the native 
earth. But the earth is not meant as a measured piece of land, water, plants, animals and the air of our 
planet, not meant as topics for natural sciences from geology to astrophysics, not meant at all as “nature” 
in the modern sense (GR: 195). 
 
The way in which Heidegger talks about the earth here is puzzling. He maintains that the 
rivers are not symbols of something else but they are meant themselves, and with them the 
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earth that surrounds them. But he also claims that the earth is not meant in geographical 
terms, as pieces of land that that we can calculate and express in mathematical terms. 
Heidegger presents a similar kind of puzzling picture of the rivers in Hölderlin’s poetry later 
when he returns to it in the lecture course on ‘Ister’. In a passage describing the rivers, 
Heidegger writes that the rivers are not ‘instances of nature, not pieces of the landscape. 
Neither are they “symbols” for the journey of humans on the earth’ (IE: 35; IG: 39). The 
rivers, then, do not describe a landscape and rivers cannot be understood as a symbol for 
something else either. 
    But what are the rivers if they do not describe the landscape and if they are not symbols for 
something else? What is this homeland that the rivers help us attain? Heidegger goes on to 
explain that the rivers do not create the homeland because they provide a geographical 
location for human settlement. The river, he maintains, is not ‘a stretch of water only passing 
through human settlement but its streaming, as that which develops the land, first creates the 
possibility of establishing the dwelling of humans’ (GR: 264). The rivers do not create the 
place in which humans can learn to dwell because they create a particular kind of 
geographical environment for dwelling, because they provide a source of water for the human 
settlements. Instead, the rivers create the dwelling place for humans because they have 
appeared as rivers for us. The rivers have become places of dwelling because humans have 
settled near these rivers, engaged with them and experience them. This is why the rivers can 
guide humans towards their homeland. In Hölderlin’s Hymn ‘The Ister’, as in Hölderlin’s 
Hymns ‘Germania’ and ‘Rhine’, Heidegger also explains that the rivers cannot be understood 
as geographical entities because the rivers are something that only become rivers as we come 
to know our homeland. Heidegger explains that the river is ‘that very locality that is attained 
in and through the journeying’ (IE: 31; IG: 36). The river is both the locality, and the 
journeying to this locality, and it cannot be thought about without paying attention to both 
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this journeying and to the locality attained through this journeying. We find the locale in 
which we become homely, we find our homeland, when we embark on this journey of 
questioning, thinking about the journeying of the river, and about the different ways in which 
the river reveals itself to us. 
    These discussions now allow us to think about the references that Heidegger makes to 
earthly things. In the lecture course on ‘Ister’ he talks about the earth in the following way: 
Yet when Hölderlin says “earth”, he is not at all referring to the “earthy realm” understood in a 
metaphysical or Christian way, a realm that, as a transitory, preliminary stage to the eternal remains 
precisely something to be surpassed, given up, and thereby “lost”. The journeying that the river is prevails, 
and does so essentially, in its vocation of attaining the earth as the “ground” of the homely (IE: 30; IG: 35, 
emphasis original). 
 
After all of his mystic references to the gods and to the mortals, Heidegger explains that to 
question Being, we do not have to experience anything otherworldly but Being itself is 
earthly. What he, then, communicates through these examples is that we question Being by 
engaging with the earthly beings amongst which we dwell and become homely, and not by 
attempting to attain something otherworldly. Heidegger here is concerned with the question 
of place, with the region ‘in which we find ourselves gathered together with other persons 
and things’ (Malpas, 2007: 221). Elden (2001: 36) also draws attention to how Heidegger 
explains that the first strophe of Hölderlin’s Rhine hymn refers to place itself, thus 
demonstrating his focus on the kinds of places described in the poem.  So, even if the earth 
and the sky in Heidegger’s writings are no longer understood in terms of how the earth and 
the sky enable the biological growth of nature, even if nature does not describe the 
spontaneous unfolding of nonhuman natural beings, Heidegger is still concerned with the 
idea of place, with how we can come to be at home in the places we inhabit on the earth and 
under the sky.  
    It now becomes clear how the rivers ground human existence in two different senses: as we 
question the rivers, as we think about how the rivers become rivers for us, we question that 
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which grounds our understanding of the world. But as we embark on this journeying and 
begin to question Being, we also attain the locale of our homeland. The river, now appearing 
to us in a new way, also grounds the physical ground on which we begin to dwell. We 
become homely by engaging with the beings that we live with. The theme of concentrating on 
beings was already explored in the last chapter where it was discussed how, for Heidegger, 
dwelling in the fourfold is about allowing the fourfold to enter into things and about staying 
with things. This is why, even if Heidegger wants us to question Being itself, he concentrates 
on these examples of beings. Although he wants us to move away from questioning beings to 
questioning Being, engaging with beings is still important, something that can guide us 
towards our homeland. In Contributions, Heidegger puts this more explicitly. He explains 
that a being is always a guide for us as we begin to question Being. This is because when we 
are questioning Being, what we are asking is ‘why and in what sense a being is “a being” for 
us’ (CP: 163; BP: 231).  
    This account of finding our homeland also draws attention to the importance that place 
plays in Heidegger’s accounts of dwelling. Heidegger (Thing: 164; Ding: 168) explains that 
place should not be seen as occupying a pre-given space because this thinks of space 
mathematically. Understanding space in this way is part of technological thinking because 
mathematically measured distance attempts to clearly define the position of an object without 
elaborating on its actual location and is thus unable to reveal the essence of beings (BDT: 
152; BWD: 156). Heidegger illustrates how, with modern modes of transport and 
communication, long distances can be overcome quickly, and remote parts of the earth as 
well as natural processes can be captured on film. Yet, although distance is abolished, this 
does not mean that the actual location of a thing is being altered or the thing is brought to 
nearness. This is because experiencing a thing as near or far is not related to the physical 
proximity of the object. Rather, nearness is experienced when the fourfold gathers into the 
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thing, when the thing is understood in terms of the particular place and the particular relations 
that it has with the rest of the world (Thing: 175; Ding: 178). So, at the heart of Heidegger’s 
account of dwelling is also a concern for the places that we inhabit. Things allow a site for a 
fourfold, they create a dwelling place (BDT: 152; BWD: 156).  
    Heidegger elaborates on this by looking at how a bridge can create a dwelling place for us. 
A bridge does not just occupy abstract space but it creates a dwelling place: ‘It does not just 
connect banks that are already there. The banks emerge as banks only as the bridge crosses 
the stream […] The bridge gathers the earth as landscape around the stream’ (BDT: 150; 
BWD: 154, emphasis original). Different bridges gather this landscape in different ways, and 
create different kinds of dwelling places. Heidegger discusses the places created by a 
medieval bridge and a country bridge as follows: 
The city bridge leads from the precincts of the castle to the cathedral square; the river bridge near the 
country town brings wagons and horse teams to the surrounding village. The old stone bridge’s humble 
brook crossing gives to the harvest wagon its passage from the fields into the village and carries the 
lumber cart from the field path to the road (BDT: 150; BWD: 154-5).  
 
Here Heidegger describes how these bridges create different dwelling places, and how these 
places are created through the gathering together of the fourfold.3 Places, then, do not occupy 
pre-given spaces but unite a 'network of ways and significations which articulate its space 
and give meaning to dwelling' (Villela-Petit, 1996: 131).  
    Heidegger’s focus on dwelling, then, is also about how repeated encounters with places 
allow them to appear familiar to us and allow us to feel homely in these places (Harvey, 
1996: 301). As Cloke and Jones (2001: 651) elaborate, dwelling is about the ‘rich intimate 
ongoing togetherness of beings and things which make up landscapes and places’. So, the 
                                                
3 Heidegger also discusses the place created by a highway bridge here and I will return to discuss the 
significance of this in Chapter Five where I look at the role that modern technology plays in dwelling.  
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importance of place still remains in the way in which the think about the fourfold. What is 
important in me learning to question nature in my grandparents’ garden, questioning what 
allows the apples to appear as beings, is not learning to question the unfolding of some 
otherworldly phusis. Instead, what is important is allowing the garden to appear as my 
dwelling place, to learn to dwell amidst the apples.  
    This explains, in part, why Heidegger focuses on giving accounts of our dwelling places, 
why he names two elements of the fourfold the sky and the earth and why he concentrates on 
describing how the fourfold unfolds in the things amidst which we dwell. Although the earth 
does not describe the material growth and development of beings, it still describes the 
emergence of the place in which we begin to dwell. However, this discussion does not yet 
give a complete response to the question of why Heidegger talks about the sky and the earth. 
It does not yet explain why, if the earth and the sky do not refer to a nonhuman nature, these 
dwelling places that Heidegger talks about are often rural places, and why he does not give 
examples of dwelling with technical devices. These questions will be discussed in more detail 
in Chapter Five. 
 
Conclusion  
This chapter has re-examined Heidegger’s understanding of nature, phusis and the earth. It 
has discussed how Heidegger’s phusis cannot refer to a distinct set of entities, to entities that 
rise out of unconcealment on their own accord, and it has demonstrated how Heidegger’s 
earth cannot refer to that which allows for the biological growth and unfolding of natural 
beings. Instead, phusis describes the swaying of Being itself that makes all beings visible to 
us by granting them their essences, and the earth describes the concealment which always 
accompanies the unfolding of phusis. The earth is not a being, but it is the nothing from 
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which beings appear to us as beings. The chapter also rethought the meanings of the earth and 
sky of the fourfold, no longer thinking of these concepts in terms of growth of beings. 
Rethinking the meaning of phusis and the earth allowed for rethinking what it means for 
Heidegger to question Being. Unlike in the last chapter, where questioning Being was 
equated with questioning the material growth of beings, questioning Being is now understood 
as thinking how beings appear to us as beings. The chapter concluded by looking at the 
important role that the idea of place plays in Heidegger’s work, and by looking at how a part 
of the answer to the question of why Heidegger talks about the unfolding of the sky and the 
earth in things we usually think of as natural can be found from his occupation with this 
question of place. 
    Although this chapter has taken first important steps in thinking about the meaning of 
nature in Heidegger’s work, it still leaves big questions unanswered with regard to the role of 
nature in Heidegger’s thought and with to the relationship that protecting nature has to the 
green project of protecting the environment. It still remains unclear what it means to protect 
phusis, and what is the relationship between protecting phusis and preventing environmental 
degradation. Does questioning phusis require us to reject modern technology, at least to a 
degree? Does questioning Being lead to a kind of lifestyle that does not make demands on 
individual beings, and does it have environmentally friendly outcomes even if these kinds of 
outcomes were not Heidegger’s main concern? And finally, if phusis, for Heidegger, did not 
describe the unfolding of nonhuman natural beings, then why does he make so many 
references to dwelling in areas that we would think of as somehow nonhuman and natural, 
favouring in particular examples of dwelling in rural areas? Does Heidegger’s philosophy, in 
the end, rest on nostalgia for a pre-technological past where humans did not shape their 
environments to such a large extent but allowed beings to grow and develop on their own 
accord? The next chapter will begin to answer these questions by looking in more detail at 
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how we might protect nature and what kinds of political implications Heidegger’s thinking 
about Being has. The question of the rural examples of dwelling that Heidegger seems to 
favour will be discussed in Chapter Five. Chapter Five will be the last chapter that focuses on 
Heidegger’s work and Chapter Six will return to green political thinking in order to examine 
how this new way of thinking about nature can help us make better sense of green goals. 
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Chapter Four: Phusis, Politics and Letting Be 
Introduction  
The previous chapter explored the idea of nature in Heidegger’s work in order to start 
thinking about the role that the concept of nature plays in green politics. The chapter 
continued thinking about nature in Heidegger’s work after Chapter Two had demonstrated 
that the mainstream ways of approaching Heidegger’s nature cannot hold, that nature and the 
earth and the sky in his works cannot describe the growth and development of a set of 
nonhuman beings. The chapter went on to investigate the meanings of nature, or phusis, and 
the earth and the sky, that are understood in the common green readings of Heidegger as 
referring to the nonhuman environment, and explored new ways of thinking about these 
concepts. The chapter thought about the meaning of phusis, which was the Greek word for 
nature, it looked at the concealing earth, which plays a role in the happening of truth, and it 
investigated how we might learn to dwell on the earth and under the sky. By examining these 
concepts, the chapter demonstrated that Heidegger’s phusis does not describe the growth and 
development of a particular set of natural beings but describes how all beings appear to us as 
beings. The concealing earth does not refer to that which allows for the growth and unfolding 
of a separate set of natural beings but refers to the concealment that is always a part of the 
happening of phusis. And similarly, the unfolding earth and the sky of the fourfold must also 
be seen as descriptions of how all beings appear to us as beings and of the appearance of our 
dwelling place. 
    So, this would mean that we learn to protect nature when we begin to question the mystery 
of phusis. But the previous chapter only discussed how we should think about the unfolding 
of phusis. It did not ask how we could begin to question phusis: it did not explain what 
relationship this questioning has to protecting the environment and beings themselves, and 
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what kind of a role this questioning could play in green politics. For the green interpretations 
of Heidegger discussed in Chapter Two, which equated nature with natural beings, linking 
questioning Being and protecting beings was relatively straightforward. Heidegger’s calls for 
letting beings be, in particular, seemed to give us practical advice on how to preserve and 
protect nature. As a result, green thinkers inspired by Heidegger’s philosophy were able to 
suggest concrete actions that help question Being which could be incorporated into the green 
agenda. Heidegger’s advice to let beings be as they are and his description of technological 
thinking making demands on the environment seemed to further support this interpretation of 
his thinking. However, as we begin to think of phusis as an attempt to question how beings 
appear to us as beings, it becomes unclear if this kind of questioning is still related to 
protecting beings themselves.  
    The purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, it aims to demonstrate that there does not 
exist a link between questioning phusis and protecting beings, that protecting nature must 
now be divorced from the practice of environmental politics. The chapter does this by 
looking at Heidegger’s own involvements with politics and his thinking on the Greek word 
polis. This discussion is useful because Heidegger’s thinking of the polis helps us to reflect 
on the relationship that the polis has to the everyday practice of politics. The second purpose 
of the chapter is to look at how Heidegger’s discussion of the polis also allows us to think in 
more depth about what it means to question the unfolding of phusis and to protect nature, 
what it means to dwell and to be at home. This discussion will allow us to understand better 
what it might mean to question phusis and protect nature.  
    When this chapter discusses Heidegger and politics, the focus is on how Heidegger thought 
that the everyday practice of politics could help us to question Being. This is because the 
chapter inquires after the role that questioning phusis could play in the every day practice of 
green politics. The story of Heidegger’s political involvements as presented in this chapter is 
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intended as an exploration into Heidegger’s engagements with the everyday practice of 
politics, and what these engagements can tell us about how we could question phusis. It does 
not attempt to answer questions concerning Heidegger and the political. When I explore how 
political engagements were absent from Being and Time or from Heidegger’s later works on 
dwelling, I do not mean to suggest that the political is absent from these writings, but that 
Heidegger did not think that the everyday practice of politics could help him to question 
Being at the time of writing these works. Furthermore, when I explore the kinds of political 
practices that could help us to question phusis, I do not attempt to uncover the kind of politics 
that Heidegger himself would have promoted. Rather, I explore the kinds of political 
practices that Heidegger’s thinking can guide us towards.  
    This chapter is divided into seven parts. The first section begins by looking how 
Heidegger’s references to letting beings be are usually thought about by green interpreters of 
Heidegger. The next four parts then look at the development of Heidegger’s thinking on the 
Greek word polis, investigate his engagements with politics and look at the ways in which he 
thought questioning Being could inform the way we practise politics. The second section of 
the chapter begins this discussion by looking at Heidegger’s engagement with the polis in the 
early 1930s. The third section looks at how his questioning changes when he explores in 
more detail how we encounter phusis. The fourth section investigates how Heidegger thought 
about the polis in the 1940s, and how the way in which he questions Being also changes 
during this period. The fifth section concludes the discussion of the polis by looking at how 
these different ways Heidegger describes the polis can fit together, and how we should think 
about his polis. The sixth section then goes on to examine how we should re-interpret 
Heidegger’s calls for letting beings be. Finally, the seventh section looks at what the 
discussion presented in this chapter can tell us about the environmental implications of 
170 
 
Heidegger’s thinking, and what kind of role politics could play in allowing us to question 
phusis. 
 
Protecting Beings 
Heidegger makes many references to protecting beings in his works. This is most notable in 
his discussion on letting beings be. As was explored in the previous chapter, he first 
introduces the concept of letting be in ‘On the Essence of Truth’ where he maintains that to 
stop making demands on beings, we should encounter beings in their truth. And this, 
Heidegger explains, happens when we let beings be by remaining open to beings (ET: 147; 
WW: 88). These references to letting be also appear in his work on dwelling. Here Heidegger 
describes how the Greeks thought of techne in terms of letting-appear (BDT: 157; BWD: 
161-2), and how the making of the jug that he discusses in ‘The Thing’ ‘lets the jug come to 
its own’ (Thing, 166; Ding: 168-9). Heidegger elaborates on how we might let beings be and 
remain open to beings in more detail by introducing a concept of releasement in Discourse on 
Thinking.  
   Discourse on Thinking comprises of two parts: an address that Heidegger delivered in 
memory of the composer Conradin Kreutzer and an essay, ‘Conversation on A Country Path’.  
In the Memorial Address, Heidegger discusses how we can learn to release ourselves towards 
things. The German word that he uses for ‘releasement’ is ‘Gelassenheit’. This verb derives 
from ‘lassen’, which means ‘to let’. The discussion of ‘releasement’ is thus about ‘letting’. 
We can release ourselves by learning a different way of thinking, meditative thinking. 
Meditative thinking lets beings be by paying attention to things that are around us without 
trying to represent them. We learn meditative thinking when we stay with things: 
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[M]editative thinking need by no means be "high-flown." It is enough if we dwell [verweilen] on what lies 
close and meditate on what is closest; upon that which concerns us, each one of us, here and now; here, on 
this patch of home ground; now, in the present hour of history (DOT: 47; G:14). 
   
The German word that has been translated here as ‘to dwell’ is ‘verweilen’, which means ‘to 
linger’, ‘to stay’, or ‘to rest’. It is also related to the word ‘die Weile’, which means ‘a while’. 
So ‘dwelling’ here is meant in the sense of ‘staying with things’, ‘to rest with things’, ‘to 
quietly contemplate them’. ‘Releasement’ and ‘letting be’, then, are about staying with beings 
in order to allow these beings to reveal themselves to us. It is understood in opposition to 
imposing meanings on beings by attempting to represent them. 
    But how does this notion of releasement now link back to the notion of dwelling in the 
fourfold which was discussed in earlier chapters? As Dreyfus (2002: 170) explains, 
releasement towards things does not immediately teach us how we might dwell. But adopting 
this kind of attitude opens up the possibility of learning to dwell: ‘Releasement toward things 
and openness to the mystery give us a vision of a new rootedness which someday might even 
be fit to recapture the old and now rapidly disappearing rootedness in a changed form’ 
(Heidegger, cited in Dreyfus, 2002: 170). So, in the case of the apple, we can learn 
releasement when we learn to not always engage with the apple for the sake of something 
else, for the sake of eating healthily, for the sake of a particular lifestyle we wish to adopt or 
for the sake of selling it to make a profit. Instead, we must learn to think about how the apple 
appears to us as a being. This can, in the end, teach us new ways of engaging with the apple. 
    So, what would this idea of releasement look like in more practical terms, and what kinds 
of guidelines for protecting beings can we derive from it? Popular interpretations of 
Heidegger’s thinking assume that the idea of letting be is prescribing a particular 
comportment towards beings. Pearson (2000) explains how releasing ourselves towards 
beings and letting beings be leads us to adopt an attitude of respect and wonder towards 
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beings: ‘Questioning now must be understood as a self-opening or as a stance, of receptivity 
that relates to beings by looking beyond them, in an attitude of wonder or reverential 
expectation, to their source and ground in concealment and mystery’ (Pearson, 2001: 178, see 
also Zimmerman, 1994: 221; Mitchell, 2002). Questioning phusis, then, would entail 
adopting a respectful attitude towards beings, an attitude that allows beings to unfold to us as 
they are. Or as Polt (2011: 27) explains, letting beings be, staying with beings, means to 
reflect on and respect how these beings unfold as material beings, and to understand that we 
cannot control this unfolding. The comportment towards beings that has been described here 
does not have to necessarily be a passive one. In Discourse on Thinking Heidegger explains 
that releasement cannot be understood in terms of activity and passivity, but the notion of 
releasement lies beyond activity and passivity (DOT: 61; G: 32-3). So according to this way 
of thinking about letting be, different kinds of engagements with beings can allow for 
releasement. What is important in releasement is that we allow beings to unfold in a way that 
is appropriate to them (see e.g. Young, 2002: 105-6).  
    It would now seem that there exists a link between protecting phusis and protecting beings. 
If protecting phusis is thought about in this manner, then it is relatively easy to think about 
how the task of protecting phusis could be incorporated into green politics. In order to protect 
nature, green politics would have to encourage us to let beings be. But this way thinking 
about protecting phusis still is problematic. Although these accounts of letting be are not 
attempting to prescribe a passive comportment towards beings, they are prescribing 
particular, correct ways of encountering beings. Taking the apple as an example again, 
according to this account, there are correct ways of behaving towards apples that allow us to 
let the apples be. This means that an alternative way of thinking about protecting phusis is 
needed. 
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    To better understand what it means to let beings be and to understand the relationship that 
questioning Being has to protecting beings, I am going to look at the evolution of 
Heidegger’s thinking on the polis, the Greek word for politics. This inquiry into Heidegger’s 
thinking on the polis will be useful for two reasons. First, his attempts to grapple with the 
question of the polis helps us think about the relationship that protecting nature has to the 
everyday practice of politics. It thus helps us think about the role phusis could play in green 
politics, about how politics could help us protect phusis and how this could have an impact 
on protecting beings themselves. And second, at the heart of Heidegger’s questioning of the 
polis lies an inquiry into the relationship between humans and phusis. His inquiry into the 
meaning of the polis, then, helps us in thinking about how we encounter phusis, how we can 
learn to question phusis, to protect the unfolding of phusis, and how we can come to be at 
home. Heidegger’s thinking of the polis thus allows us to think about what it really means to 
protect nature if it is not be understood in terms of protecting beings. 
 
Heidegger, National Socialism and Politics 
So, to begin thinking what it means to question phusis and how this is not related to 
protecting beings themselves, I will look at the development of Heidegger’s thinking on the 
Greek word polis. This word is usually translated as ‘city-state’ but Heidegger maintains that 
it held a different meaning for the Greeks, a meaning that bears a closer relation to the truth 
of Being. I will begin the inquiry into Heidegger’s engagements with the polis and politics by 
investigating his involvements with National Socialism in the early 1930s and by looking at 
how Heidegger equated the polis with the state during this period. I do not want to go into 
detail concerning Heidegger’s involvement with the National Socialism here because I do not 
wish to make this the central focus of the chapter. This is because it is a topic that has already 
been scrutinised by many others (see e.g. de Beistegui, 1998; Caputo: 1993; Dallmayr, 1995; 
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Kisiel, 2002: ch1; Lang: 1996; Phillips, 2005; Rockmore, 1995: ch8; Zimmerman, 1990). 
Instead, I want to follow Elden’s (2000: 408-9) suggestion and look at the evolution of 
Heidegger’s thinking in relation to these involvements. This allows us to think about how 
these involvements can guide us in interpreting Heidegger’s work, how his philosophy relates 
to the everyday practice of politics and what his philosophy can tell us about how we should 
conduct politics. 
    During his early career, Heidegger was silent about the practical and political implications 
of his questioning of Being. However, in the 1930s, he began to engage with these questions. 
He felt that developments in industrial technology were threatening more traditional ways of 
life in Germany, and were prohibiting Germans from questioning the truth of Being. To 
confront the threat of technological thinking, Heidegger turned to National Socialism. He 
hoped that Hitler could provide a new beginning for the German people, a beginning that 
could resist technological thinking. In 1933 Heidegger joined the National Socialist party, 
and made public speeches in support of Hitler. He also took a more active role in the party by 
becoming the rector of the University of Freiburg. Thus, it seems that during this time he 
decided that questioning Being could have a direct impact on how we conduct politics, and 
could take the form of direct political action. 
    As rector, Heidegger hoped that he could take action to transform the university in a way 
that could help the German Volk to question Being. He presents his vision for the new role 
that universities should take in his inaugural lecture, his rectoral address. Although the 
rectoral address did not mention race, it made numerous references to other Nazi themes, 
such as the German Volk, earth and blood (Wolin, 1990: 85; Elden, 2006b: 80-1). In this 
address, it also becomes clear that Heidegger thought philosophy itself could have a role in 
shaping politics and the history of the German Volk. In the address Heidegger explains how 
thinkers themselves in the university should be able to take concrete actions to guide the 
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German nation towards a new beginning: ‘the students’ will to essence must force itself into 
the highest clarity and discipline of knowledge and must shape, through its demands and 
determinations, the engaged knowledge of the Volk and its state and incorporate this 
knowledge into the essence of science’ (SA: 37). The university, in this way, would serve the 
German Volk and would prepare men for serving the German state. The task that Heidegger 
saw for the university was not an easy one, but it was based on struggle: ‘All capacities of 
will and thought, all strengths of the heart, and all capabilities of the body must be developed 
through struggle, must be intensified in struggle, and must remain preserved as struggle’ 
(SA: 37, emphasis original). 
    The National Socialist party, however, did not take the direction that Heidegger had hoped, 
and he resigned from his position as rector in 1934. Although Heidegger had sympathies for 
National Socialism, he eventually became disillusioned with the party and concluded that 
National Socialism itself was a part of technological thinking, preoccupied with the efficient 
ordering of beings instead of questioning Being (Harries, 1978: 305). As Phillips (2005) 
explains, what for the National Socialists was a question of a biologically founded 
community of German people was, for Heidegger, a question of a historical community of 
people. This historical community is not grounded in biological race but in a common history 
and in shared understandings of Being. In the end, National Socialism turned out to be too 
technological, too involved with beings and not radical enough in the way that Heidegger had 
hoped. Thus, it could not offer a new beginning for Germany (Phillips, 2005: 14-15). 
Heidegger did, however, remain a member of the party until the end of the war. 
    Because questioning Being led Heidegger to take a stand on the organisation of politics 
during this period, it seems that he did not want to separate questioning Being from politics. 
During this time, Heidegger also made his first references to polis, and associated the Greek 
word polis with the state itself (de Beistegui, 1998: 57-8; Elden, 2000: 409). This raises 
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serious concerns as to whether we should let questioning Being guide our politics. Heidegger 
himself begins to grapple with these questions after his resignation as rector. He begins to ask 
if the link between questioning Being and politics is as straightforward as he had thought 
before (Elden: 2000: 416). He also begins to think in more detail about the polis and 
examined how it cannot be simply equated with the state. The relationship between politics 
and questioning Being is, then, more complicated than Heidegger’s engagements with the 
idea of the polis during this period would suggest. He never apologised for his involvements 
with National Socialism. However, some kind of response to these involvements and a 
possible explanation for his silence begins to emerge from his works after 1934. Heidegger’s 
rethinking of the polis begins soon after his resignation with the lecture course Introduction 
to Metaphysics, and it is to this discussion of the polis that I shall turn to next.  
 
Shift in Questioning Polis 
In Introduction to Metaphysics Heidegger begins to distance himself from National 
Socialism. His treatment of the polis undergoes a change and here he no longer thinks that the 
polis can be equated with the state. Heidegger’s thinking of the meaning of the polis follows 
a discussion of how humans encounter phusis and through this, establish beings as beings. 
This discussion can, then, help us start thinking about how we encounter phusis and we can 
come to be at home. In Introduction to Metaphysics, the relationship between humans and 
phusis is understood as a violent encounter. The language that Heidegger uses in this lecture 
course is similar to the language he used to describe the happening of truth in ‘Origins of the 
Work of Art’ as a strife between the earth and the world, and also bears similarities to the 
more confrontational tone of the rectoral address. 
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    These explorations into the nature of phusis and the polis are framed around a reading of 
Sopocholes’ Antigone. Heidegger concentrates on interpreting the opening strophes of 
Antigone. This is the first movement of these strophes in full:  
Manifold is the uncanny, yet nothing  
uncannier than man bestirs itself, rising up beyond him.  
He fares forth upon the foaming tide  
amid winter's southerly tempest  
and cruises through the summits  
of the raging, clefted swells. 
The noblest of gods as well, the earth,  
the indestructibly untiring, he wearies,  
overturning her from year to year,  
driving the plows this way and that  
with his steeds. (IM: 156) 
  
So what are these opening strophes of Antigone about and why are they important for our 
understanding of phusis? Because of the detailed description of the winter storm, we could 
easily conclude that these strophes tell the story of man’s evolution as he encounters the 
violent forces of the surrounding environment and learns to master this environment. But 
Heidegger claims that the verses tell something more fundamental than this. They do not tell 
the story of man’s encounter with nature understood in a conventional sense but they tell 
about man’s encounter with phusis, about revealing beings as beings (IM: 159; EM: 114). 
The winter storm, then, describes the unfolding of phusis itself that, as explored in the 
previous chapter, cannot be equated with the nonhuman environment.  
    Heidegger begins his interpretation of this passage by looking at the mention of ‘uncanny’ 
in the beginning of the passage. The first reference to ‘uncanny’ in the first line, he explains, 
178 
 
refers to the swaying phusis. I will return to the meaning of ‘swaying’ in the next paragraph, 
after looking at the meaning of ‘uncanny’ in more detail. The original Greek word for 
‘uncanny’ is deinon, which Heidegger explains means ‘violent’. But he does not want to use 
the word ‘violent’ here as referring to those everyday things that we might find frightening, to 
what he calls ‘petty terrors’ (IM: 159; EM: 114). Instead, Heidegger maintains that ‘violent’ 
is meant here as ‘the terrible in the sense of the overwhelming sway, which induces panicked 
fear, true anxiety, as well as collected, inwardly reverberating, reticent awe’ (IM: 159; EM: 
114-5). ‘Violent’, then, refers to that which is most frightening and, at the same, time awe-
inspiring. It is that which does not allow us to be at home (IM: 168; EM: 115-6). 
    So here Heidegger describes the swaying of phusis as violent and awe-inspiring. The use 
of the verb ‘to sway’ to describe the unfolding of phusis might seem puzzling at first. Indeed, 
Heidegger’s original German has connotations that cannot be easily translated into English. 
What here is translated as ‘swaying’ is in German the verb ‘walten’, which means ‘to prevail’ 
and ‘to reign’. The verb ‘walten’ is also related to the word ‘Gewalt’, or ‘violence’. The root 
of ‘Gewalt’ is ‘-walt’, which means ‘force’, and is also related to words denoting 
‘governance’ and ‘authority’. ‘Gewalt’, then, does not only refer to arbitrary violence but also 
to power used in governance, and it is this latter meaning of ‘Gewalt’ that Heidegger wants to 
turn our attention to (IM: 161; EM: 115). Thus, saying that phusis sways highlights that 
phusis does not unfold in an arbitrary fashion but it has an inherent order. The Greeks named 
the order of the unfolding phusis dike, which is usually translated as ‘law’. But Heidegger 
translates dike as ‘fittingness’. He explains that ‘we understand fittingness first in the sense of 
joint and structure; then as arrangement, as the direction that the overwhelming gives to its 
sway; finally, as the enjoining structure, which compels fitting-in and compliance’ (IM: 171; 
EM: 123). So phusis has a law, an inherent structure and arrangement, according to which it 
unfolds. Its swaying is not arbitrary.  
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    But it is not only the overwhelming phusis that is identified as uncanny in these verses; 
humans are described as uncanny as well. Indeed, the second line of the opening movement 
claims that nothing is more uncanny than man. Humans are uncanny because they use 
violence to disturb the sway of phusis, which has its own order, to establish beings as beings. 
The second movement describes how humans disturb phusis in more detail:  
Even the lightly gliding flock of birds  
he snares, and he hunts  
the beast folk of the wilderness  
and the brood whose home is the sea,  
the man who studies wherever he goes.  
With ruses he overwhelms the beast  
that spends its nights on mountains and roams,  
and clasping with wood  
the rough-maned neck of the steed  
and the unvanquished bull  
he forces them into the yoke. (IM: 156-7)  
 
 
 
So humans impose their own order on the violently unfolding phusis as they encounter 
phusis, establishing beings as beings. But why does this encounter have to be a violent one?  
    The answer to this question is related to how Heidegger understands the happening of truth 
as a complex unfolding that can never be expressed or represented through correct 
statements. Humans break out against dike because they can never fully bring phusis into 
appearance in beings: ‘breaking-forth and breakup happen only insofar as the powers of 
language, of understanding, of mood, and of building are themselves surmounted in doing 
violence’ (IM: 167; EM: 120). The sway of phusis is so complex that every time we try to 
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bring phusis to stand in beings, this has to happen ‘in the midst of the booming and buzzing 
confusion of things’ (Dahlstrom, 2001a: 93). Thus, we necessarily perform an act of violence 
against phusis. Here it also becomes clear that although Heidegger uses confrontational 
language that bears similarities to the language used by National Socialists, he is not talking 
about violence, struggle or confrontation in relation to beings themselves. The violence he 
talks about does not describe violence against beings, but describes violence against phusis. 
But if we begin to think of the happening of truth and our confrontation with phusis as a 
violent encounter, can this encounter still be thought of as a better way of encountering 
beings than technological thinking? 
    To answer this question, Heidegger looks at the Greek word techne from which the modern 
word ‘technology’ is derived. However, unlike technological thinking, the Greek techne 
allows us to encounter beings in their truth. Techne has a much broader meaning than 
‘technology’, it not only refers to the work of a craftsman or to those things that we today 
would think of as technical. This is because for the Greeks, techne means a kind of knowing 
that is present in all human works: 
Knowing, in the genuine sense of techne, means initially [anfängliche] and constantly [ständige] looking 
out beyond what, in each case, is directly present at hand. In different ways and on different routes and in 
different domains, this Being-out-beyond sets to work in advance that which first gives to what is already 
present at hand its relative justification, its possible determinateness, and thus its limit. Knowing is the 
ability to set Being into work as something that in each case is in such and such a way (IM: 169-7; EM: 
122). 
 
So unlike technological thinking that represents beings, in techne, the focus is on our 
knowledge of Being, and on bringing Being to stand in beings. Techne breaks out against 
dike, the order of phusis, but it still has knowledge of phusis. And because of this, techne 
brings phusis to stand in beings and allows for the happening of truth. Although this 
encounter is violent, techne still pays attention to and respects dike, and this is something that 
technological thinking is unable to do. 
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    Heidegger goes on to discuss how art, in particular, is an example of techne. The emphasis 
that he places on art is important because it shows that phusis will always remain something 
inexpressible, something that can be brought into presence in the work of art but cannot be 
made explicit, explained or understood (IM: 167; EM: 122). This emphasis on the work of art 
can also be seen in other lecture courses that Heidegger gave in the mid-1930s, and it is 
related to the accounts of the happening of truth given by him during this time. As discussed 
in the previous chapter, in 1935 Heidegger delivered the lecture ‘Origins of the Work of Art’, 
which discusses in detail how art can reveal Being through the strife between the earth and 
the world, between concealment and unconcealment.  
    The next two movements of Antigone’s opening strophes then go on to discuss in more 
detail the consequences of violently encountering phusis. This violent encounter means that 
the interpretation that humans have of beings is groundless. The fifth verse of these opening 
strophes explains: ‘Everywhere trying out, underway; untried, with no way out /he comes to 
Nothing (IM: 157; EM: 113).’ The idea of the Nothing was already discussed in the last 
chapter. The Nothing is the concealing earth, that which is not yet a being itself but from 
which beings can appear to us as beings. So this means that revealing beings always requires 
an active engagement from humans in the form of techne. The swaying of phusis itself does 
not yet determine how beings appear as beings because it does not provide a stable ground for 
the existence of beings. 
    Reflecting on our violent confrontation with phusis finally brings Heidegger to the 
question of the polis. Although the polis is usually translated as a ‘city-state’, he maintains 
that this is not the meaning that it held for the Greeks. So here Heidegger’s interpretation of 
the polis shifts, the polis is no longer identified with the state. But the polis and the political 
are still linked because, as I will explain later, we can start thinking of the political in terms of 
the polis. So what is the polis? Heidegger explains that the ‘ The polis is the name for the 
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site, the Here, within which and as which Being-here is historically, the site of history, the 
here, in which, out of which and from which history happens’ (IM: 162; EM: 117, emphasis 
original). The polis is first established when humans encounter the sway of phusis, bring 
phusis to stand and establish beings, revealing the truth of Being in beings (IM: 182; EM: 
131). This site encompasses the society as a whole: ‘To this site of history belong the gods, 
the temples, the priests, the celebrations, the games, the poets, the thinkers, the ruler, the 
council of elders, the assembly of the people, the armed forces, and the ships’ (IM: 162-3; 
EM: 117). But Heidegger emphasises that all these do not belong to the polis because they 
share a relationship with the statesmen or with the generals, because of political relations in 
the sense that we understand politics today. Instead, all these belong to the political because 
they engage with beings that have been established as beings through a violent encounter 
with phusis (IM: 163; EM; 117). So polis here is no longer equated with the state. Instead, it 
refers to that which exists prior to the political, to that which allows beings to appear to us as 
beings in the first place. The question of the polis and the question of how we can come to be 
at home, then, is a question of our confrontation with phusis. 
    But who confronts phusis and establishes beings as beings in the first place? Heidegger 
explains that the struggle that establishes the polis is ‘sustained by the creators, by the poets, 
thinkers, and statesmen’ (IM: 65; EM: 47). Listing the poet here as opposed to the artist 
might seem puzzling, particularly because before we examined how Heidegger talks about art 
as a whole as something that plays an important role in allowing beings to appear as beings. 
The reason for this mention of the poet is that Heidegger thinks all art is in its essence poetry. 
This is because, as discussed in the previous chapters, he privileges language in questioning 
Being: Being itself speaks to us through language. Language is what allows the artist to make 
sense of the world, and is that which allows beings to appear as beings. All art, according to 
Heidegger, must, then, rest on poetry (OWA: 70-1; UK: 59-61). This is why we can often 
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find him referring to poetry alone when we would expect him to be talking about art as a 
whole. This is something to keep in mind because we will encounter more of these references 
to poetry later on. Mentioning the thinker as playing a part in establishing the polis is less 
surprising. The role of thinking in questioning Being is a topic that was already examined in 
the previous chapter, and it should not seem strange that Heidegger here is pairing thinking 
and poetry. Thinking here is not meant in terms of forming statements and definitions of 
things, but it is meant as something that questions phusis, and it is thus similar to art (see e.g. 
WCT: 165; WHD: 103). 
     What is interesting in this passage is the reference to the statesmen participating in 
establishing the polis. Although we can see from the emphasis on the role of the thinkers and 
the poets in establishing the polis that Heidegger is beginning to distance the happening of 
the polis from the everyday affairs of the state, this reference to the statesmen demonstrates 
that the polis is not yet banished entirely from the sphere of politics, and the statesmen can 
participate in establishing the polis. This is because Heidegger is interested in questioning 
how the way in which we confront phusis allows beings to appear to us in a certain way, and 
how certain ways of conducting politics allow for certain ways of bringing phusis to stand 
(see Blitz, 1981). For example, the Western liberal tradition is based on a particular 
conception of humans as individual beings with rights. So, the statesmen participate in the 
happening of the polis by conducting politics and finding new ways of conducting politics 
that confront phusis in a different way. 
   Heidegger’s description of this violent encounter between humans and phusis now helps us 
arrive at a different understanding of the relationship between questioning phusis and 
protecting beings. Protecting phusis and finding our homeland is now about preserving the 
strife between humans and phusis, it is about human techne breaking out against the order of 
dike. What is significant in this confrontation is that we do not encounter phusis as such when 
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we establish beings as beings, but human interpretation and confrontation is always required 
for revealing beings. Thus, as Fried (2001: 85) explains, ‘[f]or Being to emerge into 
unconcealment, and for Dasein to let beings be, Dasein cannot remain passive; it must 
confront the given interpretation of the world’. There is no unfolding of phusis that is proper 
to beings. These interpretations emerge from that which is nothing, from that which is not yet 
a being, from the concealing earth itself (see also Ward, 1995: 206). 
    This discussion of how humans encounter phusis and this rethinking of the polis as a 
violent encounter now casts doubts on whether questioning Being can help us in protecting 
the apple. As the role of the statesmen in establishing the polis demonstrated, questioning 
Being does not have to be wholly divorced from politics, the statesmen themselves, in 
addition to the poets and the thinkers, can violently confront phusis and establish the polis. 
But we now need to rethink the consequences that violently confronting phusis has for 
protecting beings.  
    To explain why this is so, I am going to return to examining how we can question the 
unfolding of phusis in my grandparents’ garden. To do this, we would have to confront 
phusis anew and find new ways of thinking about the apples in the garden as something that 
are not simply to be grown as efficiently as possible, as a resource to be sold. Instead, we 
would have to concentrate on how the apple is revealed to us as a being in the first place. But 
what the account of the violent encounter between humans and phusis draws our attention to 
is that confronting phusis and finding new ways of questioning the apple do not necessarily 
guide us towards environmentally friendly attitudes. This is because respecting the 
spontaneous growth of the apple and the secure rhythm of changing seasons are both already 
violent interpretations of the unfolding of phusis, products of a violent encounter between 
dike and techne. There are many ways in which this violent encounter can take place and 
there is no guarantee that it will happen in a particular way, that we will begin to think of the 
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apple as something that must unfold spontaneously, respecting the rhythms of the changing 
seasons. We could start thinking of the apple as something that will only really be an apple 
when it is baked into a pie. This would focus on the consumption of the apple, and there is 
nothing that guarantees that this consumption would be sustainable.  
    So, Heidegger’s interpretation of Antigone in Introduction to Metaphysics allows us to 
begin to make sense of what it means to protect phusis and why this cannot be guaranteed to 
be environmentally friendly. However, his questioning here still does not fully explain how 
we should question the unfolding of phusis and what it means to protect nature. His central 
focus is still on questioning how beings are revealed to us as beings when we encounter 
phusis. This can best be seen in the role that the statesmen, who do not think about Being but 
organise beings, play in establishing the polis. So in Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger 
does not have much to say about how we learn to encounter phusis, what kind of thinking or 
questioning allows us to encounter phusis.  But as he continues to question phusis and the 
polis, he begins to address these questions. As Heidegger does this, he provides a different 
reading of the relationship between humans and phusis, explaining what it means to question 
phusis and what consequences it has for our thinking of the polis. He also begins to think 
more about how we can find our homeland through our encounter with phusis. It is, however, 
still important to keep in mind what Heidegger said about the polis in Introduction to 
Metaphysics because, as I will demonstrate at the end of the chapter, it will help us in 
interpreting how he thought about the polis in his later work. 
 
Ister and Homecoming     
Heidegger presents a new way of thinking about the polis seven years later, in a lecture 
course on Hölderlin’s poem on the river Ister. This discussion on the polis takes place in 
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conjunction with a longer discussion on how we can come to be at home. As was already 
discussed in the previous chapter, the way in which Heidegger questions the homeland in this 
lecture course is different from how he questioned the homeland in Hölderlin’s Hymns 
‘Germania’ and ‘Rhine’, delivered seven years earlier, around the same time as Introduction 
to Metaphysics. Whereas in Hölderlin’s Hymns ‘Germania’ and ‘Rhine’ it is the poet and the 
poetic descriptions of the rivers that can help the German people to found their homeland, in 
Hölderlin’s Hymn ‘The Ister’, the focus is different. Heidegger now discusses how we might 
come to know our homeland in different language. The poet no longer founds the homeland, 
but he can help us find the mood that guides us towards questioning Being.  
    A similar shift can be observed in the way that Heidegger discusses the polis in this lecture 
course. Here, he returns to Antigone and to the question of the polis in order to provide a new 
interpretation of Antigone. In this new interpretation, the central theme of the opening 
strophes of Antigone is no longer the violence between humans and phusis. Instead, 
Heidegger explains that these verses concentrate on describing the homelessness of humans 
and on thinking how humans can become homely. The theme of the homeland in Heidegger’s 
writings is already familiar to us as I explored its importance in the previous chapter by 
looking at how finding our homeland is about the finding the place in which we come to 
dwell. In the lecture course on the Ister, thinking about this homeland further results in a 
different way of thinking about the polis. 
      So how is the account of how we confront phusis and the interpretation of Antigone now 
different? In this new interpretation of Antigone, deinon, that describes both phusis and 
humans, is still translated as ‘uncanny’, but the meaning of ‘uncanny’ changes. Instead of 
understanding ‘uncanny’ as violent, Heidegger identifies three different meanings for this 
word. Deinon is now described as fearful, powerful and frightful: 
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The fearful is something frightful, yet also that which commands admiration. The fearful shows itself both 
in honour and in awe. The powerful can be that which everywhere prevails and looms over us, yet also that 
which is actively violent, that force that compels all necessity into a singular, uniform compulsion (IE: 67; 
IG: 77). 
 
This way of thinking about ‘uncanny’ is not completely divorced from the interpretation of 
‘uncanny’ that Heidegger presented in Introduction to Metaphysics: deinon is still understood 
as something powerful that can also be violent. But violence is no longer the main way in 
which we are to think about the meaning of ‘uncanny’, now ‘uncanny’ also refers to the 
fearful and the frightful.  
    Heidegger wants to start thinking about these different meanings of ‘uncanny’ in their 
unity, as words that always belong together (IE: 68; IG: 76). He goes on to argue that a word 
that encompasses all these three different meanings is ‘inhabitual’: ‘The inhabitual is the 
extraordinary that directly and essentially exceeds everything habitual, is that in a certain way 
it stands “outside” the habitual’ (IE: 67; IG: 77). To explain the full significance of 
understanding deinon as ‘inhabitual’ Heidegger also draws attention to how the German word 
for ‘uncanny’, ‘das Unheimliche’, is related to the word ‘das Unheimische’, which means 
‘unhomely’. The uncanny is related to unhomeliness: humans are uncanny and inhabitual 
because they are not homely (IE: 71; IG: 87). The encounter with phusis and becoming 
homely, then, describes how we learn to venture beyond those beings that are familiar to us to 
encounter the uncanny, frightening phusis and through this, learn to be at home.  
    So in the lecture course on the Ister, Heidegger depicts humans as being unhomely because 
they exist amongst beings. It is the task of humans to learn to question Being, to come to be 
at home. Dasein no longer encounters phusis for the sake of revealing beings, but for the sake 
of becoming homely amidst beings. De Beistegui (1998: 108) explains how the homeland is 
not something that exists in the beginning but it is something that we find through 
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journeying: ‘this moment of return is not a movement of returning to something that was 
originally, but that the origin itself is constituted through this movement of return’. 
     The interpretation of deinon in the lecture course on ‘Ister’ also marks a shift in the kind 
of language that Heidegger uses to question the polis, shedding further light into how we 
should approach the meaning of the polis. The question of the polis is now the question of the 
unfolding of the truth of Being that determines the essence of all beings (IE: 84; IG: 106). 
Because Heidegger attempts to talk about the polis in terms of Being rather than beings, he 
becomes less certain about his abilities to explain what the polis really is:  
Perhaps the polis is that realm and locale around which everything question-worthy and uncanny turns in 
an exceptional sense. The polis is polos, that is, the pole, the swirl, in which and around which everything 
turns. […] The human being is then related in an exceptional sense to this pole, in so far as human beings, 
in understanding being, stand in the midst of beings and here essentially have a status in each case, a 
stance in their instances and circumstances (HI 81; IG: 100).  
  
The discussion here is similar to the description of the polis that was presented in 
Introduction to Metaphysics but a shift in Heidegger’s thinking akin to the shift that took 
place in his interpretation of deinon can be recognised. He is not asking about the meaning of 
the polis in terms of beings, in terms of how beings are revealed as beings, but he is asking 
about the polis for the sake of Being. This is why Heidegger’s polis will always remain 
something question-worthy, and this is why he starts his description of the polis with a 
‘perhaps’. He is here journeying into the mystery of Being itself. He cannot fully express 
what it means to question Being and what consequences this questioning can have.  
    The way in which the polis is established also changes here. Because the polis is no longer 
understood in terms of how beings are revealed as beings but in terms of Being itself, the 
polis is no longer established by the statesmen. It is now only the poets and the thinkers who 
establish the polis (IE: 146; IG: 182). The description of the polis no longer touches on how 
to establish beings as beings, but it is now about questioning phusis, about finding our 
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homeland and about existing in nearness to Being. This is a task that the statesman cannot 
undertake. It is, instead, a task for the poets and the thinkers to act as our guides as we search 
for the homeland. But how do the poets and the thinkers guide us towards our homeland? Is 
there any decisive moment when the poets and the thinkers are able to act as our guides? This 
question can be answered by turning to the beginning of the lecture course on ‘Ister’ where 
Heidegger questions the opening line of Hölderlin’s Ister Hymn.  
    This poem begins with the words ‘Now, come fire’. ‘Fire’ here refers to that which makes 
the day visible (IE: 7; IG: 6). The question of when the polis is established, then, is a question 
of what ‘now’ refers to in this line. Heidegger explains that ‘now’ ‘names the time of calling 
of those who are of a calling, a time of poets. Such a time is determined out of that which the 
poets are called upon to poetize their poetry’ (IE: 8 IG: 8). So ‘now’ does not refer to a time 
that can be measured or calculated, to the kind of time that can be recorded and might be of 
use for the statesman. Instead, it refers to the time of the poet questioning and thinking about 
Being, to a time we can never point to because this questioning is a process that we cannot 
fully grasp. So this means that we cannot explain what the polis is, explain when and how the 
polis is established. Instead, we can only question the polis. The sphere of the polis does not 
lie in the activities of the statesmen and it does not lie in effectively mobilising a nation to 
confront phusis, but it lies in this questioning. 
    But what exactly does it mean to establish the polis and find our homeland?  Heidegger 
does not explain this and cannot do so because Being is not something we can explain. 
Instead of prescribing how we should think of Being, he is attempting to prepare a way for us 
to leap into a different way of thinking without being able to explain how we are, in the end, 
to take this leap (WCT: 12-13; WHD: 48). Ben-Dor (2007) suggests that Heidegger’s 
response to his political involvements can also be found from this inability to express the 
meaning of the polis. For Heidegger now, to think about Being is to stay silent: ‘Being silent 
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is to heed to the inexpressible and to respond to it’ (Ben-Dor, 2007: 404). Thus, as Ben-Dor 
puts it, ‘Better to speak about Being rather than to construct a theory of Being’ (Ben-Dor, 
2007: 70). Heidegger’s account of establishing the polis now looks different than it did in 
Introduction to Metaphysics. It is no longer about the statesmen founding the polis and 
finding a new destiny for a community. The journey towards our homeland is not a journey 
we can explain or understand because it will be, in the end, our own personal journey of 
questioning which the poets and the thinkers can only guide. 
    I am going to return to investigating how we exist in our homeland and in the polis in more 
detail at the end of this chapter when revisiting what it means to let beings be. But before this, 
I will look at how the way of thinking about the polis presented in the lecture course on 
‘Ister’ can be fitted together with the account of the polis Heidegger presented in Introduction 
to Metaphysics, and how these two accounts together can tell us something about the polis 
and its relationship to the political.   
 
Ister and Introduction to Metaphysics 
So what can all of this now tell us about the relationship between questioning phusis and 
protecting beings? Some have suggested that the shift in Heidegger’s thinking which takes 
place in the lecture course on ‘Ister’ means that what he said about encountering phusis in 
Introduction to Metaphysics now becomes invalid. Pearson (2001, see also Zimmerman, 
1990: 120-1; Wright, 1999) argues that the shift in the way in which deinon is interpreted 
signifies a change in the way that Heidegger understands the meaning of phusis and letting 
be. Because his focus is now less on violence and more on awe when describing how we 
encounter phusis, the encounter with phusis in this lecture course is not violent in character. 
Heidegger is no longer emphasising the active role of humans in bringing phusis to stand. So 
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according to Pearson, the interpretation of deinon in the lecture course on ‘Ister’ offers a new 
interpretation of deinon that replaces the one presented by Heidegger in Introduction to 
Metaphysics. Only this new interpretation can be used to make sense of what it means to let 
beings be and how we should comport ourselves towards beings.  
    But making a distinction between these two different interpretations is not as simple as it 
seems at first. Fried (2000: 83) and de Beistegui (1998: 141) point out that what is also 
significant is that Heidegger’s actual translation of Antigone’s opening strophes is the same in 
these two lecture courses. And translation, Heidegger maintains, is always an important part 
of the interpretation itself (IE: 61-2; IG: 74-6). So if his interpretation of Antigone had 
changed, we would also expect to find a new translation of these opening strophes. Fried 
(2001: 85) also encourages us to look closer at how the focus on quiet questioning and 
concepts such as letting be were already present in Heidegger’s earlier works such in ‘On the 
Essence of Truth’ and were not first introduced in his later works. This means that thinking of 
violence and letting be as two different, mutually exclusive, ways of comporting ourselves 
towards phusis becomes difficult. Thus, there is no evidence that Heidegger goes on to 
provide a new interpretation of deinon in Hölderlin’s Hymn ‘The Ister’. 
    How, then, can we reconcile these two different readings of Antigone? De Beistegui (1998: 
142-3; see also Ward, 1995: 190) argues that in the lecture course on ‘Ister’ Heidegger’s 
interpretation of Antigone does not change, but what changes is the question that he wants to 
answer through his reading of Antigone. So, the interpretation of the polis in Hölderlin’s 
Hymn ‘The Ister’ does not point to a change in Heidegger’s interpretation, but it points to a 
change in his focus. In the lecture course on ‘Ister’, Heidegger is not questioning how beings 
appear to us as beings as he did in Introduction to Metaphysics. De Beistegui explains that in 
Hölderlin’s Hymn ‘The Ister’, the question of phusis is a question of how we can become 
homely amidst Being itself: ‘After all, the reading of 1935 served as an introduction into 
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metaphysics, whereas, in the 1940s, it is for Heidegger a matter of thinking before and 
beyond metaphysics: a matter of leaving metaphysics’ (de Beistegui, 1998: 143, emphasis 
original).  
    And although Heidegger’s references to the homeland in Introduction to Metaphysics 
remain scarce, this does not mean that he was not concerned with the question of 
homecoming in Introduction to Metaphysics. As suggested by Mugerauer (2008), 
Heidegger’s way of thinking about the homeland had developed when he was delivering the 
lecture course on ‘Ister’. During the time of delivering Introduction to Metaphysics, 
Heidegger’s focus was still on how we are not at home, and how, to find our homeland, we 
must encounter the uncanny, venture out of this homelessness to confront the swaying of 
phusis (Mugerauer, 2008: 58-9).  
    But when Heidegger delivered the Ister lecture course, his thinking had developed, and he 
was able to better explain how we venture into the foreign, how we confront phusis, and how 
this allows us to journey towards our homeland. The relationship that this way of thinking 
about the polis has to the violent encounter with phusis that Heidegger discussed in 
Introduction to Metaphysics can be seen in how he addresses the question of the relationship 
between Being and violence in another lecture course on Hölderlin’s poetry. Here, Heidegger 
emphasises the importance of shyness as we begin to question Being. Shyness refers to quiet 
questioning that cannot make statements about beings themselves: ‘Shyness is that reserved, 
patient, astonished remembrance of that which remains near in a nearness’ (EHP: 153; EHD: 
131). This shyness, Heidegger states, is ‘more decisive than all violence’ (EHP: 153; EHD: 
132). So here, Heidegger does not deny the significance of violence, but maintains that 
shyness is more decisive. This is because shyness does not describe how phusis is 
encountered for the sake of revealing beings, but it describes how phusis is encountered for 
the sake of Being itself.   
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    So this means that these two interpretations of Antigone in Hölderlin’s Hymn ‘The Ister’ 
and in Introduction to Metaphysics together can help us think about the relationship between 
questioning phusis and protecting beings. Through the account of violence in Introduction to 
Metaphysics we can learn about how we establish beings as beings and how this is a violent 
encounter that cannot be guaranteed to have environmentally friendly outcomes. The account 
in Introduction to Metaphysics does not tell us much about how we can come to be at home 
because it is concentrating on describing how we can begin our journey to home by turning 
toward the uncanny phusis. But the account of phusis in Hölderlin’s Hymn ‘The Ister’ is 
about questioning Being itself and this is why it is more decisive than a violent confrontation 
with phusis. This is the kind of questioning that, in the end, allows us to question Being, to go 
beyond asking how beings appear to us as beings and to question the polis itself.  
    The development of Heidegger’s thinking of the polis also allows for finding a response to 
the concerns raised by his involvement with National Socialism from the way in which 
Heidegger’s thinking of the polis changes in his later works. In his later works, establishing 
the polis and finding our homeland is no longer about how a community searches for its 
common homeland but it is about our individual journeys as we embark on a journey towards 
becoming homely. The politicians can no longer found the polis, the journey towards our 
homeland is secret and intimate, the statesmen cannot dictate how this journey unfolds but 
only the poets and the thinkers can guide our paths along this journey. The polis is now 
associated with the inexpressible and no longer with larger political projects aimed at finding 
a new destiny for a community of people.  
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Letting Be 
So what about the ideas of letting be and releasement that were discussed at the beginning of 
the chapter? How could we start thinking about letting be and releasement differently when 
Heidegger’s interpretation of letting be seems to explicitly state that it is about comporting 
ourselves towards beings in particular ways? Investigating this is the purpose of the current 
section. Revisiting our understandings of letting be and releasement is also useful because it 
helps us better understand polis. As Mugenaeur (2008) explains, in Heidegger’s later writings 
on letting be that I am going to explore here, Heidegger was returning to his homeland, and 
what he is now trying to articulate is how we can stay in our homeland. These writings, then, 
can help us think more about how we stay in the polis and how we can dwell in our 
homeland. 
    Clues for how we can revise our understanding of letting be can be found from a seminar 
that Heidegger gave in le Thor in France in 1969 where he elaborates on the meaning of 
letting be. He begins by thinking about what it means to say that there is a being. Here, 
Heidegger portrays letting be as a similar kind of going beyond beings as the meaning of 
deinon in Hölderlin’s Hymn ‘The Ister’. Letting, he maintains, must not be thought of as 
prescribing a particular comportment towards beings, but instead, it must be thought of as 
giving. The meaning of ‘giving’ can be understood by looking at the German expression ‘es 
gibt’, which means ‘there is.’ ‘Es gibt’, however, has a different meaning from the English 
‘there is’. Literally translated into English, it means ‘it gives’, and thus it refers to that which 
gives us beings. Heidegger, however, maintains that we must be careful when thinking about 
the meaning of ‘giving’ because we easily slip into metaphysical thinking when reflecting on 
it. It is easy to think of ‘giving’ as referring to beings themselves, as describing the fact that 
there are beings. This could happen if, for example, if, when we encounter an apple tree, what 
would concern us the most would be the fact that there are apples in the tree. 
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    So how can we, then, avoid this way of interpreting letting? To find another way of 
thinking about letting be, instead of concentrating on the being that is, we can focus on the 
‘giving’ in ‘es gibt’. We can ask how a being unconceals itself to us, we can concentrate on 
how the being has emerged as a particular being, why we can think of that particular being as 
a being. So, we could concentrate on thinking about what gives us an apple, what allowed the 
apple to appear as an apple. This seems to be the kind of interpretation of letting be that is 
advocated by the green thinkers who ask how the apple appears as a being. But crucially, 
Heidegger maintains that this second way of understanding letting is still part of metaphysical 
thinking. This is because it concentrates on the being as a being, it inquires about letting be 
for the sake of beings themselves. We are still concerned with the appearance of the apple 
itself. 
    But there is a third way of understanding what it means to let things be that is not a part of 
metaphysical thinking. This third way of understanding letting be does not refer to how 
beings rise into presence and unfold to us as beings. This way of approaching letting be is not 
about beings, but it focuses on that which gives us beings, on that which allows beings to 
appear to us as beings. If we concentrate on this, then ‘there is no longer room for the very 
name of being. Letting, is then the pure giving, which itself refers to the it that gives’ (FS: 60, 
emphasis original). So the emphasis is now on that which allows beings to rise into presence 
in the first place, not on prescribing particular comportments towards beings themselves (see 
Haugeland, 2007). Here we can also observe how Heidegger is struggling to talk about this 
‘it’: he explains that ‘it gives’ but he cannot say that ‘it is’ because this ‘it’ is not itself 
another being.  
    Can we also start thinking of releasement as this kind of attempt to go beyond beings? We 
can, and revisiting the idea of releasement also helps us start thinking about how we might 
learn to let beings be, to go beyond beings and to question phusis. To explore this, I want to 
196 
 
concentrate on the second part of Discourse on Thinking, ‘Conversation on a Countrypath’. 
This piece of writing depicts a conversation taking place between three participants, a 
teacher, a scholar and a scientist. In this dialogue, Heidegger elaborates on what it means to 
venture beyond the realm of human representation. Releasement, he explains, is a journey 
into something nonhuman. But in ‘Conversation on A Country Path’ it becomes clear that 
‘nonhuman’ does not refer to the nonhuman beings with which we learn to stay as we release 
ourselves towards them. The following passage from ‘Conversation on A Country Path’ helps 
make sense of this nonhuman element in releasement:  
Teacher: What is it that you designated by the name releasement?  
 
Scientist: If I may say so, not I but you have used this name.  
 
Teacher: I, as little as you, have done the designating.  
 
Scholar: Then who did it? None of us?  
 
Teacher: Presumably, for in the region in which we stay everything is in the best order only if it has been 
no one's doing.  
 
Scientist: A mysterious region where there is nothing for which to be answerable.  
 
Teacher: Because it is the region of the word, which is answerable to itself alone.  
 
Scholar: For us it remains only to listen to the answer proper to the word. 
(DOT, 71: G: 46-7)  
 
So here it would seem that the naming, the word, not the material being, is the nonhuman 
element that comes to us. But why is listening to the word significant here?  
    This can be understood if we recall what was said about language in the last chapter. As we 
started thinking of phusis differently, as that which allows beings to appear to us as beings, 
language also acquired a different role. As was already described in previous chapters, 
language, for Heidegger, is something that is always ahead of us, there is always a wealth of 
meanings in language that we cannot fully grasp or understand. This is because language is 
not created by us alone, but we are merely one of the participants in creating new meanings 
and understandings. These words are not under the conscious control of any one human. 
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Although we all participate in how these meanings emerge and come about, it is never only 
one human who does the naming and the designating, and this is never a conscious activity 
(WL: 124; WS: 243). The nonhuman in releasement, then, does not refer to beings 
themselves, but it refers to that which is not yet a being, to the concealing earth. This would 
mean that the nonhuman in releasement refers to that which allows for revealing beings as 
beings, it refers to the swaying of phusis. So, as we learn to release ourselves towards things, 
we do not let beings themselves unfold to us as they really are, but we allow the words that 
speak about these beings to come to us.  
    What does this releasement, understood as a journey into the nonhuman, look like, then, 
and how can we learn to release ourselves? Releasement is not something that we can 
describe, but it is something that we must patiently wait for:  
    Teacher: Waiting, all right ; but never awaiting, for await-  
ing already links itself with re-presenting and what is  
re-presented.  
 
Scholar: Waiting, however, lets go of that; or rather I  
should say that waiting lets re-presenting entirely alone.  
It really has no object.  
 
Scientist: Yet if we wait we always wait for something.  
 
Scholar: Certainly, but as soon as we re-present to ourselves  
and fix upon that for which we wait, we really wait no  
longer.                                                                     (DOT: 68; G: 42) 
 
The emphasis here is on waiting without being able to express or explain what we are waiting 
for because that which we wait for does not originate from us. The setting in which the 
conversation takes place is also noteworthy, and helps make sense of the nature of this 
waiting. The participants of this dialogue are on a walk outside of human habitation, on a 
country path. If the journey has a clear destination or a purpose, it is not discussed, and it 
does not affect the flow of the conversation. Thus, waiting is a journey into something 
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nonhuman, something outside the realms of human representation that we cannot fully grasp 
and explain. 
    Thinking of releasement as waiting, as a journey outside the realm of human 
representation, now helps make sense of releasement. But at the same time, it makes it 
impossible to explain exactly what Heidegger means with this idea of releasement. Indeed, in 
‘Conversation on A Country Path’, Heidegger’s purpose is not to explain the meaning of 
releasement, but to allow this meaning to come to us through the dialogue. As Dalle Pezze 
(2006) explains, it is important to note that in the beginning of the dialogue, each participant 
speaks according to their own role: the scientist is attempting to grapple with the subject 
matter through a scientific inquiry, and the scholar through a more traditional philosophical 
viewpoint, whilst the teacher guides the two other participants towards meditative thinking. 
But at the end of the dialogue, the three thinkers have abandoned these roles and no longer 
speak through them. They no longer attempt to control the dialogue, but they allow the 
dialogue itself to guide their thinking (Dalle Pezze, 2006: 96).  
    As the three participants continue to reflect on what they are waiting for, the dialogue 
continues as follows:  
Teacher: In waiting we leave open what we are waiting for.  
 
Scholar: Why?  
 
Teacher: Because waiting releases itself into openness . . .  
 
Scholar: . . . into the expanse of distance . . .  
 
Teacher: ... in whose nearness it finds the abiding in  
which it remains.                                                 (DOT: 68; G: 42). 
  
Here we can see that no one participant of the dialogue alone formulates the meaning of the 
waiting, but they allow its meaning to come to them. Heidegger’s purpose here is not to 
explain the meaning of releasement but to describe the kind of questioning that can teach us 
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to release ourselves towards things. Releasement does not aim to describe or explain what 
this path looks like, but it attempts to show us how we might begin this kind of questioning. 
We can only grasp what releasement is when we ourselves begin this journey into the 
nonhuman. 
    Instead of manipulating beings as resources and trying to find out information about them, 
forming correct statements about beings, Heidegger is encouraging us to stay with things, to 
be open to their mystery, to bear their stillness (Stenstad, 2006: 120). This is the venturing 
into the foreign that Heidegger talked about when discussing how we can find our homeland, 
this is the kind of attitude that, in the end, allows us to find our dwelling place and to be at 
home. Here we can also see how Heidegger’s thinking had developed even further from the 
time of the lecture course on ‘Ister’: he is even more reticent to name Being and to explain 
how he goes about questioning Being. In some ways, his language has become simpler, but at 
the same time, it has also become much harder to explain how Heidegger goes about 
questioning Being. This is why, to illustrate his thinking at this time, I had to resort to directly 
quoting lengthier segments of this work.  
    The claim that Heidegger made in the Memorial Address about not thinking of releasement 
in terms of activity and passivity must now also be understood differently. The reason why 
releasement cannot be understood in these terms is not that releasement can encourage both 
active and passive comportments towards beings but the reason is that releasement is not 
attempting to prescribe any kinds of comportments towards beings. So, thinking of 
releasement as behaving towards beings in a particular manner means to already take one step 
too far because releasement is not concerned with beings themselves. Instead of thinking 
about releasement as something that prescribes a certain way of behaving towards beings, we 
should think about it in terms of the journey towards our homeland. I will give more concrete 
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examples of this kind of an attitude in Chapters Five and Six where I explore in more detail 
what dwelling in the fourfold could look like.  
    Finally, to conclude this discussion of questioning phusis and of the relationship between 
protecting beings and questioning phusis, I would like to return to what Heidegger said about 
technology in ‘Question Concerning Technology’. As has been explained in previous 
chapters, technological thinking was one of Heidegger’s central concerns in his later writings: 
it is a kind of thinking that focuses on forming correct representations of beings, and forgets 
to question the truth of Being. When discussing technological thinking, Heidegger does seem 
to be interested in questioning the effects that technological thinking has on beings 
themselves. He explains in a famous passage how the way in which modern technology 
reveals nature makes unreasonable demands on the environment: ‘a tract of land is 
challenged into the putting out of coal and ore. The earth now reveals itself as a coal mining 
district, the soil as a mineral deposit’ (QCT: 14; FT: 15). So here it seems that the problems 
with technological thinking are understood in reference to the demands made on beings. 
   But could we start thinking of these demands as something that are not made on beings 
themselves? We can do this if we look closer at what Heidegger says about making demands 
in ‘Question Concerning Technology’. After explaining how modern mining methods make 
demands on the environment, Heidegger moves on to describe how these demands are made. 
Demands are made as ‘a tract of land is challenged into the putting out of coal and ore. The 
earth now reveals itself as a coal mining district, the soil as a mineral deposit.’ (QCT: 14; FT: 
15, emphasis mine). The use of the verb ‘to reveal’ is significant here. Heidegger is 
concerned with how the coal mine is revealed to us in a certain way, with how our 
environment is revealed to us. The unreasonable demand is made in reference to the coal 
mine being revealed as something which is to be controlled and used as a resource, not as 
something that will always remain mysterious and question-worthy. The demand is not made 
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on the coal mine itself, as a being, but it is made on phusis that is not allowed to unfold in its 
concealment. 
 
Heidegger and Politics  
These reflections on the development of Heidegger’s thinking on the polis, and on letting be 
and releasement, now help us start thinking about what it means to protect nature when it is 
understood as questioning the unfolding of phusis, as something that is separate from 
protecting beings. So what does the journey towards our homeland and establishing the polis 
look like? As has been explained previously, I cannot give clear instructions concerning how 
we can learn to be at home or offer any kind of final word on what the polis is. But I can give 
some guidelines on how we can start to think about journeys towards home. Releasement is 
about belonging to the opening of our dwelling site, a site that we did not create, that we 
cannot represent or understand through technological thinking (Mugerauer, 2008: 470). To do 
this, we need to learn to stay with things, in their nearness, and be open to that which Being 
gives us to think. This, particularly in Heidegger’s later writings, happens when we embark 
on our own journeys towards our homeland. As Skocz (2004: 303) explains when describing 
how rivers can help us find our homeland, the river ‘leaves us to our own devices, to the 
journeying that is ours to take. That journeying will take us to our dwelling place, to where 
we are at home.’ The journeying into the foreign and our coming to be at home, then, consists 
of our own questioning.  
    But the fact that Heidegger emphasises our own journeys of questioning towards the 
homeland does not mean that we are alone in this questioning. As can be recalled from the 
discussion of mitsein in Chapter Two, Dasein is never in the world alone but exists with other 
Dasein. The homeland, indeed, is what allows people and things to gather together, as a 
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community (Mugerauer, 2008: 521). However, as was explored in the second chapter, when 
we learn to dwell and, to use the language that Heidegger employed in Being and Time, to 
exist in the world authentically, we also learn to be with others in a more authentic way. 
Recognising the groundlessness of our ambitions and goals in life allows us to exist with 
others in a different manner, not imposing our goals and aims in life onto others. Ben-Dor 
(2007: 318) describes this way on being as follows: ‘We are on the way together and in this 
togetherness; indeed, this togetherness calls to my own thinking and thinging. We are all 
hovering in time together, and when this togetherness calls and talks to our own innermost 
“how” we project our past onto the future’. This is not really an answer to the question of 
what the polis is, but it provides us with ways of questioning the polis, of thinking about how 
we can learn to dwell and be at home. All of this may still sound fairly abstract at this stage. I 
will, however, offer more concrete examples of what this kind of dwelling might look like in 
the next two chapters that follow. 
    Heidegger’s thinking of the polis also allows us to start thinking about the role that 
questioning phusis could play in green thinking. As this chapter has demonstrated, our 
understanding of the political is still dependent on the polis, on how the truth of Being 
unfolds to us because this is what opens up the world where certain political opportunities 
and possibilities of acting present themselves to us. But the inexpressibility of the polis 
means that everything we can say about politics and about alternative ways of organising 
politics must remain provisional, we cannot undertake any task of re-organising the way we 
conduct politics as a result of questioning Being. Establishing the polis cannot be thought of 
in terms of organising and protecting beings, and it cannot have any environmental 
consequences.  
   Thinking of the polis as something that we must, in the end, remain silent about, thinking of 
it as a mysterious homecoming and being-with-others, might, at first, seem like something 
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detrimental for green politics because it now looks as if protecting nature is no longer a 
question of everyday politics at all. So how could we think about the role of green politics in 
the light of how the later Heidegger no longer thought of the statesmen as those who can 
encounter phusis? I do not want to begin answering this question by trying to rethink where 
we should locate political actions, by claiming that because the statesmen are now excluded 
from the sphere of the polis, Heidegger wants us to radically rethink the meaning of politics 
and wants us to start thinking of the very act of questioning phusis as a political act (e.g. 
Elden, 2000). This is because I am here inquiring about the concept of nature in green politics 
that is already implicitly present in green thinking. I am not interested in reinventing the 
meaning and the content of green politics. So how, then, can politics play a role in 
questioning phusis if we do not embark on a mission to reinvent the way we think about 
politics? 
    Although in Heidegger’s later writings the statesmen are no longer those who can found 
the polis because this role is reserved for the poets and the thinkers, this does not exclude 
questioning phusis completely from the sphere of politics. Even if the statesmen themselves 
cannot bring about new ways of questioning phusis, this does not mean that Heidegger 
completely gave up thinking about politics in his later work. Lewis (2005) argues that 
towards the end of his life, Heidegger did begin to think that certain political systems would 
be better suited for questioning Being than others. In his interview with Der Spiegel, 
Heidegger says that ‘the decisive question for me today is: how can a political system 
accommodate itself to the technological age, and which political system would this be?’ 
(cited in Lewis, 2005: 176).  At this point, then, thinking about the kind of political system 
that is able to overcome technological thinking was an important question for Heidegger. But 
how can this kind of questioning fit into thinking about phusis? 
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    I think that politics can have a more important role in questioning Being than Heidegger 
himself recognised. This is because political structures can play an enabling role in us finding  
our paths towards questioning phusis. There are ways of organising politics that make it more 
difficult to question phusis and to resist technological thinking; there are ways of practising 
politics that encourage us to approach the world more in terms of technological thinking, in 
terms of numbers and resources. For example, although this was ignored by Heidegger, the 
global capitalist system and the neoliberal agenda that extends beyond the economic sphere, 
to areas such as health and education, encourage us to view all aspects of our lives as 
quantifiable resources that we can attach a price tag to (de Beistegui, 1998: 159-60, see also 
Kockelmans, 1984: 273-4; Lewis, 2007: ch 5). And conversely, we could find political 
practices that oppose these tendencies and can help us question phusis. So, politics cannot 
found a new beginning and cannot question Being, but it can still help us in overcoming 
technological thinking. The role of politics is not reinventing the way in which we live 
according to some preconceived idea of a new beginning, but political actions can help us 
reflect on how we can overcome technological thinking on our own. I will return to examples 
of the kinds of political actions that could encourage us to question phusis in Chapter Six.  
    This does not, however, solve all the problems and concerns present in Heidegger’s 
description of the polis. Although Heidegger, in his later writings, arrived at a formulation of 
the polis that does not search for a unified destiny for a community, there is nevertheless a 
concern that a danger could lurk even in these individual journeys towards the homeland that 
we are encouraged to take. Firstly, there is still a concern, especially in the context of 
Heidegger’s involvements with National Socialism, that Heidegger’s homeland is established 
through excluding certain voices and experiences from it, by establishing a community that is 
homogenous. Secondly, Heidegger’s accounts of dwelling and the homeland seem to exhibit 
a yearning for a non-technological rural past. The next chapter will address these concerns by 
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looking at the role that rural nostalgia plays in Heidegger’s writings and at the extent to 
which cultures, for Heidegger, were homogenous.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has followed the arguments of the previous chapters, that the concept of nature 
plays an important role in green politics but the meaning of this concept is difficult to define, 
that Heidegger’s philosophy can be useful in thinking about this concept but that the common 
green ways of thinking about nature in his philosophy as describing the unfolding of 
nonhuman environments end up in contradictions, and that nature should be understood as 
describing the unfolding of all things, not only of those things that are deemed as somehow 
nonhuman. This chapter has continued this discussion by looking at how we could protect 
nature if it is understood, not as the unfolding of nonhuman environments, but as describing 
how all beings appear to us as beings. The chapter has explored the links between protecting 
nature, understood as Heidegger’s phusis, and preserving the environment. It has 
demonstrated that these two are not essentially linked. Despite the fact that Heidegger 
maintains we can question Being by letting beings be, questioning Being does not necessarily 
have any environmental consequences. This is because our understanding of beings is based 
on a violent encounter with phusis. The chapter also explored what it means to question 
phusis by looking at the idea of the homeland in Heidegger’s writings, and at how we can 
think about questioning phusis as a journey towards our homeland, a journey that the 
statesmen cannot help us make but that can be guided by the poets and the thinkers. The 
chapter also explored how, although political actions themselves can never directly confront 
Being, they can play a part in questioning Being through establishing political structures that 
might make this task easier. 
206 
 
    This way of questioning nature solves many of the problems in thinking about nature that 
have been discussed before. Because the concept of nature no longer describes the 
spontaneous growth and flourishing of nonhuman environments, we no longer have to 
explain how we can make the distinction between human and nonhuman environments. 
However, this still does not fully answer the question of what it means to protect nature. 
Although questioning nature is no longer associated with the practice of environmental 
politics, Heidegger’s criticism of technology and his frequent use rural examples of how we 
might learn to dwell and question phusis still seem to advocate traditional, more ‘natural’ 
ways of doing things. His use of examples of dwelling in rural areas seem to suggest that he 
is privileging environments that we would conventionally think of as nonhuman and natural 
as sites for dwelling. It is easy for us now to start exploring how we might learn to dwell 
amidst apple trees, but what about learning to dwell with technological items? Could we learn 
to dwell, for example, with iphones? It is also unclear if Heidegger is able to accommodate 
different voices in the communities that are established as we begin to dwell. The next 
chapter moves on to examine these questions by looking in more detail at the kinds of places 
in which we can learn to dwell as we begin to question Being with the aim of demonstrating 
that dwelling does not imply a return to a traditional, homogenous culture where minority 
voices are silenced, and that we can dwell amidst technical devices. The concluding chapter 
will then look at how this way of thinking about nature can help us make better sense of 
green politics.  
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Chapter Five: Heidegger and Technology 
Introduction 
The first chapter of the thesis began by demonstrating how the concept of nature seems to 
communicate something important about green goals and how, at the same time, the meaning 
of this concept is difficult to articulate. Thinking of nature as referring to nonhuman 
environments is problematic because we exist in such interconnected networks with our 
environments that a large majority of the environments on Earth cannot be thought of as 
nonhuman. Chapter Two then turned to the philosophy of Heidegger in order to start thinking 
about this concept of nature. This chapter demonstrated why the mainstream green ways of 
thinking about nature in Heidegger’s work as describing the spontaneous unfolding of 
nonhuman environments cannot hold and how nature in his work must refer to something 
else. Chapters Three and Four then went on to investigate the role that the concept of nature 
plays in Heidegger’s thinking in more detail in order to understand how we should start 
thinking about nature in green politics. Chapter Three looked at how we cannot equate 
phusis, Heidegger’s nature, with the nonhuman environment and his concealing earth with 
those aspects of the unfolding of our nonhuman environments that are concealed from us. 
Chapter Four explained how questioning phusis does not prescribe any particular kinds of 
attitudes towards beings themselves and does not automatically lead to environmentally 
friendly outcomes. Instead, protecting nature is about homecoming and learning to dwell, 
about understanding that we cannot represent and control beings. And so, these chapters 
presented a way of thinking about nature that overcomes problems in talking about nature as 
something nonhuman because it does not rely on drawing boundaries between human and 
nonhuman environments. 
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    But although the previous chapters explained how Heidegger’s thinking can allow us to 
start thinking about nature in a different manner, it is not yet clear if we have overcome all 
the problems in thinking about nature that were discussed in Chapter One. Although we no 
longer think of nature as the non-human environment, the idea of nature as something 
traditional or unchanged still seem to feature in Heidegger’s accounts of dwelling. The way 
in which Heidegger talks about dwelling in the fourfold as rootedness and as a return to a 
Greek beginning seems to imply a return to older, more traditional ways of doing things and 
to communities that are culturally homogenous. The fact that Heidegger also frequently gives 
examples of how we might learn to dwell in rural areas suggests that, to an extent, he is still 
thinking of dwelling in terms of nonhuman environments. This way of thinking about nature, 
therefore, would not be much better than the more conventional way of thinking about nature 
because nature would still be an ideological mask hampering our discussion of politics. My 
aim in this chapter is to look closer at Heidegger’s accounts of dwelling and technology in 
order to explain why these accounts do not imply that we should return to traditional, rural 
communities, why dwelling does not imply that we think of cultures as homogenous and how 
nature is not linked to preserving traditions. These investigations will also allow us to explore 
in more detail how we can learn to dwell and begin to question phusis.  
    This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section looks at the potential problems 
of thinking about dwelling in Heidegger’s fourfold. The second section looks at the role of 
tradition in Heidegger’s thinking in more detail and explores how his thinking of dwelling 
cannot be simply seen as advocating a return to older and more traditional ways of doing 
things, to closed traditional communities with homogenous understandings of how we can 
dwell in that community. The third section focuses on the role of technology in Heidegger’s 
dwelling, and looks at how we can learn to dwell amidst technical devices. Finally, the fourth 
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section looks at how we can now apply the notion of dwelling to areas that we would not 
conventionally think of as natural and how we could begin to dwell in urban areas. 
 
Problems with Dwelling 
Although thinking of nature in terms of phusis helps us address some of the concerns we had 
about talking about nature, it is still unclear whether Heidegger’s phusis can overcome all the 
problems in thinking about nature. His description of dwelling in the fourfold raises two 
concerns. First, Heidegger’s calls for a god to save us from technological thinking by offering 
a new cultural paradigm seems to suggest that cultures are homogenous and dwelling in the 
fourfold is about recovering the one true, traditional, way of dwelling that a culture has. 
Dwelling and nature here seem to be associated with the idea of tradition that, as was 
discussed in Chapter One, is one common way of portraying something as natural. 
Furthermore, this way of dwelling would also be based on excluding dissenting voices from 
the dwelling place. These concerns are heightened through the way in which Heidegger talks 
about a return to our Greek heritage, and with how he privileges the German language as 
something that is particularly suited for describing the Greek experience of Being (see e.g. 
Miller, 1995: 252-3). There is a danger, then, that dwelling is governed by the idea of some 
natural, traditional existence to whose harmonies we must return to. 
    Second, there is a concern that the way Heidegger discusses dwelling suggests that for him, 
dwelling is about returning to some romanticised rural past, about dwelling environments that 
are seen as being somehow nonhuman. This concern arises because Heidegger frequently 
gives examples of how we might learn to dwell in rural areas, and he does not investigate 
how we could dwell amidst modern technical devices. Heidegger’s criticism of technological 
thinking seems to suggest that the only way to resist this kind of thinking is to get rid of 
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technical devices and to return to some pre-technological era (e.g. Feenberg, 1999). Thus, the 
cultural paradigm we are supposed to recover would lead us to some traditional, pre-
technological way of life, and environments that we conventionally think of as being shaped 
by man less would now be privileged in dwelling.  
    The problems that arise when we begin to approach dwelling in this manner can be seen, 
for example, in Ingold’s (1993) adoption of Heidegger’s dwelling. Ingold explores how 
places can become important to us by analysing Bruegel’s painting The Harvester. At the 
centre of this painting there is a pear tree around which people are harvesting. In the 
background of the painting we can also see a stone church. Ingold (1993: 169) explains how 
the stone church in the painting allows us to dwell just like the trees next to the church allow 
us to dwell:     
Like the tree, the church by its very presence constitutes a place, which owes its character to the unique 
way in which it draws in the surrounding landscape. Again like the tree, the church spans human 
generations, yet its temporality is not inconsonant with that of human dwelling. As the tree buries its 
roots in the ground, so also people's ancestors are buried in the graveyard beside the church, and both sets 
of roots may reach to approximately the same temporal depth. Moreover the church, too, resonates to the 
cycles of human life and subsistence. Among the inhabitants of the neighbourhood, it is not only seen but 
also heard, as its bells ring out the seasons, the months, births, marriages and deaths. In short, as features 
of the landscape, both the church and the tree appear as veritable monuments to the passage of time. 
 
Although Ingold is giving an example of how we can dwell amongst things that have been 
made by humans and are not part of a nonhuman nature, his interpretation of dwelling still 
retains some of the problems associated with thinking about nature that were discussed in 
Chapter One.  
   Although the church that Ingold describes has been built by humans, it is not a modern 
technological item but it has been built with materials that some might consider as nonhuman 
and as natural. Ingold is also talking about dwelling as something that is very closely linked 
to one particular place where people can find a unified paradigm to help them make sense of 
their lives. Thus, the church can be seen as a traditional, natural item, something around 
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which we can gather to learn to live with the natural harmonies of the local traditions. As 
Hinchliffe (2003: 220) explains, Ingold’s emphasis on these local qualities of dwelling leads 
him to place too much emphasis on rootedness in particular local landscapes. Describing how 
the stone church allows people to make sense of births, marriages and deaths also highlights 
the homogenous, traditional values that make the lives of the peasant significant, and 
produces an image of a peaceful and harmonious existence with these values. There is, then, a 
danger that Heidegger’s description of dwelling is creating an ahistorical account of what it 
means to dwell in the world, one that is rooted in tradition and ‘natural’ ways of doing things 
(Bender, 1998: 37), unable to touch upon how places are always changing, always in flux. 
This way of approaching the concept of dwelling can, as explained by Urry (2000), prohibit 
us from thinking how we are not rooted in any kind of homogenous, harmonious traditions, 
how many tightly knit communities ‘are characterised both by highly unequal local social 
relations […] and by hostility to those on the outside’ (Urry, 2000: 140). There, then, does 
not exist one, harmonious way for people to exist together, but even these local traditions are 
characterised by contestations and exclusions, and it is not yet clear how Heidegger’s account 
of dwelling can address these exclusions. These concerns also become more pertinent in the 
light of Heidegger’s engagements with National Socialism in the 1930s. 
    Similar problems can be observed in the examples of engaging with apples in ways that 
resist technological thinking which have been given throughout the thesis. Although it has 
been established that apples are not a part of any nonhuman nature, the examples of dwelling 
with apples that I have given so far have involved walking in gardens and baking apple pies. 
These examples have not involved modern technology but apples, that are conventionally 
understood as being somehow natural, and have contained depictions harmonious and 
pleasant gatherings with friends in an attempt to recover, perhaps, some sense of pre-
technological gatherings. Thus, we can observe a yearning for some older, traditional ways of 
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consuming and engaging with apples in these examples. These problems that we encounter in 
thinking about what it means to dwell can, however, be overcome, and dwelling does not 
only have to be understood in terms of Ingold’s stone church or in terms of baking apple pies. 
In the sections that follow, I will explore in more detail how we can begin to look at 
Heidegger’s dwelling in a way that is not subject to these problems, and look for ways of 
thinking about dwelling that go beyond eating apples. 
 
Homogenous Paradigm 
To start thinking about whether Heidegger’s understanding of dwelling necessarily leads to 
the kinds of problems discussed above, I am going to begin by looking at if Heidegger 
thought of cultures as something homogenous and unchanging. After this, I will move on to 
examine the role of nonhuman environments and technology in dwelling. As explained in this 
chapter’s introduction, Heidegger’s talk of a god offering a paradigm for us to make sense of 
the world has, in particular, been identified as a problematic aspect of his account of 
dwelling. These references to a god seem to demonstrate that Heidegger believed that 
cultures are homogenous, that learning to dwell and coming to be at home would entail the 
exclusion of others who do not fit into our understanding of what it means to be at home. 
    Some have, however, explored how we can interpret Heidegger’s calls for a new god 
differently, in a way that does not lead us to view cultures as homogenous and static. Dreyfus 
(2000: 330) suggests that the way in which the later Heidegger talks about the gods and 
dwelling departs from the way in which Heidegger articulated the role of the gods in ‘Origins 
of the Work of Art’. In ‘Origins of the Work of Art’, the work of art was a cultural paradigm 
that ‘articulates or rearticulates the culture’s understanding of being by embodying the 
cultural heritage’ (Dreyfus, 2000: 330). But in his later work, Heidegger is no longer calling 
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for a god to save us. Instead, he is calling for a plurality of gods to appear in the fourfold: 
‘when things shine, a god (one of many) attunes mortals to the current situation by means of 
his or her local authority […] The job of these gods is getting mortals in tune with their 
current world’ (Dreyfus, 2000: 330). Heidegger, talking about the role of a plurality of gods 
in dwelling, demonstrates that he no longer thinks of dwelling as something based on closed 
communities with one cultural paradigm but instead, there are different, competing gods. 
This means that we can never talk about a community’s understanding of Being because there 
are always different ways of revealing things, different ways in which beings can appear to us 
as beings. Any community must always think about how to deal with these differences.  
    Indeed, as Vaden explains, thinking of cultures as heterogeneous is something that is 
required for overcoming technological thinking:  
The heterogeneity of experiential traditions is a direct consequence of the fact that identity is not grounded 
on a fundament, a thinking substance or hung upon a transcendental structure. […] locality suffers also if 
the network is homogenized in the name of experiential purity, intensity and strong roots (Vaden: 2004: 
421).  
An emphasis on heterogenous traditions and contestations within these traditions is needed to 
overcome the idea that we can somehow understand the traditions we are embedded in. We 
cannot explain the essence of our dwelling place but it is something that we can experience as 
we learn to dwell, as the four elements of the fourfold come to be gathered together (see 
Young, 2000: 202-203). So, Heidegger may have believed that Germans had a privileged 
access to the way in which Greeks understood phusis, a claim that Vaden explains that we, as 
non-native German speakers who do not have access to this tradition, must take on faith 
(Vaden, 2004: 418). But this does not have to mean that cultures, for Heidegger, are 
homogenous and that they are not open to contestation. Although he is talking about 
traditions and how we are embedded in these traditions, this does not imply that cultures 
always remain static and unchanging. To be with others in our homeland entails including 
214 
 
others in our way of dwelling, allowing our practices and ways of being to change and 
evolve.  
    It is also important to note here that Heidegger’s dwelling place is not demarcated through 
establishing definable borders and excluding others from dwelling through these kinds of 
practices. These practices would, again, belong to technological thinking (see Elden, 2008). 
This was already explored in Chapter Three when the importance of place in Heidegger’s 
thinking was being discussed: places, for Heidegger, cannot be thought of as occupying any 
pre-given spaces and they cannot be thought of as having definable boundaries. Instead, they 
come into being as we begin to dwell in them. 
    Another way of approaching this would be to concentrate on the activity of dwelling and 
on what it contains. This is illustrated by Rose (2012) who explains that dwelling is not only 
about having a particular kind of comportment towards the world but dwelling is also about 
acting in the world and shaping it. As was already discussed in the previous chapter, our 
encounter with phusis is a violent encounter, we do not work in harmony with the unfolding 
phusis but we shape the world in which we live ourselves: we always find ourselves in the 
world amidst traditions that give meaning to our lives. This means that we do not passively 
encounter the world but actively shape it, we build places as we dwell in them. Heidegger 
discusses this in Building Dwelling Thinking by describing dwelling as a building: ‘The Old 
English and High German word for building, buan, means to dwell. This signifies: to remain, 
to stay in a place. The real meaning of the verb bauen [the German word for ‘to build’] has 
been lost to us’ (BDT: 144; BWD: 148, emphasis original). Heidegger also notes how 
‘bauen’ is related to the words ‘bin’ and ‘bist’, the first and second singular forms of the 
German verb ‘to be’. The way that humans are in the world, then, is a kind of building (BDT: 
145; BWD: 148). Heidegger explains: 
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This word bauen also means to cherish and protect, to preserve, and care for, specifically to till the soil, to 
cultivate the vine. Shipbuilding and temple-building, on the other hand, do in a certain way make their 
own works. Here building, in contrast with cultivating, is a constructing. Both modes of building […] are 
comprised within genuine building, that is, dwelling (BDT: 145; BWD: 149). 
 
Through this building, through taking care of and shaping our environments, we give rise to 
new ways of doing things, new norms and new traditions that continue to shape the world of 
others: ‘[w]e do not dwell because we have built, we build and have built because we dwell, 
that is, because we are dwellers’ (BDT: 146; BWD: 150, emphasis original).  
    Paying attention to Heidegger’s references to the plurality of gods also allows for a 
different way of interpreting what he said about returning to a Greek beginning. This return 
does not mean a return to Greek culture, but it means keeping in mind that the Western way 
of being-in-the-world will always be conditioned by the Greek world. As Phillips (2005: 171-
2; see also Risser, 2012: 33) explains, for Heidegger, the Germans, through the encounter 
with the Greeks, are to become something other than Greeks, they will come to be at home in 
their own historical traditions which are not the same as those of the Greeks. We can never 
fully reconcile our complicated historical heritage, the heritage created through our 
encounters with others. New ways of existing in the world are always born out of these 
different kinds of encounters. Although our way of being-in-the-world is always dependent 
on what came before, we cannot simply return to what once was. Dwelling does not have to 
be about traditional ways of doing things in close-knit communities. But if this is the case, 
then why does Heidegger make frequent references to dwelling amidst non-technical items, 
why do his descriptions of dwelling seem to describe traditional ways of doing things? To 
understand this, I shall now move to investigate these references to things that we would 
conventionally consider natural which Heidegger makes when he discusses dwelling. 
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Rural Utopias 
As can be seen in the examples Heidegger gave on dwelling which have been discussed 
throughout the thesis, he thought about dwelling primarily in terms of rural areas. Part of the 
reason that he gave these kinds of examples can be found in his background. Heidegger was 
not born in a city, but in the small village of Messkirch. He returned there throughout his life, 
and spent a lot of his time in a small forest hut where he could work without electricity and 
running water (see Sharr, 2006). This is how Heidegger describes the surroundings of the 
forest hut: 
On the steep slope of a wide mountain valley in the southern Black Forest, at an elevation of 1150 metres, 
there stands a small ski hut. The floor plan measures six metres by seven. The low-hanging roof covers 
three rooms: the kitchen which is also the living room, a bedroom and a study. Scattered at wide intervals 
throughout the narrow base of the valley and on the equally steep slope opposite, lie the farmhouses with 
their large over-hanging roofs. Higher up the slope the meadows and pasture lands lead to the woods with 
its dark fir-trees, old and towering (WSP: 27). 
 
Heidegger cherished the rhythm of the life in the hut that allowed him to experience the 
landscape and its ‘hourly changes, day and night, in the great comings and goings of the 
seasons’ (WSP: 27).  
    Malpas (2007: 314) explains Heidegger’s usage of these rural, or ‘natural’, examples of 
dwelling through his background, explaining that Heidegger’s thinking of Being is taking 
place in those places in which he himself was rooted. This means Heidegger’s privileging of 
the rural and supposedly natural environments when describing dwelling does not imply that 
we cannot learn to dwell in other areas as well. But although this can explain some of his 
rural nostalgia, I think that there is more to this. This becomes evident particularly through 
the remarks that Heidegger makes about the role that modern technology and urban 
environments play in dwelling. He was concerned that people who live in the fast-paced city 
are unable to experience dwelling: ‘a very loud and very active and fashionable obtrusiveness 
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often passes itself off as concern for the world and existence of the peasant (WSP: 29). He 
was worried of the damage that this urban population might cause to the rural lifestyles:  
But nowadays many people from the city, the kind of who “know their way around” and not least of all the 
skiers, often behave in the village or at the farmer’s house in the same way “have fun” at their recreation 
centres in the city (WSP: 29). 
 
Heidegger also explores the threat that modern technology makes to our ability to dwell when 
giving a talk on the 700-year anniversary of Messkirch. Here he maintains that with the 
emergence of modern technology and radio- and television antennas on people’s houses, the 
inhabitants of Messkirch can no longer be at home (RZ: 575-6). So it seems, then, that 
Heidegger believed that modern technical devices would make dwelling impossible. 
    In the paragraphs that follow, I am going to think in more detail about the relationship 
between technology and dwelling, and explore whether dwelling has to take place in the 
context of non-technological things. I will explore how, although Heidegger himself may 
have been prejudiced against modern technology and urban environments, we can 
nevertheless use his philosophy to think about dwelling with technological items. I will thus 
demonstrate that we can overcome rural nostalgia when thinking about dwelling.  
    Returning to what Heidegger had to say about technology in ‘Question Concerning 
Technology’ is helpful for this inquiry. A closer reading of ‘Question Concerning 
Technology’ reveals that Heidegger is not, in fact, interested in describing technological 
items themselves when he is questioning the essence of technology. Heidegger explains that 
‘Above all through our catching sight of what comes to presence in technology, instead of 
merely staring at the technological. So long as we represent technology as an instrument, we 
remain fast in the will to master it’ (QCT: 32; FT: 40). Instead of questioning technical 
devices, Heidegger is interested in asking about something different: ‘The question 
concerning technology is the question concerning the constellation in which revealing and 
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concealing, in which the coming to presence of truth, comes to pass.’ (QCT, 33; FT: 41). So 
he thinks about technological thinking as a particular way of revealing beings, and he is 
interested in questioning how technological thinking allows beings to appear to us as 
particular kinds of beings. 
    This means that Heidegger, in questioning the essence of technology, is asking about the 
way in which technological thinking reveals things to us today. He is not asking about the 
qualities of technological items themselves and he is not describing some enduring properties 
of technological things (Rojcewicz, 2006: 12). Thomson (2000: 437) thus explains that, yes, 
for Heidegger, technical things show up in a particular kind of way, as resources to be 
manipulated and used. However, this is not because technical devices have particular 
essences that require these devices to always show themselves to us in a particular way, 
because technical devices have essences that lead us always to see these devices and anything 
associated with them as resources. Instead, technical devices are seen as resources because 
today, revealing is governed by technological thinking, and ‘everything in the contemporary 
world will show up for us as reflecting the essence of technology, technological devices 
included’ (Thomson, 2000: 437, emphasis original). If things in the future come to be 
revealed to us in a different way, then everything, including technical devices, could start 
showing up to us differently as well. 
    So although Heidegger criticised technological thinking, he was not advocating a return to 
some rural past, and we cannot simply think of him as someone who wanted to return to a 
more traditional way of practising and doing things. Indeed, in Discourse on Thinking 
Heidegger explains how using technological devices does not automatically condemn us to 
technological thinking:  
For all of us, the arrangements, devices, and machinery of technology are to a greater or lesser extent 
indispensable. It would be foolish to attack technology blindly. It would be shortsighted to condemn it as 
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the work of the devil. We depend on technical devices they even challenge us to ever greater advances 
(DOT: 53, G: 22).  
 
Our modern way of life depends technological devices and therefore, we should not abandon 
them and should not fully condemn the kind of thinking that brought us these devices. 
Instead, Heidegger proposes an alternative attitude towards the use of these technologies:  
We can use technical devices, and yet with proper use also keep ourselves so free of them, that we may 
let go of them any time. We can use technical devices as they ought to be used, and also let them alone as 
something which does not affect our inner and real core. We can affirm the unavoidable use of technical 
devices, and also deny them the right to dominate us, and so to warp, confuse, and lay waste our nature 
(DOT: 54; G: 22-3). 
 
The task for us in thinking about how we could resist technological thinking, then, is not to 
think about how we could live our lives in ways that would utilise technology as little as 
possible. Instead, the task is to think about how we can continue to engage with technical 
items in ways that still allow room for dwelling and for questioning phusis, how we could 
learn to engage with these technical devices in such ways that we ‘deny them the right to 
dominate us, and so to warp, confuse and lay waste our nature’ (Heidegger, cited in Dreyfus, 
2002: 167).  
    But what kind of role could these technological devices continue to play in our lives? I will 
explore this by returning to Dreyfus and Spinosa and look at how they see the role that 
technology could play in dwelling in the fourfold. For Dreyfus and Spinosa, dwelling allows 
for resisting technological thinking because it allows us to think of things as something other 
than resources, because it allows us to be gathered by things when these things ‘pull our 
practices together and draw us in we experience a focusing and a nearness that resists 
technological ordering’ (Dreyfus, 1995: 162). As explored in previous chapters, in Dreyfus 
and Spinosa’s interpretation, the earth of the fourfold refers to those background practices 
that are not intelligible to us but that nevertheless ground our everyday dealings with the 
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world. The sky refers to those actions and ways of behaving that we feel are appropriate in a 
given moment. The divinities refer to the reverential sentiment that arises when ‘one feels 
grateful for receiving all that is brought out by this particular occasion’, when one feels in 
tune with what is happening and is grateful for the gift that one has received (Dreyfus and 
Spinosa, 1997: 167). The mortals describe how we can learn to resist the totalising practices 
of technology, how we cannot adopt a totalising understandings of beings. Instead, beings can 
now appear to us in different ways as we adopt different identities and as the fourfold gathers 
together in different ways. Dreyfus and Spinosa (2003: 344) thus explain that ‘the gathering 
of people around things such as a jug of wine or a family meal resists the totalising and 
dispersing effects of the efficient ordering demanded by the technicity’. So what role could 
technical devices continue to play as we learn to dwell? 
    To demonstrate that it is indeed possible to begin to dwell amidst technical devices, 
Dreyfus and Spinosa draw attention to the fact that for Heidegger, modern technological 
devices can also gather the fourfold into things. Dreyfus and Spinosa explain how, in 
‘Building Dwelling Thinking’ (151-2; BWD: 152-3), Heidegger gives three examples of 
bridges that can gather the fourfold together. The two first examples are from pre-
technological eras. Heidegger gives an example of a bridge in a small country village that 
allows for the passage of horses and wagons. He also gives an example of a medieval stone 
bridge that leads from the castle to the cathedral square. But surprisingly, Heidegger also 
talks about a highway bridge, the purpose of which is to connect highways together in order 
to provide easy and efficient transportation for cars. And importantly, he does not think that 
the highway bridge is radically different from the two other types of bridges: he does not 
think that it is impossible for the fourfold to be gathered into this bridge and he does not think 
that it is impossible for us to learn to dwell on the highway bridge (Dreyfus and Spinosa, 
1997: 169-70). 
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    So, what kind of role can these technological things play in dwelling and how could they 
be a part of coming together of the fourfold? Dreyfus and Spinosa argue that dwelling on the 
highway bridge is a different kind of dwelling from the dwelling that takes place on the old 
stone bridge or on the village bridge. Drawing attention to how Heidegger claims that the 
gods cannot present in the highway bridge because they have been pushed aside, Dreyfus and 
Spinosa argue that dwelling on the highway bridge is not the kind of dwelling where we can 
feel in tune with what is happening around us and be grateful for the gift of dwelling 
(Dreyfus and Spinosa, 1997: 170). Nevertheless, we cannot ignore that for Heidegger, some 
form of dwelling is taking place on the highway bridge.  
    To think about what kind of dwelling this could be, Dreyfus and Spinosa go on to propose 
that technical devices play an important part in allowing us to dwell because they can allow 
us to navigate between different kinds of non-technical worlds. To illustrate, Dreyfus and 
Spinosa explain: 
For there is room in such interconnecting worlds not only for a joyful family dinner, writing to a life-long 
friend, and attending the local concert but also for surfing on the Internet and happily zipping around an 
autobahn cloverleaf in tune with technology and glad that one is open to the possibilities of connecting 
with each of these worlds and many others (Dreyfus and Spinosa, 1997: 174). 
  
In a similar manner, we could think of an electrical oven as something that plays an important 
part of an autumnal gathering of eating a homemade apple pie. The oven itself facilitates the 
baking of the pie, making it possible for the gathering to take place. At the same time, the 
oven does not make it impossible for the fourfold to gather together, it does not prohibit the 
earth from unfolding as those background practices that bring friends together in the autumn, 
it does not prohibit the sky from manifesting itself as the different possibilities of acting that 
are appropriate in such occasions, and it does not prohibit the appearance of the gods in the 
gathering. Thus, Dreyfus and Spinosa argue that we can use technological devices to an 
extent while not being completely overtaken by technological thinking. We can question 
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Being if we use technological devices as tools which help us navigate through different kinds 
of worlds that allow for the gathering of these local practices. 
    But this account of technology is still somewhat problematic. I am here going to draw on 
Vaden’s criticism of Dreyfus and Spinosa to explain why this is so. Vaden explains that 
Dreyfus and Spinosa still have a universal account of technology – technical things always 
appear to us in a particular way, always require us to engage with them in a certain manner 
(Vaden, 2002: 423). Although we can begin to dwell amidst technical devices, in Dreyfus and 
Spinosa’s account, there is still a particular role played by technical things themselves, 
technical things occupy a certain role in our lives by virtue of being technical. Dreyfus and 
Spinosa (1997: 177), indeed, explicitly state that ‘a device is not neutral; it affects the 
possibilities that show up for us’. This view, however, contradicts the fact that for Heidegger, 
the essence of technology did not describe any permanently enduring properties of technical 
devices themselves. Because of this, reserving a special role in dwelling for these devices by 
virtue of them being technical is problematic.  
   But reflecting on these difficulties that arise when we try to think of technological items 
themselves as problematic makes it difficult for us to find a way of talking about 
technological devices. This is because even if we do not want to say that there is some 
particular, permanently enduring essence of technology, it seems that a special place is 
reserved for technical things in dwelling. They seem somehow destructive to me and I think 
they encourage us to view things in the world only in terms of resources and efficiency. The 
medieval stone bridge seems to be different in character from the busy and noisy highway 
bridge that we cross hurriedly. And Heidegger also seems to acknowledge the special role 
that technological items play in dwelling when he explains that the divinities are not present 
as we dwell on the highway bridge. So how could we start thinking about dwelling with these 
technical devices? 
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    As has already been explored in previous chapters, Dreyfus’ interpretation of technological 
thinking stems from his particular reading of Heidegger: for Dreyfus, Heidegger’s Being 
refers to those shared background practices that allow beings to appear to us as intelligible 
beings. In this thesis I have, however, argued that instead of thinking of Being as these 
background practices, we should think about Being as that which allows for the emergence of 
these practices. So, to understand the role that technical devices play in dwelling and to go 
beyond Drefyus’ account of technological thinking, it might be useful to start thinking of 
ways of going beyond the practices that surround technical devices and start looking at what 
gives rise to these practices in the first place.  
    Vaden (2004) offers a way of going about this by suggesting that we should not be 
concentrating on technical practices themselves but we should look at the ways of being-in-
the-world that have made possible their existence. He does this by explaining how certain 
kinds of technologies cannot exist alongside certain ways of being-in-the-world because in 
some circumstances, adopting a particular technology would also require that beings are 
revealed through technological thinking. As an example, Vaden turns to Dreyfus’ own 
example of Japanese tea ceremony and highlights that a Japanese tea ceremony could not be 
conducted with a polystyrene cup. We cannot claim that technical devices have some 
universal properties but what we can say, as put by Vaden (2002: 231, emphasis original), is 
that ‘from the point of view our way of living, that particular technology destroys its 
possibility’. In relation a particular local world, adopting one particular kind of technology 
would require us to abandon our old lifestyles and succumb to technological thinking, seeing 
things and ourselves in terms of resources. 
    Vaden’s interpretation of Heidegger and technology also guides towards a different way of 
understanding the example of dwelling on the highway bridge that Heidegger gives in 
‘Building Dwelling Thinking’. If we look closer at how Heidegger describes the gathering of 
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the fourfold into different kinds of bridges and at why he claims that the gods are absent from 
dwelling on the highway bridge, it begins to look as if, contrary to what Dreyfus and Spinosa 
claim, Heidegger is not saying that the gods cannot be present in technical things: 
The highway bridge is tied into the network of long-distance traffic, paced as calculated for maximum 
yield. Always and ever differently the bridge escorts the lingering and hastening ways of men to and from, 
so that they may get to other banks and in the end, as mortals, to the other side. […] The 
bridge gathers, as a passage that crosses, before the divinities - whether we explicitly think of, and 
visibly give thanks for, their presence, as in the figure of the saint of the bridge, or whether that divine 
presence is obstructed or even pushed wholly aside (BDT, 151-2; BWD: 153,emphasis original).  
 
Heidegger here does not say that the gods are always absent from dwelling on the bridge but 
he says that they are absent because they have been pushed aside. So, the divine presence 
may be absent from the bridge because it has been pushed aside, but for us to be able to push 
aside this divine presence, it must have existed there in the first place. As Thomson (2000: 
238) elaborates: 
Heidegger is attempting to get us to notice the presence of the divinities which linger in the background 
of even our most advanced technological constructions. When he refers to the presence of the divine, 
Heidegger is evoking those meanings which cannot be explained solely in terms of human will, 
encouraging us to attend to that pre-conceptual phenomenological presencing upon which all of our 
interpretations rest. 
 
Heidegger’s account of the bridge and of the divinities suggests that the bridge is not just 
something we use to commute from place to place as efficiently as possible, but even the 
highway bridge is partly concealed by the earth. Paying attention to this concealment instead 
of just quickly driving along the bridge could allow for the appearance of the divinities and 
for dwelling on the bridge. 
    This way of approaching technological items now avoids the problems present in Dreyfus 
and Spinosa’s account of technology. Technology no longer has any cross-cultural, 
universalist essence, technical devices can appear to us in different ways through different 
ways of being-in-the-world, and technical devices can still be something that allow us to 
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dwell. Rather than technological devices themselves being something inherently problematic, 
the problem is with the way in which we sometimes use these devices, in the way we often 
push the divinities aside when engaging with them. 
    But what would the role that technological devices play in dwelling look like now? In 
some ways, the new interpretation of this role is less permissive than Dreyfus and Spinosa’s 
interpretation, in some cases it can lead us to conclude that a particular kind of technology 
just cannot exist alongside a particular lifestyle. Certain technologies cannot exist in certain 
contexts, not even as tools that allow us to connect with other local worlds. The Japanese tea 
ceremony cannot be conducted with a polystyrene cup. And in the case of the apple, for 
example, it would be difficult to celebrate the apple harvest in the autumn if we did not grow 
our own apples but bought these apples from the supermarket. But in some other ways, this 
way of thinking about technology can end up being more permissive than Dreyfus and 
Spinosa’s account and can allow for more technology in dwelling. This holds true in 
particular in the Western context that we are interested in exploring here. So how is this?  
    We can start thinking about this if we remember that cultures, for Heidegger, are not static 
and homogenous, that he called for a plurality of gods to allow us to dwell in the fourfold. So 
if the way in which we dwell can evolve, this could also mean that technical items themselves 
can signify something more than just objects that allow us to efficiently order our lives and 
live them to maximum efficiency. For example, if we begin to use the dishwasher during 
family meals, then the dishwasher can become one of the things which allow for the 
gathering of the fourfold and allow us to dwell during a family meal. The sound of the 
dishwasher, for example, can become a familiar sound, playing a part in the happening of the 
family meal. Similarly, using the electrical oven can become a part of the event of sharing 
apples in the autumn which allows the gathering together of the fourfold, allows us to let 
beings be and allows for releasement. So this would mean that in some instances, technical 
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devices can begin to play a more positive role in dwelling than was suggested by Dreyfus and 
Spinosa. This also means that it is not only the old stone church that can provide a setting for 
dwelling, but a newly-build church could play this role as well. 
    These reflections also provide an answer to the question that was posed earlier: do those 
things that we conventionally think of as natural play some privileged role in dwelling, can 
we learn to dwell amidst iphones just as we can learn to dwell in a quiet garden amidst apple 
trees? The answer to this question depends on the kinds of ways of being-in-the-world that 
engaging with these technological items in particular circumstances require and not on the 
technological nature of particular items. Because we often use iphones as resources, as items 
that we can use to contact others as quickly and as efficiently as possible, these phones are 
usually used when things in the world are revealed to us through technological thinking and 
when we have not learned to dwell in the world. A walk in a quiet garden, however, is often 
encountered through different ways of being-in-the-world. When we are taking a walk amidst 
apple trees, we do not always do this for the sake of efficiency, for the sake of picking and 
growing apples as efficiently as possible. However, there is nothing in the iphone itself that 
makes it impossible for us to start treating it differently and makes it impossible for us to see 
it as something other than a resource. Instead of just using the iphone as a tool for efficiently 
contacting people, we could start reflecting on how the phone appears to us as an iphone, how 
it gathers together friends and how it becomes a part of our encounter with others. Thinking 
of the iphone in this manner would require that we change the way in which we interact with 
it, that we would no longer think of it as a tool to distract us from whatever is happening 
around us and to organise our lives as efficiently as possible.   
    So now we are ready to think about dwelling in a way that overcomes technological 
thinking but, at the same time, does not succumb to nostalgia. Finding our homeland and 
staying with things is not a return to a culturally homogenous or a pre-technological 
227 
 
homeland. It is about acknowledging that we cannot understand what beings mean to us, we 
cannot represent beings with numbers, and we cannot organise and optimise our lives in order 
to make everything run at maximum efficiency. Instead of engaging with things through 
technological thinking, we are now encouraged to engage with them through techne that, as 
was explained in the previous chapter, describes bringing Being to stand in beings when we 
recognise that we alone are not completely in charge of the process of making and 
manufacturing things. When we are engaging with things through techne, we allow for the 
unfolding of phusis and techne together (Brogan, 2006: 44). 
    There are, however, no clear guidelines that can allow us to reliably distinguish between 
technological and non-technological ways of interacting with our environments. Heidegger 
does not provide us with a checklist that allows for distinguishing between a way of farming 
apples that can be deemed industrial and a way of farming apples that does not make 
demands on the environment. Both of these farming methods still require the use of tools and 
require that we shape the environment for the purpose of growing apples. As O’Brien (2011: 
102) explains, ‘[i]n a way, the question will always resist any attempt to demarcate things 
rigidly – there will always be a penumbra where it is not yet clear if the transition has already 
been made’. Indeed, seeking principles to allow us to reliably distinguish between these two 
would still be a part of technological thinking. But this does not mean that the differences in 
kind between these different ways of interacting with our environments do not exist. What 
Heidegger encourages us to do is to question different ways of shaping and interacting with 
them. 
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Urban Dwelling 
This exploration into the role on technology in Heidegger’s thinking demonstrates that his 
account of dwelling can be used to think about us learning to dwell amidst modern technical 
devices. Dwelling does not have to be seen as advocating a return to some rural past or 
embracing older, traditional ways of doing things. In this section, I will explore what this way 
of dwelling could look like in more practical terms. If technical devices can play a role in 
dwelling, then there is room to start thinking of the places in which we dwell differently. We 
can go beyond Dreyfus’ suggestions of dwelling in the fourfold, we can go beyond ‘practices 
such as friendship, backpacking into the wilderness, and drinking the local wine with friends’ 
(Dreyfus, 2002: 171). So we can start looking for ways of dwelling not only in the forest or 
when eating local food, but also in areas which we do not usually think of as natural or as 
traditional. In this section, I will investigate this idea further by looking at how the notion of 
dwelling could be applied to urban areas. This exploration into urban dwelling remains, 
however, limited. The purpose of the section is not to investigate urban dwelling in great 
detail but rather, to demonstrate that Heidegger’s dwelling can be used to explore how we can 
dwell in the urban. 
    There have been attempts to think about how Heidegger’s account of dwelling in the 
fourfold could be extended to describe urban forms of dwelling. Malpas (2012) suggests that 
when we think about dwelling in a Heideggerian sense, it is important that we do not get 
caught up in this urban/rural distinction because this is not what is central to Heidegger’s 
argument. The focus of our inquiry should, instead, be on looking for this sense of dwelling, 
both in urban and in rural areas. Heidegger, Malpas elaborates, prefers the rural because he 
wants quietness, he wants to stay with things. But this does not exclude urban environments 
from dwelling because similar kinds of opportunities for staying with things can be found in 
the city, albeit in different forms (Malpas, 2012). Villela-Petit (1996: 138), in a similar vein, 
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thinks that although Heidegger himself did not concentrate on cities, new forms of dwelling 
can emerge from the contemporary urban experiences: 
[H]eidegger refused to experience the city, no doubt seeing in cosmopolitanism and cultural pluralism 
nothing but a rootlessness which might be captured in the expression “the desert extends” […] [W]ithout 
minimising the defects of the cities and their degradation of our civilisation, can one not also see therein 
the crucible of unique experience, of that of a plural society in which a new consciousness of self and of 
humanity may eventually emerge? 
 
So where in cities could we, then, find opportunities for staying with things? Where can we 
find these experiences of place in the urban that can make us feel at home and how could we 
learn to dwell in a city? 
    A lot of accounts on place-formation in the urban focus on the multiplicity of networks that 
make up urban spaces and emphasise the instability of these places (see e.g. Amin, 2002; 
Anderson et al. 2012; Massey, 2011; Massey, 1999). But while it is important to pay 
attention to these networks, we should not completely deny the existence of relatively stable 
places in the urban. Casey (2001, see also Pratt, 1999; Wunderlich, 2010) cautions against 
paying too much attention to these interconnections at the expense of ignoring the places that 
can still be formed through them. Places may become increasingly uniform ‘without […] 
ceasing to exist altogether as places for us – places in which we orient ourselves and feel at 
home’.  He gives an example:   
The proliferation of movies on video – in itself a proliferation of virtual space – has not meant the end of 
public movie theatres, but has appeared to intensify the desirability of such theatres as real places with 
their own sensuous density and interpersonal interest (Casey, 2001: 685). 
 
Yi-Fu Tuan, for example, illustrates how something we can only come feel homely in cities 
as follows:  
This profound attachment to the homeland appears to be a worldwide phenomenon. It is not limited to any 
particular culture and economy. It is known to literate and nonliterate peoples, hunter-gatherers, and 
sedentary farmers, as well as city dwellers. The city or land is viewed as mother, and it nourishes; place is 
an archive of fond memories and splendid achievements that inspire the present (Tuan, 1977: 154). 
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Nevell and MaCann (2005:280) discuss, in a similar manner, how we can find pockets in the 
city, large or small, where we can settle down and feel at home. It is these pockets where we 
can learn to feel at home that we can think of in terms of Heidegger’s dwelling. Even if we 
cannot learn to know the whole city, certain parts of it can become familiar to us. 
Furthermore, we constantly work and shape the cities in which we live: cities do not present 
us with a stable environment, but we actively shape cities as we live and work in them. Star 
(1990: 328), for example, demonstrates how work done on infrastructure in cities is always 
incremental, never finished once and for all. The familiarity that we have with places we 
interact with frequently also allow us to develop a sense of place and a sense of belonging:  
Today, we can see how the anonymous encounter on the city crossroads, on the subway, on the bus, or in 
the lunchtime plaza where street vendors sell pretzels and chili dogs forges from a multicultural 
conglomeration of strangers some genuine sense of place and community (Barber, 2002: 200).  
 
So a similar sense of belongingness can be found in cities as in rural areas.  
    MacFarlane (2011) explains how this kind of belongingness and sense of a place in the 
urban can be thought of in terms of Heidegger’s dwelling. MacFarlane explains how, in the 
city, people can begin to dwell as they ‘draw upon previous experience or memories, and the 
multiple temporalities and rhythms of the city itself help to shape the possibilities of leaning 
through dwelling, from rhythms of day and night, to capitalist cycles of growth, collapse, 
shrinkage and decay, to the rhythms of long-term migration’ (MacFarlane, 2011: 23). So we 
could also find a place to dwell in the city by learning to stay with the things we encounter, 
and we can also learn to be at home in an urban environment. These reflections on how we 
might begin to dwell in the urban through gaining a sense of home in places that are familiar 
to us allow for moving beyond the example of the apple when thinking about dwelling. 
Although the thesis began by considering what makes the apple natural, it is now time to 
explore how this idea of naturalness stretches beyond anything that we might conventionally 
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consider as natural, and how we could find opportunities for dwelling in urban environments. 
I am going to look at commuting to work in a crowded train as an example of this. 
    Unlike the earlier examples of dwelling that I have given, commuting to work on a 
crowded train does not describe any kind of peaceful existence with our surroundings, but it 
takes place amidst hurried travellers, often in noisy and crowded environments. Neither is the 
journey an example of existing in some kind of harmony with our environments. The way in 
which we shape the urban environment as we commute to work might be conflictual; we can 
be part of a gentrification process pricing existing inhabitants of the areas we live in out of 
their homes. Tensions can also arise in the form of increasing ticket prices and property 
prices that may force us to move further away from our work and have longer commuting 
times. But nevertheless, we can think about dwelling in the fourfold in an environment such 
as this. The train carriage in which we travel to work can be thought of as an example of the 
kind of familiar place that can allow us to dwell. So where can we locate the fourfold in this 
example of a train journey? 
    To begin to dwell during the rush-hour commute, we would have to stop thinking of the 
commute as a mere resource. We can accomplish this if we do not just think of this journey 
as something that we have to undertake in order to get to work in the most efficient manner 
possible, playing with our iphones in an effort to distract us from what is happening around 
us, staring at the time, thinking about how much longer the journey still takes. The commute 
is not just a resource, something that we have to do every day to get to work, something that 
we can assess and understand by thinking about how long the commute takes and how 
crowded the train is. To learn to dwell, we could pay attention to what surrounds us and not 
just think of this commute as an unpleasant task we need to do twice a day, as something that 
we wish to be over as quickly as possible. Maybe there are some new ways in which we can 
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start making this journey, maybe we can take a less-efficient but more pleasant route to work, 
maybe we can stop for a coffee on the way or maybe we can begin to dwell with others 
undertaking the same journey. Doing this would allow the commute to be a commute. We 
would still use trains as transport vehicles to get to work, but our attitude towards this journey 
would be different. The journey can no longer be understood and articulated by thinking 
about how efficiently it gets us to work, but the journey is something that unfolds to us in 
ways that we cannot express. We cannot explain this journey by talking about how useful, 
efficient or comfortable it is. But it is also important to note that we still cannot think of these 
urban places as somehow harmonious and peaceful as a result of us beginning to dwell in 
them, dwelling would not miraculously make the commute less crowded and less hot, and it 
would not mean that we exist in some harmony with our surroundings (for an account of 
dwelling in urban poverty, see McFarlane, 2011). 
    For someone who has not lived in a city, thinking about dwelling in this manner might 
seem alien, and it might seem impossible to even start thinking about commuting in terms of 
dwelling. Taking a crowded train to work every morning would make it impossible for 
someone not rooted in an urban environment to dwell. But similarly, for someone who has 
not lived in rural areas, dwelling on the countryside might seem like an alien concept, 
adapting to the rhythms of the life there might feel difficult and artificial because one is not 
rooted in those ways of doing things. 
    Looking at Heidegger’s thinking in this manner, then, demonstrates how we can use his 
thinking to arrive at a different way of thinking about dwelling. It presents a new way of 
thinking about nature, a way that avoids the criticisms that the idea of nature has attracted. 
This is not meant as an interpretation of what Heidegger really meant when he talked about 
dwelling. We can clearly see from his writings that he was suspicious of modern technology, 
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his examples of dwelling centred on local, rural communities and he romanticised the ways 
of dwelling in these places. Instead, the purpose of this chapter was to demonstrate that the 
implications of Heidegger’s thinking are more far-reaching and radical than even he noticed, 
and that his thinking can be used to overcome problematic ways of thinking about nature. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has continued to think about nature by exploring the roles that tradition and the 
rural play in Heidegger’s thinking. The previous chapters of the thesis began by exploring 
nature in Heidegger’s thinking and suggested that nature should not be understood as 
referring to a set of nonhuman natural beings. These chapters argued that nature should 
instead be understood as describing how all beings appear to us as beings. Protecting nature, 
then, is not about preventing environmental degradation. Instead, it is about overcoming 
technological thinking, overcoming thinking of beings as resources that we can manipulate 
and understand, about learning to stay with things, learning to dwell and becoming homely.  
Statesmen themselves cannot question the unfolding of nature, but it is a task we ourselves 
can accomplish through our own personal paths of questioning nature that we can find by 
following the signposts given to us by the poets and the thinkers. Green politics can, 
however, contribute to this questioning by making it easier for us to embark on this path. But 
despite demonstrating how we can think about nature without making references to the 
unfolding of nonhuman environments, these chapters still left some questions unanswered. 
They did not explain why, if Heidegger did not think of nature in terms of a nonhuman 
environment, he gave so many examples of how nature unfolds in environments that we 
conventionally think of as nonhuman, in the forests, in the countryside and away from 
crowded cities.  
234 
 
    In order to address these concerns, this chapter explored how Heidegger’s accounts of 
dwelling and resisting technological thinking do not rest on an understanding of cultures as 
traditional and homogenous but entail thinking of cultures as something changing and 
evolving. Dwelling in the fourfold does not require us to go back to older and traditional 
ways of doing things but it allows for evolving cultures and traditions. The chapter also 
demonstrated how, despite the fact that Heidegger frequently gives examples of rural areas to 
explain how we might learn to dwell and despite the suspicion with which he talked about 
cities, dwelling does not have to entail any kind of rejection of technological items. This 
means that we can begin to think of dwelling in the context of urban areas. Thus, thinking of 
nature as Heidegger’s phusis and learning to dwell in the fourfold as a way to question this 
phusis overcomes the criticisms that talking about nature usually encounters. This way of 
thinking about nature does not imply a return to traditional, more ‘natural’ ways of doing 
things and it does not privilege areas that we would conventionally think of as natural. 
Instead, it finds opportunities for dwelling and for questioning phusis in the forests, in the 
countryside and in urban areas. The next chapter will follow this discussion by going on to 
explore how the way of thinking about nature presented here fits into green politics and by 
considering whether thinking about nature in this manner can answer the question of what 
kind of role the concept of nature plays in green politics. 
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Chapter Six: Nature in Green Politics 
Introduction  
The first chapter of the thesis began by exploring the puzzling role that the concept of nature 
plays in green politics. It demonstrated that nature seems to communicate something 
important about green goals, that there is more to green politics than just preventing 
environmental degradation. But the chapter also observed that the meaning of this concept 
seems to be difficult to explain. The chapters that followed then embarked on a task of 
looking at Heidegger’s philosophy in order to listen to the word ‘nature’ through Heidegger’s 
discussion of the Greek word phusis and to understand why nature seems to play such an 
important role in green politics. Chapter Two introduced Heidegger’s thinking and examined 
how, in common with green interpretations of his philosophy, ‘nature’ is understood as 
describing the spontaneous growth and development of nonhuman environments. It also 
demonstrated how this way of thinking about nature in Heidegger’s work leads to 
contradictions and argued that we need to think of an alternative way of approaching nature 
in his work. Chapter Three, through an examination of what Heidegger says about phusis, 
dwelling and technological thinking, ended up thinking about the concept of nature in a 
manner that is different from how it is conventionally understood. This chapter suggested that 
we should think of nature as resisting technological thinking that aims at exact 
representations of beings in order to control and manipulate them, and as learning to dwell in 
the fourfold and becoming homely. Thinking about nature in this manner is able to overcome 
the problems in thinking about the concept of nature that were examined in Chapter One. 
Nature is no longer understood as referring to the nonhuman environment and we do not have 
to make distinctions between human and nonhuman environments in order to talk about 
nature. Chapter Four then went on to examine what it means to protect nature when it is 
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understood in the manner suggested in the thesis and demonstrated how this way of thinking 
about nature cannot be understood as having an impact on preventing environmental 
degradation. Finally, Chapter Five examined Heidegger’s rejection of technology, his 
suspicion of cities and the numerous examples of dwelling in rural areas that he gives in order 
to demonstrate why his thinking does not have to imply rural nostalgia and how we can also 
dwell in urban areas amidst modern technology. 
    The purpose of this chapter is to return to green thinking and to investigate how this 
different way of thinking about nature helps make sense of green goals. The argument in the 
chapter is divided into four sections. The first section will look at what kind of role 
questioning phusis could play in green politics, and suggests that green politics should be 
thought of as having two different goals, the goal of protecting nature and the goal of 
protecting the environment. The second section will look at how the different goals of 
protecting nature and protecting the environment can still fit together in a way that it makes 
sense for green politics to pursue these two different kinds of goals. The third section then 
looks at how thinking of green politics as having two goals can help us make better sense of 
green thinking and it will look in more detail where in green politics we can locate this 
concern for phusis. The fourth section concludes by looking at how thinking of nature as 
Heidegger’s phusis helps us think about how we can protect nature and the kind of politics 
that could aid us in questioning phusis. Through these explorations, the section suggests some 
avenues that green thinkers could explore when thinking about the question of nature.  
 
Locating Nature 
So, how could questioning phusis be a part of green politics? As Chapter Four explored, 
politics and political actions cannot themselves question phusis and cannot overcome 
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technological thinking. But there are, however, ways of organising politics that can make our 
task of questioning phusis easier and can allow us to dwell. It is in promoting these kinds of 
structures that we can find a place for protecting nature in green politics. I will return to 
examples of what this way of protecting nature could look like at the end of the chapter. I will 
now move on to look more closely at the place that protecting nature occupies in green 
politics. 
   Suggesting that protecting nature should be understood in terms of practising the kind of 
politics that can help us question the unfolding of phusis, as something different from 
preventing environmental degradation, might sound alarming because it fails to engage with 
environmental problems. The purpose here is not to deny the seriousness of environmental 
problems or the importance of addressing them. I think that preventing environmental 
degradation should be seen as a part of green concerns but I also think that preventing 
environmental degradation should be seen as a concern that is separate from the goal of 
protecting nature. So this means that we should start thinking about green politics as having 
two different kinds of goals, the goal of protecting nature and the goal of protecting the 
environment.  
    In the paragraphs that follow, I will look in more detail at the ways in which we can think 
of green politics as having these two different kinds of goals. This investigation starts by 
looking at how we can concentrate on preventing environmental degradation, use 
technological thinking to find solutions to environmental problems, while, at the same time, 
concentrating on the goal of questioning the unfolding of nature, of Heidegger’s phusis. A 
closer examination of Heidegger’s thinking reveals that he does leave us space to reflect on 
both of these. I am going to explore how this is so by looking at how Heidegger explains that 
we exist always in errancy. 
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    To begin this discussion, I will look at what Heidegger has to say about the myth of Er in 
his Parmenides lecture courses. His interpretation of this myth helps us start thinking about 
how we can question Being whilst still existing amongst beings and engaging with beings. 
The myth of Er is the concluding myth of Plato’s Politeia. It tells the story of Er, a dead 
soldier who comes to life on his funeral pyre and tells of his journey. He tells of the demonic, 
uncanny district, the district that all souls must pass through before their mortal course on the 
earth. Because all souls pass through this district, it can tell us something about how humans 
exist in the world. The demonic district is the field of concealment: it is a barren field that 
does not allow anything to grow: ‘is itself bare of all that grows as well as completely void of 
everything the earth lets spring forth’ (PE: 118; PG:  176). The district, thus, does not allow 
for phusis, it does not allow any beings to emerge as beings.  
    But there is one thing that does appear in this demonic district. The souls that wander 
through it must make camp by a river called Carefree. It is named such because the water that 
can be found in this river is special:  
This water does not know care concerning what is opposed to disappearance, to going away, and 
consequently to withdrawing concealment. This water, which cannot be contained in any vessel because it 
is the pure going away of itself, does not know care over unconcealedness, the care that beings be secured 
in the unconcealed and therein remain constant (PE: 119; PG:177).     
 
Everyone who is to begin their mortal journey on the earth must pass through this district and 
must drink from the river Carefree. Thus, everyone who journeys on the earth exists in such a 
way that beings are always partly concealed from them; they can never fully make sense of 
beings. This is why beings can appear to us as beings. But people drink different amounts 
from this river. Some, saved by insight, drink only a due measure. But some drink too much 
from the river. Heidegger explains that those who drink too much cannot show care towards 
beings: 
They deliver themselves over to what happens to appear and likewise to what happens to disappear. They 
are at the mercy of the withdrawal and the concealment of beings. […] They are the careless ones, who 
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feel content with the thoughtlessness that has withdrawn from every claim on the thinker (PE, 120: PG: 
178). 
 
As Ward (1995: 201) explains, this means that concealment itself is concealed to those who 
drink more than the due measure. They thus fail to question Being, and they fall back to 
technological thinking, thinking that they can define and understand beings, manipulate them 
and use them as resources. Only those who drink a due measure remain thoughtful, and can 
continue to question Being. 
    What is interesting about Heidegger’s interpretation of this myth is that it explains why we 
should not be constantly venturing beyond beings, why we should not allow concealment to 
prevail in the world as much as possible. This is because drinking too much from the river 
lethe does not allow for the happening of truth and for questioning phusis. Heidegger 
explains that those who drink continuously from this river cannot exist in the world as 
humans. For them, everything is concealed, they do not allow for the errancy that is part of 
the way humans are in the world, that is required for violently confronting phusis and 
allowing for the happening of truth (PE: 121; PG: 180). Those who drink once from the river 
but drink too much are also unable to question Being because truth is concealed from them. 
They succumb to technological thinking. Only those who drink the right amount encounter 
beings in their truth. Only by drinking the right amount, by continuing to engage with beings, 
can beings be unconcealed to us. Only then can we remain attentive to the mystery of Being 
and learn to momentarily leap beyond beings, question the truth of Being, the unfolding of 
phusis, and become homely. So we can only momentarily grasp Being because to exist on the 
earth as humans, we must always engage with beings. 
    In ‘On the Essence of Truth’, Heidegger calls this way of being as existing in errancy. 
Errancy describes how, even when we question phusis, we cannot fully escape our 
engagements with beings. And so, Heidegger explains that ‘the human being is subject to the 
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rule of mystery and at the same time to the oppression of errancy’ (ET: 151; WW: 93, 
emphasis original). Existing in errancy is unavoidable: ‘The errancy through which man 
strays is not something which, as it were, extends alongside man like a ditch into which he 
occasionally stumbles; rather errancy belongs to the inner constitution of the Dasein into 
which historical man is admitted’ (ET: 150; WW: 92). We are always turning away from the 
mystery of Being towards beings. Errancy leads us astray, leads us to engage with beings 
instead of questioning Being. But errancy does not close off all the possibilities for 
questioning Being: ‘errancy, at the same time contributes to the possibility that […] by 
experiencing errancy itself and by not mistaking the mystery of Dasein, he not let himself be 
led astray’ (ET: 151; WW: 93). We, then, should not attempt to overcome errancy but we 
should acknowledge its presence, accept it and question it. Errancy is not something that we 
can ever get rid of fully. We will always question Being from amidst beings that we are 
turned towards. What is important is to recognise engaging with beings for what it is, not to 
confuse it with questioning Being. So practising environmental politics, engaging with 
beings, does not make it impossible for us to question phusis because engaging with beings is 
always part of how we are in the world.   
    Always existing in errancy is not only something unavoidable but it can also be seen as 
something desirable. The reason for this becomes clear if we return to the themes explored in 
Chapter Four that traced the development of Heidegger’s thinking of the polis. The inquiry so 
far has not engaged with the question of whether there is something in Heidegger’s thinking 
of Being that led to his engagements with National Socialism as some have claimed (see e.g. 
Caputo, 1993, Lacoue-Labarthe, 1990). So, should we be wary of relying too much on 
questioning Being and on Heidegger’s account of the polis, is there something about the way 
in which Heidegger questions Being that led to his engagements with National Socialism? 
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    I do not think that questioning Being necessarily had to lead Heidegger to National 
Socialism. However, as Richardson (1992: 18) explains, Heidegger’s involvements with 
National Socialism point to a danger in his work because they demonstrate that there was 
nothing in the way in which he questioned Being that could have prevented these kinds of 
engagements. Heidegger’s involvements with National Socialism demonstrate that it is easy 
to err in this manner when concentrating on questioning Being and avoiding making any 
statements concerning how things stand with beings themselves. Heidegger never properly 
addressed this danger, at least not explicitly. As explored in Chapter Five, Heidegger’s 
response to his political involvements was to move away from everyday political 
engagements. So rather than providing an answer to the question of how we can question 
Being in a way that has political consequences and, at the same time, avoid the dangers in 
this kind of questioning, Heidegger distanced himself from this question, and began to 
divorce his questioning from the conduct of politics. But if the purpose here is to go beyond 
our personal journeys of questioning Being and to be able to say something about the role of 
phusis in green politics, then this kind of engagement is insufficient, and we need to look 
closer at these potential dangers in Heidegger’s thinking. Recognising that even when we are 
questioning Being, we are always turning towards beings can provide a way out of these 
problems by demonstrating how we can engage with beings and think about the 
consequences of our actions on this level while questioning Being. 
    The dangers of focusing solely on questioning Being in the case of green politics are clear. 
As explored in Chapter Four, if we did not pay attention to environmental degradation, if we 
only concentrated on questioning the unfolding of nature, of phusis, and on learning to dwell, 
we could end up with unsustainable ways of dwelling. The previous chapter also 
demonstrated how learning to dwell amidst apples might result is unsustainable ways of 
consuming apples. Thus, only questioning the unfolding of phusis could have potentially 
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disastrous consequences for the environment because there is nothing in the way in which 
Heidegger questions phusis that could prevent us from adopting environmentally unfriendly 
ways of living and dwelling. Thinking of environmental politics as another goal that green 
politics has is a way of addressing these concerns because it allows us to think about 
questions of environmental degradation as we begin to question phusis. But when we engage 
with questions of environmental degradation, we must also remember that concentrating only 
on protecting and managing the environment is not enough because it would mean forgetting 
to question Being and losing sight of nature, forgetting that we should not only think of 
beings in terms of resources. Regulating and taking care of the environment perfectly only 
leads us further away from questioning phusis. Heidegger describes the obsession with 
perfectly controlling our environments as follows: 
Everything is functioning. This is exactly what is so uncanny, that everything is functioning and the 
functioning drives us more and more to even further functioning, and that technology tears men loose from 
the earth and uproots them (Spiegel: 105). 
 
To lead fulfilling lives, we must recognise that even if we could regulate the environment 
perfectly, we still could not fully understand the unfolding of beings. 
 
Fitting Together 
So we have now arrived at an understanding of green thinking where green politics is, in fact, 
driven by two different goals, the goal of protecting nature and the goal of protecting the 
environment: protecting the environment is about preventing environmental degradation in a 
more traditional sense and protecting nature is about resisting technological thinking, about 
learning to dwell in the fourfold and about questioning phusis. But how, then, do these the 
two different goals of green thinking, dwelling and preventing environmental degradation, fit 
together and why does it make sense to pursue these two goals at the same time? I am here 
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going to explore two ways in which we can think of these different goals as belonging 
together. I will first look at how working to prevent environmental degradation can inspire us 
to begin questioning phusis. And after this, I will look at how questioning phusis has the 
potential to help us find new, environmentally friendly ways of dwelling. 
    So how could wanting to protect the environment help us start reflecting on phusis? We 
can understand how this is so if we think about how it is not an accident that green politics 
has two goals, the goal of protecting the environment and the goal of protecting nature. This 
happened because, after Aristotle, understandings of the unfolding of beings have changed. 
Where the pre-Socratics describe phusis as the unfolding of all beings, modern interpretations 
have interpreted phusis following Aristotle, as only describing the unfolding of some 
nonhuman environment.  
    But if phusis has, for a long time, been something we primarily observe in things 
considered as a part of the nonhuman environment, then maybe this means that questioning 
the unfolding of that which is conventionally understood as the nonhuman nature might help 
us start thinking about what it means to protect phusis. If it is really this idea of phusis that 
we are trying to get at when we are talking about nature, then the way in which we 
experience nature, even when we equate with the mysterious growth and development of 
nonhuman environments, should bear some similarities with how we experience phusis.  
    Something like this is indeed suggested by Vycinas (1961: 150-151) who writes that ‘[t]he 
rising and setting sun, changing phases of the moon, the starry sky, and the serene mountains 
or wild forests still give a glimpse of the once over-whelming phusis.’ So, for example, 
thinking of the apples growing in the garden and thinking of the importance that they have for 
us can help us escape technological thinking and to think about things as something other 
than just resources. Thinking about the unfolding of that which we conventionally think of as 
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nonhuman nature, then, is a way of helping us start thinking about phusis, just as long as we 
remember that the unfolding of this phusis is not limited to environments we conventionally 
think of as nonhuman.  
    So one reason why protecting the environment and protecting nature are linked is that 
reflecting on that which we conventionally think of as the nonhuman environment can help us 
start questioning phusis. But there is also another reason why I think these two are linked. 
Questioning phusis can have an impact on the way in which we conduct environmental 
politics. Although, as explored in previous chapters, abandoning technological thinking 
cannot be guaranteed to have environmentally friendly consequences, resisting technological 
thinking can open up possibilities for alternative ways of living which can have 
environmentally friendly outcomes. Technological items can open up these possibilities 
because, although technical devices can continue to play a part in our lives as we learn to 
dwell, overcoming technological thinking requires that we start engaging with these devices 
differently, that we do not just see them as resources and that we do not just think of 
ourselves as subjects whose sole purpose is to use these devices with maximum efficiency. 
And this kind of rethinking has the possibility of opening up new, environmentally friendly 
ways of doing things. How is this so? 
    Gaining a different understanding of who we are in the world has been identified by many 
green thinkers as something necessary for us to start living more sustainable lifestyles. As 
Paterson (2007: 223) explains, motivating people to change their habits of consumption is a 
question of changing people’s sense of who they are in the world: changing people’s 
behaviours is not just about finding new, more environmentally friendly technologies, but it 
is also about changing people’s perceptions of themselves so that they will adopt these new 
technologies. He uses cars as an example to illustrate this further. In order to motivate people 
to drive less and to switch to alternative forms of transport such as cycling, we need to 
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change people’s perceptions of themselves as free car-owning individuals that have a right to 
reach their destination at maximum efficiency (Paterson, 2007: 222-223; see also Plumwood, 
1991: 21). Not seeing ourselves as free car-owing individuals and the world around us as a 
resource to be managed as efficiently as possible may not yet guarantee that we adopt 
environmentally friendly modes of transport. But it does encourage us to rethink the way in 
which we travel, opening up possibilities for doing things in an environmentally friendly 
fashion. 
    Another example of how questioning phusis can help us change our lifestyles can be found 
by again looking at the apple as an example. How could avoiding technological thinking 
when we begin to engage with the apple open up new possibilities for practising 
environmental politics? Barry’s (2012) example of transition movements elaborates on some 
of the consequences that beginning to dwell could have for the way in which we consume 
food. Barry (2012: 110) explains that because food is something that we need everyday, 
shared rituals and practices can easily be developed around the production and consumption 
of food. Proponents of transition movements argue that in order to confront environmental 
degradation, we should not just consume food differently, but we need to reinvent the way 
that we consume food, we should aim to ‘protect local distinctiveness and pride in local food 
cultures form the predations of an industrialised, chemicalised, homogenising and mass 
production food system.’ Transition movements thus propose ‘according more time to food 
preparation and consumption and having greater awareness of and connection to where, how, 
and who has grown and prepared one’s meals’ (Barry, 2012: 111). So here again, these 
alternative forms of consumption are not only about finding better forms of utilising the 
environment as a resource, but they are about changing our perception of who we are in the 
world. Thus, transition movements can be thought of in terms of focusing less on finding the 
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most efficient ways of doing things and placing importance of dwelling and becoming 
homely.  
    Rethinking the way in which we consume food can, for example, have an impact on how 
we consume apples. It can encourage us to re-invent the way that we eat apples. As a result of 
these kinds of reflections, we could start taking greater pride in how we prepare food from 
apples. We could start seeing apples as something more than nourishment, seeing consuming 
apples as a more important part of our daily routines. We may also begin to consume locally 
produced apples, avoiding apples that have been brought to us through longer supply chains 
that we feel alienated from. As has been explained previously, this does not necessarily lead 
to environmentally friendly outcomes and it does not necessarily mean that we will adopt 
practices that allow us to grow and consume apples in the most environmentally friendly 
fashion. Indeed, growing food locally is not always the best way to protect the environment. 
Critics have argued that locally grown food is not necessarily the most sustainable option, 
and calculations have demonstrated that sometimes importing food from warm climates can 
be more environmentally friendly than growing food in colder climates (Gnalli and Brunori, 
2013: 11-12).4 However, thinking about how we can start consuming food differently can 
open up new avenues for dwelling and can open up new ways of thinking about how we can 
become environmentally friendly. It guides us away from industrially produced food and 
away from driving to big supermarkets, thus reducing pollution (see Whitelegg, 1995). 
    In this account of dwelling, it is still entirely possible that our ways of dwelling and our 
renewed understandings of who we are in the word end up being environmentally unfriendly 
                                                
4 This might be an unfair criticism to make about the transition town movement whose focus is not, in fact, to 
develop sustainable practices but instead, to develop resilient ones, to develop communities that are able to 
absorb shocks. Thus, from a resilience stand point, it might make more sense to rely on locally produced food 
because this might make these food networks more resilient (see e.g. Connors and MacDonald, 2010; Hopkins, 
2008; Walker and Salt, 2006). However, it is still the case simply learning to dwell and returning to some 
traditional ways of doing things do not yet necessarily lead to resilient communities, but we need to rely on 
technological, calculative thinking to start thinking about resilience. 
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and destructive. This does not, however, have to be a problem because reflections on 
environmental politics can guide the way we dwell on the earth. As has been explained in 
Chapter Five, ways of dwelling are open to contestations and are always changing, they do 
not remain static. Allowing some reflections on environmental politics to guide the way in 
which our dwelling practices evolve makes sense because, as was explored earlier in the 
chapter, it is questionable whether, when we are thinking about how the way we question 
Being might shape politics, it is desirable to rely on this kind of questioning alone. The way 
that Heidegger questions Being does not give us tools for assessing the consequences that this 
kind of questioning has for beings themselves. These technological inquiries into dwelling 
are not necessarily something that make it impossible for us to dwell, just as long as we are 
not overcome by this technological way of thinking and are able to give space for non-
technological ways of doing things.  
    There are, then, two ways in which we can think about preventing environmental 
degradation and protecting nature as linked. Firstly, dwelling can open up new possibilities 
for confronting environmental degradation. Secondly, reflecting on environmental 
degradation and thinking about how we can best confront it can also guide the way in which 
we dwell. This would mean that, at times, when thinking about the environmental 
consequences of alternative ways of consuming apples, we might have to give up some of the 
idealised images we have of what it means to grow apples locally. These reflections on 
environmental degradation can encourage us to rethink the ways in which we dwell, and 
encourage us to found ways of dwelling in an environmentally friendly fashion. We might, 
for example, end up experimenting with new ways of farming or sourcing food through 
alternative networks that give us more control over where and how this food is sourced. 
    This means that although green politics is made of two different goals, these goals are not 
entirely separate, and the pursuit of one of these goals can support the pursuit of the other. 
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These two goals might, at times, be in conflict with each other, and we might need to make 
choices and decide which one to support in a given instance. But they can also be mutually 
supportive goals.  
 
Nature in Green Politics 
So far this discussion of green politics and what it should entail has taken place at a fairly 
abstract level. I am now going to return to green politics itself in order to find out where in 
green politics we can find these two different goals. I will also look at if this way of thinking 
about green politics helps in responding to the questions raised by Chapter One about the role 
that the concept of nature plays in green politics.  
    The first chapter of the thesis raised concerns about the way green thinkers talk about 
nature. It demonstrated how sometimes, when green thinkers are talking about nature, this 
talk becomes very problematic. This is because greens refer to nature as the nonhuman 
environment without explaining how we can make distinctions between human and 
nonhuman environments. So there is a concern that talking about nature hampers the way in 
which we discuss environmental politics because our practice of environmental politics is 
now informed by a concept of nature that is a socially constructed concept. Yet, sometimes, 
this concept seems to be articulating something important about protecting our environments 
that cannot be articulated through the language of environmental politics. Recognising that 
green politics has two different kinds of goals helps us make sense of the way in which the 
concept of nature should be used in green politics: it allows us to recognise that although the 
concept of nature might be useful in articulating some green goals, it can also be detrimental 
in other instances. I am going to begin this exploration into how we should use this concept 
by looking at when we should not be using it.  
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   These reflections allow us to understand when we should not be talking about nature, when 
talking about nature is unhelpful and obscures the aims of green politics, and when we could 
better understand these goals without making references to nature. Firstly, they help us 
understand how, even if the concept of nature does articulate something important about 
green goals, it should not be used to discuss environmental degradation. For example, when 
Barry (1999) highlights the importance of exploring the heterogeneous relationships that we 
share with an unpredictable nature, these references to nature are not needed, and we could 
simply talk about the environment in order to avoid problems in thinking about nature as 
referring to the nonhuman environment. Neither should this concept of nature play a role in 
Naess’ (1989) discussions on the causes of environmental degradation and the solution to 
environmental crisis. Even if nature does feel like an important concept, even if it does seem 
to communicate something important about the way in which we should take care of our 
environments, in these cases, where the main concern is environmental degradation, this 
concept should not be used. We can make better sense of environmental degradation without 
making references to nature.  
    This also helps us respond to a second concern that Chapter One raised in regards to the 
use of the concept of nature in green thinking, the way in which green thinkers refer to nature 
when they are discussing how we should extend the moral community to include nonhuman 
natural beings. This way of talking about extending the moral community is problematic 
because it is unclear what these natural beings are, and why we should be privileging 
nonhuman natural beings over nonhuman beings. But we can now see that the concept of 
nature is not needed when we are discussing extending the moral community to include 
nonhumans. For example, references to nature are not needed in Eckersley’s (1992) account 
of ecocentrism. Eckersley’s case for ecocentrism can be made without talking about nature. 
As can be recalled from Chapter One, Eckersley wants to think about extending the moral 
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community by looking at the degree of sentience of an organism, its capacity for richness of 
experience and whether its species is endangered amongst other factors. Nature does not have 
to feature in these discussions. Instead of talking about extending the moral community to 
encompass natural, nonhuman beings, we could simply talk about extending it to nonhuman 
beings, evaluate the level of sentience of an organism and investigate whether the species is 
endangered without talking about nature. Nature, although it can be helpful in articulating 
some of green goals, is not helpful in trying to talk about ecocentrism.  
    So we have now discussed when green thinkers should stop talking about nature because 
making these references to nature is not helpful in making sense of green goals. But where in 
green politics can we, then, find a concern for nature, and when can talking about nature help 
us understand green goals? Because the green way of approaching nature is mixed up with 
thinking of nature as the nonhuman environment, it can be difficult to locate this kind of 
concern for nature as phusis in the approaches to green thinking that were introduced in 
Chapter One. However, if we look carefully, we can find these references to nature. Thinking 
of nature in terms of phusis can be seen most clearly in the account of green politics provided 
by deep ecology that concentrates on how the experiences that we have of nature can change 
the way in which we conduct environmental politics. As discussed in previous chapter, deep 
ecology is not just about finding environmentally friendly ways of living. For deep ecology, 
protecting nature was not about managing the environment or about deriving rules by which 
we can start according value to natural beings. Instead, the starting point for deep ecology 
was to recognise that things do not exist as atomistic objects but they can only be understood 
as parts of larger wholes. Protecting the environment was about finding a renewed sense of 
the self where we begin to experience ourselves as a part of the larger whole of our 
environments, where we begin to identify ourselves as a part of our environments and 
through this identification, begin to value our environments for their own sake. Deep 
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ecologists thus emphasise recognising how our environments are not just resources and want 
us to begin to experience these environments as something more than this (see e.g. Naess, 
1989). 
    Thinking about this experience of nature that guides deep ecology as Heidegger’s phusis 
rather than nonhuman nature is important. This is because it allows us to make better sense of 
the kinds of arguments that deep ecologists are making and it prevents us from dismissing 
them unduly. So how is this? As Chapter One demonstrated, deep ecology has been criticised 
because it relies on learning how to protect nature through intuitions, and it is thus relying on 
socially constructed ideas of what nature is rather than investigating actual environmental 
degradation. Consequently, many have argued that deep ecology’s priority is not to protect 
our environments, but it is to develop the sense of the self, to develop ourselves so that we 
can begin to experience ourselves as a part of a larger whole. De-Shalit (2000: 52), for 
example, argues that 
The fact is that these philosophers have political goals that are not necessarily related to pollution, sewage, 
radioactive radiation, waste disposal, the extinction of wild animals, or the keeping of balance of 
ecosystems. They are looking to say something about politics –from the definition of the self. 
 
We are now in a position of address these criticisms. Rethinking what we really mean when 
we are talking about nature demonstrates that it is not so easy to dismiss the arguments that 
deep ecologists are making. If the concern of the deep ecologists is for nature, understood as 
Heidegger’s phusis, then the fact that deep ecologists are unable to address environmental 
degradation is not a problem. This is because, as demonstrated earlier in the thesis, 
environmental degradation is not something that protecting nature should be able to address.  
   The mistakes made by deep ecologists are to assume that this renewed sense of the self can 
only be gained through experiencing some nonhuman environment and to think that 
protecting nature automatically leads us to protect the environment. Nature, contrary to what 
Naess (1989: 66) claims, is not only found by looking at the heart of the forest or the life of 
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the river. These experiences can also be found from areas that we do not conventionally think 
of as natural. My experiences of nature, for example, extend beyond the apple trees that grow 
in my grandparents’ garden, beyond the Finnish forests and beyond the countryside: these 
experiences can be found by concentrating, for example, on the life of on urban streets or in 
the heart of a block of flats in a city. If deep ecologists wish to protect nature and prevent 
environmental degradation, they could do this by incorporating reflections on how to conduct 
environmental politics into their accounts without making references to protecting nature.  
    The other approach to ecocentrism, the rules-based approach, does not focus as much on 
nature, understood in terms of phusis. As discussed earlier in the chapter, in this approach, 
the concept of nature is mostly used to refer to the nonhuman environment that, as explained 
in the first chapter, is a problematic way of approaching nature. We can overcome these 
problems by simply not talking about nature when discussing environmental degradation. But 
the concern for nature is not lacking from all of these rules-based approaches to ecocentrism, 
and we can find hints of the importance of nature even from these accounts. Curry (2006: 
102), for example, argues that we should not view nature in purely mechanistic and 
materialistic terms because nature has a spiritual dimension to it as well. Recognising this 
spiritual dimension in protecting nature is important because seeing nature in these terms 
would ensure that we would no longer think of nature as a passive, inanimate object. Instead, 
we would recognise that nature will always remain to us ‘an inexhaustible mystery’ (Curry, 
2006: 104). Curry’s account of nature presents a richer view of what is at stake in protecting 
our environment than Eckersley’s. It acknowledges that the way in which we experience our 
surroundings and make sense of them has environmental consequences and that overcoming 
thinking of our surroundings as made up of inanimate objects and resources is important for 
confronting environmental degradation. But we can make better sense of Curry’s argument if 
we do not try to mix these two ways of questioning and thinking about nature together and 
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think that they are both talking about protecting the environment. Acknowledging that 
protecting nature, understood as questioning phusis, resisting technological thinking and 
learning to dwell, and preventing environmental degradation are separate goals prevents us 
from rejecting the claim that this mystery of nature is unimportant because preventing 
environmental degradation should be left to science.   
     But how could making this distinction between protecting nature and protecting the 
environment help us make sense of the arguments of those green thinkers who do not claim to 
be attributing intrinsic value to nature? Because the green literature that does not accord 
intrinsic value to nature consists of many different kinds of approaches to thinking about the 
environment, in the interest of space, I will here only concentrate on examining John Barry’s 
(1999) account of virtue ethics and ecological citizenship and on Andrew Dobson’s (2003) 
account of ecological citizenship. I will spend slightly longer examining this example 
because it is an interesting case. Whereas Barry’s account of ecological citizenship uses the 
idea of nature to make sense of how we might become ecological citizens, Dobson’s does 
not. Thinking of the question of preserving the environment and protecting nature as two 
separate questions helps make sense of the different ways that Dobson and Barry formulate 
their accounts of ecological citizenship, and demonstrates that some of the disagreements 
between Dobson and Barry are caused by them asking different kinds of questions. 
    As explained in Chapter One, Barry does not think that greens should accord intrinsic 
value to some homogenous nature. For him, nature cannot teach us lessons about how to live 
in harmony with our environments. Instead of focusing on a homogenous nature, greens 
should focus on ‘individuals within particular cultural contexts facing more or less 
determinate parts of the environment’ (Barry, 1999: 51). Focusing on these different kinds of 
relationships that we share with our environments leads Barry to advocate virtue ethics as a 
means of protecting the environment. Barry thus proposes an account of ecological 
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citizenship based on the development of ecological virtues. People can develop ecological 
virtues when they come to see their interests in a wider context, when they begin to see how 
their interests are linked to the interests of nature and no longer see their interests in terms of 
narrow self-interests.  
    But thinking of nature in terms of phusis and dwelling is not completely missing from 
Barry’s account of environmental ethics. This can be seen in the way that Barry discusses 
agricultural stewardship which for him is something that helps us develop ecological virtues. 
We can learn this model of agricultural stewardship and gain insight into how to develop 
ecological virtues in rural areas that have been shaped less by the human hand. Barry argues 
that the urban population is less able to encounter nature: ‘modern life for the majority of 
people is not based on direct relations to, or experiences of, the land or the non-human 
environment’ (Barry and Smith, 2008: 578). But people can still develop ecological virtues in 
urban areas: ‘While the majority of people in modern society have not direct, transformative 
experiences of nature, this does not mean that the dispositions and attitudes constitutive of 
stewardship as a mode of action are impossible to cultivate in an urban setting’ (Barry, 1999: 
257). In urban settings, people can learn to act in an ecologically virtuous manner by 
participating in democratic processes and through social learning. However, knowledge of 
nature gained through this kind of behaviour is still mediated and not direct. Because of this, 
rural areas will always play a privileged role in the practice of environmental politics (Barry, 
1999: 228). So, in the end, although Barry’s account is different from that of deep ecology, it 
still shares some surprising similarities with it. The idea of learning to care for our 
environments, learning to develop ecological virtues through experiencing a nonhuman 
nature is still at the heart of Barry’s account, and nature is still teaching us what our model of 
taking care of the environment should be like (see e.g. MacGregor, 2006: 88-90). Thus, the 
idea of experiencing a nonhuman nature is present in Barry’s account of green politics. 
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    To overcome Barry’s focus on the transformative experiences of nature that we can find in 
rural areas, we could argue that we now have to stop basing the development of ecological 
virtues on these experiences of nature. Developing ecological virtues would have to be based 
purely on scientific reasoning about what can best help us protect our environment. But this 
would now leave something out of the approach proposed by Barry. This new approach 
would leave out the experience of nature that can open up new possibilities for confronting 
environmental degradation. To explore further how this way of thinking about nature could 
help make better sense of Barry’s arguments, I will examine in more detail a debate between 
Dobson and Barry on what ecological citizenship should entail, and explain how the approach 
to green politics proposed in this thesis can help make sense of what is at stake in this debate. 
    Dobson (2003) presents an account of ecological citizenship that frames the question of 
how to take care of our environments in a way which does not rely on an idea of nature. 
Dobson’s ecological citizenship relies on an ‘ecological form of post-cosmopolitan 
citizenship’ which is concerned with non-contractual responsibilities that are not bounded by 
the territories in which we live (Dobson, 2003: 68). These responsibilities are determined by 
the size of a person’s ecological footprint. Humans come to know what their duties as 
ecological citizens are by the following rule: ‘if my ecological footprint is of an unsustainable 
size, then my obligation is to reduce it’ (Dobson, 2003: 120-121). This formulation of 
ecological citizenship aims to persuade people that they have duty to ensure that their 
ecological footprint does not make it impossible for others, for people living in other parts of 
the globe and future generations, to enjoy natural resources (Dobson, 2003: 91). 
    But Barry is concerned that Dobson’s formulation of ecological citizenship does not extend 
far enough because it does not, in the end, explain what gives rise to these duties that we have 
towards others. Barry thus explains that ‘Dobson’s notion of ecological citizenship demands 
too much, especially in the absence of any discussion of the balance to be struck between 
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legitimate “self-interest” and concern for others’ (Barry, 2002: 146). Furthermore, Barry 
argues that Dobson’s account does not explain why perceiving injustice would lead to a 
change in our behaviour:  
[I]t also needs to be said that environmental education, knowledge and awareness by themselves are not 
sufficient conditions for changing individual and collective behaviour in a more sustainable 
direction. Merely making people aware about the environment impact of human consumption practices 
for example, will not automatically make them alter their consumption. On top of knowledge of their 
effects on the environment and their dependence upon it, people also need to be given reasons to 
change their ways of thinking and acting (Barry, 2002: 140).  
 
Barry thus argues that ecological citizenship should be based around the idea of developing 
ecological virtues, based on those transformative experiences that we have of a nonhuman 
nature that inspire us to begin to develop ourselves so that we can become good ecological 
citizens. According to Barry, this formulation of ecological citizenship is better able to 
explain what motivates us to become ecological citizens in the first place. 
    Dobson (2003: 121) responds to Barry by explaining that his account of ecological 
citizenship does not demand too much. Dobson explains that there are limits to the duties we 
owe to others when we become ecological citizens and that these kinds of duties are not 
open-ended: duties are owned because of an unfair distribution of resources between citizens. 
Dobson also addresses the question of why we would want to care for the environment. 
Ecological citizens, in Dobson’s account, care for the environment because they want to do 
justice. However, Dobson (2003: 121-2) admits not being able to explain what might 
motivate them to do justice and to act like ecological citizens in the first place.  
    So Dobson’s account of ecological citizenship fails, in the end, to address the underlying 
motivations that encourage us to take care of our environments. At the same time, Barry’s 
account of what these motivations might be and where they are coming from is not entirely 
satisfactory because these motivations arise from transformative experiences that we have of 
some nonhuman nature which can supposedly teach us how to act in an environmentally 
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virtuous manner. Thinking of these transformative experiences we have of nature as 
something that do not relate to protecting our nonhuman environments can help find a way of 
thinking about these problems. We could still follow Dobson and recognise that the duties of 
ecological citizens are formed through making calculations concerning how we interact with 
our environments and of the kinds of impact that these interactions have, and we could still 
argue that they do not derive from any kind of experience of a nonhuman nature. But this 
does not mean that nature itself is not important. The experiences we have of nature and 
recognising the importance of taking care of the places in which we live can allow for a 
transformation in the way in which we view ourselves and this can result in us being willing 
to scale down our consumption. Thinking about protecting nature and taking care of the 
places in which we live in terms of questioning Heidegger’s phusis helps, as will be explored 
more in the next section, further reflect on how we can protect nature and take care of the 
places in which we dwell.  
     
Protecting Nature  
The previous section demonstrated how recognising that green politics has two different 
kinds of goals, the goal of protecting nature and the goal of protecting the environment allows 
for making better sense of the green arguments and helps us better locate the concern for 
nature in green politics. This section concludes the chapter by exploring how thinking about 
nature as something other than the nonhuman environment, as the unfolding of Heidegger’s 
phusis, also opens up new avenues for thinking about protecting nature. If protecting nature 
no longer draws its inspiration from questioning some kind of a nonhuman environment, 
how, then, should we start approaching the kinds of political structures that can help us 
question phusis? I will here explore the kinds of political structures that can aid us in 
questioning phusis and also suggest some new avenues that green politics could pursue when 
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thinking about them. I will begin by looking at the kinds of political structures that Heidegger 
thought could help us question Being. 
    The kinds of structures that can help us protect nature, I think, have to promote openness, 
democratic participation and public engagement. Heidegger himself was suspicious of the 
potential democracy holds for allowing us to overcome technological thinking and allowing 
us to dwell. This becomes evident, for example, in the interview with Der Spiegel where 
Heidegger expresses doubts as to whether democracy can help us overcome technological 
thinking (Spiegel: 104). Heidegger had these doubts because he saw that democracy itself is 
based on technological thinking, on the idea that we are atomistic, free individuals. 
Consequently, it cannot offer us tools for overcoming it (IJssling, 1992: 9; Gauthier, 2011: 
96-7). As de Beistegui (1998: 116) explains, ‘[w]ith the collapse of fascism and of Soviet 
communism, the liberal model has proven to be the most effective and powerful vehicle of 
the global spread of technology’.  
    However, although current models of democracy might be bound up with technological 
thinking, Heidegger may have misjudged the potential democracy has for allowing us to 
overcome technological thinking. Malpas (2006: 385 n. 212), for example, finds in 
democracy the kind of focus on questioning that can allow us to overcome technological 
thinking. It is possible to find different forms of democracy, separate from capitalism, which 
can question Being (Dallmeyr, 2010: 80). Democracy and democratic engagements in the 
public sphere are important because they can allow for the kind of engagements with places 
that resist technological thinking and the kind of sense of place that allows us to dwell. 
Coward (2008: ch3) argues in a similar vein and wants to think of dwelling as something that 
happens in places which are public and shared by others, that can be shaped by and lived in 
by all. So, although we approach democratic structures often through technological thinking, 
it is nevertheless these kinds of structures, with their emphasis on openness and public 
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engagement, that can help us question phusis. What kinds of political structures, then, can 
encourage these kinds of engagements with places?  
    A lot of green politics is already addressing these questions by exploring how we can 
develop a sense of place, often centring around thinking about how small, decentralised 
communities could provide us with a new sense of a place:  
A society made up of decentralised, self-sufficient communities, in which people work near their homes, 
have the responsibility of governing themselves, of running their schools, hospitals and welfare service, in 
fact constituting real communities, should, we feel, be a much happier place (The Ecologist, 1972: 62).  
 
But this inquiry should not be restricted to these kinds of reflections, and it should not be 
made by relying on an idea of living in harmony with some kind of a nonhuman nature. 
Green politics should also explore the sense of place in areas that we do not conventionally 
consider as natural. These kinds of investigations are not completely missing from green 
politics. Cannavo (2007), for example, draws attention to how the green concern for place 
does not only apply to areas that we would conventionally consider as nonhuman and 
therefore natural, but this concern extends beyond, to the urban and to the suburban. So what 
could showing concern for places in this manner look like? 
    Green politics could, for example, play a role in the example of dwelling during the rush-
hour commute, which was discussed in the previous chapter. It could do this by encouraging 
us to learn to dwell in the fourfold by paying attention to how we make sense of places and 
rethinking the power-relations in deciding who plans the development of urban areas. Cities 
are often planned for the efficient circulation of capital rather than for the sake of the people 
who live in the cities (see e.g. Harvey, 2012: ch1).  Often areas that are being regenerated in 
urban areas are done for the sake of foreign investors and visitors, appealing to some vague 
ideas to advertise the city while the city itself ‘lies around like a vague backcloth, a taken for-
granted idea’, and the local communities do not participate in the debate on what the city 
should be (Healey, 2002: 1784; see also Scott: 1998). Jane Jacobs (1961), for example, 
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criticises plans to regulate what happens in the city too much and to contain the different uses 
of the city in isolated areas because they are unable to pay attention to the “intricate, many-
faceted cultural life of the metropolis’ (Jacobs, 1961: 19). 
    Regulating too much how a city is used does not make dwelling impossible, but it does 
make it more difficult. It is this kind of approach to place-making that can prohibit us from 
dwelling in a Heideggerian sense because it ignores local meanings and experiences and 
ignores how particular places become important to people (Relp, 1979: 146-7). As Cannavo 
(2007) illustrates, this kind of regulation of places takes away from our experience of the city 
and of our surroundings. Suburban development plans that attempt to clearly assign a 
designated use to each developed place usually lead to a decline in public spaces as ‘shopping 
malls, private clubs, and gated communities’ begin to dominate these spaces (Cannavo, 2007: 
107). Work, shopping and living spaces become isolated from each other, and suburban 
streets often lack sidewalks on streets for children to play in (Barber, 2002: 191-2, see also 
Byers, 2005). Our encounters with others become increasingly regulated through our use of 
the kinds of spaces where the purpose of our encounters with others is specified already in the 
design of the place. Shopping areas in mixed-use communities, where shopping is an activity 
undertaken amidst other activities such as commuting and recreation, allow for different ways 
of encountering others. Cannavo elaborates on these mixed-use areas as follows: 
[They] begin to build multifaceted relationships and develop a sense of habitation in, identification with, 
and responsibility for, a shared place; in some cases, a shared sense of community might arise. Meanwhile, 
the neighbourhood itself is enriched and enlivened with a variety of meanings (Cannavo, 2007: 107). 
 
Thus, refraining from regulating the use of spaces and designing mixed-use urban spaces can 
aid us in learning to dwell in the manner that has been discussed in the previous chapters. It 
allows us to be with others in a more authentic manner by not imposing pre-determined 
meanings on the places in which we dwell.  
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    Allowing local communities to have more say in the way that their communities are 
designed and having places in the city that are driven less by the need for the development of 
capital can also help us in our quest of thinking about what it means to dwell and how we can 
question phusis. In the case of the rush-hour commute, for example, it might transform the 
way we commute and the length of our commute. If places were less segregated and less 
divided between residential and work places, we could have the opportunity to live closer to 
where we work. If capital interest were not the primary determinant of property development, 
house prices nearer city centres could be more affordable, and people could be able to move 
closer to where they work. All this can decrease the time we spend commuting, and could 
mean that commuters would better afford the luxury of not paying attention to the efficiency 
of their commute. They would have more time to dwell in the city. 
    At the same time, this could also open up new avenues for practising environmental 
politics, and support the green goal of protecting the environment. As Cannovo (2010) 
illustrates, rethinking how places are designed and used, moving towards more mixed-use 
urban places, could result in people being less reliant on cars to do shopping. Reducing the 
population’s reliance on cars would also allow for more pedestrian friendly public spaces, 
allowing us to make more journeys on foot (Cannavo, 2010: 228-9; Whitelegg: 1995). 
Although these environmentally friendly outcomes are not guaranteed, questioning phusis in 
this manner and thinking about place in the urban can open up possibilities for a more 
environmentally friendly way of dwelling in the city. 
    Learning to dwell in the city would not mean that we begin to live harmoniously with our 
environments, that inequalities and poverty would suddenly disappear. As was explored in 
Chapter Five, these are questions that we cannot, at least not at the moment, address through 
questioning Being and through dwelling. These kinds of problems, like environmental 
problems, require a different kind of questioning to be tackled. But thinking about dwelling 
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can encourage us to dwell in the city with others, to feel a sense of place in the city. Being-
with others in a more authentic manner can also allow us to take first steps towards thinking 
about solving these problems because it can teach us to be more tolerant of the different ways 
in which other city-dweller are in the world. It can encourage us to take more responsibility 
for the problems that surround us and to begin a different kind of questioning in order to try 
to find solutions to these problems. 
 
Conclusion  
This chapter has explored the role that protecting nature could play in green politics alongside 
protecting the environment. Previous chapters have demonstrated how the concept of nature 
plays an important role in green politics. It articulates something important about green goals 
but the meaning of this concept is nevertheless difficult to articulate. This thesis then turned 
to Heidegger’s philosophy to try to make sense of the concept of nature. Abandoning the 
common green interpretation of Heidegger’s nature, phusis, as the spontaneous growth and 
development of nonhuman natural beings in ways that we cannot fully comprehend, the thesis 
went on divorce nature from the material growth of a set of natural beings and suggested that 
we should start thinking of nature as describing how all beings appear to us as beings. 
Protecting nature is now about resisting technological thinking, a kind of thinking that thinks 
of beings in terms of resources that can be controlled and manipulated. It is no longer related 
to the practice of environmental politics, but it is about learning to dwell, about allowing 
beings to appear to us as beings while keeping in mind that we cannot fully understand how 
they appeared as beings. This will, in the end, allow us to dwell in the places that we inhabit 
and be at home in them. 
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     The role of this chapter was to examine how this new way of thinking about nature can 
help us make better sense of green goals by demonstrating that green politics has two 
separate goals, the goal of protecting nature and the goal of protecting the environment. The 
chapter begun by looking at where in green politics we can locate this concern for nature. It 
then went on to look in more detail at what it might mean to protect nature and to learn to 
dwell and at the role modern urban and technological environments could play in this 
dwelling. It suggested some ways in which these two goals that green politics has can fit 
together. Protecting nature can help in protecting the environment because it can open up 
possibilities for new ways of doing things and for more environmentally friendly lifestyles. 
The chapter also suggested that phenomena found in what we conventionally call the 
nonhuman nature can help us start thinking about phusis because this is where we are used to 
observing nature. Finally, the chapter looked at how thinking about protecting nature as 
something separate from the practice of environmental politics helps us make better sense of 
green politics and helps us understand how we can go on talking about nature without talking 
about it in terms of the nonhuman environment. The chapter explored when we should and 
when we should not talk about nature in green politics and looked at how thinking of nature 
as Heidegger’s phusis allows us to start thinking about what it means to protect nature if it is 
to be understood as something separate from the practice of environmental politics. 
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Conclusion 
In this thesis I have examined the role that the concept of nature plays in green politics 
through an examination of the thinking of Heidegger. I have also elaborated on the concept of 
nature by interrogating the experiences that I have of the apples that grow in my 
grandparents’ garden, attempting to locate the experiences of nature in this garden. Finding 
that green political thinkers did not wholly address the concerns of those who claim nature is 
not anything nonhuman but it is social, the thesis moved on to examine Heidegger’s thinking 
in order to find a new way of approaching about nature. A rethinking of what the concepts of 
nature and the earth refer to in his thought allowed for a new way of investigating the 
question of nature. Nature no longer refers to the nonhuman environment but it now refers to 
the way in which all things appear to us as beings. Nature is not in my grandparents’ garden 
because the apples that grow there are somehow nonhuman and natural, but nature is there 
because I have learned to dwell in this garden, I have learned to pay attention to how the 
garden appears to me as a garden. This has allowed for a new way of thinking about the 
relationship between nature and environmental politics. Protecting nature is no longer about 
preventing environmental degradation, and environmental politics should be practised 
without making any references to nature. Protecting nature should be seen as another, 
separate goal that green politics has.  
 
The Puzzle of Nature  
This thesis began by looking at how the way in which nature is discussed in the green 
literature is a puzzle. Green thinkers differ from more traditional environmentalist thinkers. 
Whereas environmental thinkers are concerned with taking care of our environments for the 
sake managing the resources in the environment, green thinkers claim that they are interested 
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in protecting nature, understood as the nonhuman environment, itself. A majority of green 
thinkers show concern for nature by espousing a position of ecocentrism. Ecocentrism 
transcends traditional anthropocentric concerns by maintaining that it is not only humans that 
are intrinsically valuable but nature has value in itself. It should be protected for its own sake, 
not for the sake of the resources it has for humans. The moral community should thus be 
expanded to include not only humans but also other nonhuman living beings, and even non-
living beings. Green thinkers who do not adopt the ecocentric position claim that the interests 
of humans and nature are so interlinked that we cannot make separations between human and 
nonhuman interests, and they incorporate the interests of nature into their account of green 
politics by investigating these linkages.  
    But when green thinkers talk about the importance of protecting nature, which they 
understand as the nonhuman environment, they are unable to fully respond to the criticism 
made by those who claim that nature is not nonhuman but it is also social. According to the 
proponents of the social nature thesis, our environments cannot be divided into categories of 
human and nonhuman because those environments that we conventionally think of as being 
nonhuman exist in interconnected networks with things that we would conventionally think 
of as human. What comes to count as nature is discursively mediated and socially 
constructed, often through various ideological struggles. Where, for example, can we locate 
nature in my grandparents’ garden? Although the garden and the countryside in which it 
exists may have been framed as somehow more natural than the urban cities, the existence of 
the countryside is conditioned by the urban processes that surround it, the garden has been 
created and maintained by humans, and the apple trees growing in the garden have been 
planted there by humans. 
    Green thinkers have addressed these concerns by explaining how it is important to pay 
attention to the socially mediated character of the knowledge we have of nature. But they still 
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seem to think that something called nature does exist, and if we pay careful attention to the 
socially constructed character of the knowledge we have of nature, we can gain some kind of 
understanding of nature. They do not, however, explain how we can think of nature as 
existing in the light of the concerns raised by the proponents of the social nature thesis. All of 
this, then, seems to suggest that we should stop talking about nature altogether and start 
thinking about how to protect the environment without making any references to the idea of 
nature. 
    But despite the concerns expressed by the social nature theorists, the concept of nature 
does seem important, it does seem to communicate something important about green goals 
that cannot be articulated by just talking about the need to protect the environment. There is 
something in the way that green thinkers talk about the spontaneous growth and development 
of nature that cannot be articulated by just talking about how to protect the environment. 
Walking in my grandparents’ garden does feel somehow special and important and I feel that 
talking about what I experience in the garden by talking about nature is able to explain it. 
 
Heidegger  
Heidegger’s philosophy was able to shed light on this question of nature. Heidegger makes 
numerous references to nature throughout his works, by discussing phusis, the Greek word 
for nature, the role that the concealing earth plays in the happening of truth and by 
introducing the idea of dwelling in the fourfold of the earth, the sky, the gods and the mortals. 
In common green interpretation of Heidegger’s philosophy, his references to nature are seen 
as referring to the spontaneous growth and development of our non-human environments and 
the sky and the earth are seen as referring to what allows for the growth and flourishing of a 
separate set of natural, nonhuman beings. To allow for the unfolding of nature and the earth 
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and the sky we must refrain from controlling and regulating what happens in our 
environments, we must not interfere with natural processes but must allow them to unfold in 
their own ways. 
    And indeed, the way in which Heidegger talks about phusis and the sky and the earth 
seems to suggest that this interpretation is correct. Most notably, Heidegger gives numerous 
examples of how we can dwell on the earth and under the sky in environments that we 
conventionally think of as nonhuman, and he seems to emphasise that dwelling must respect 
the spontaneous unfolding of the earth on which we dwell and of the sky above us. But by 
examining Heidegger’s philosophy in more detail, the thesis demonstrated that these concepts 
must refer to something else. It showed how the common green way of thinking about the 
earth, the sky and nature contradicted Heidegger’s understanding of the happening of truth 
and concluded that his thinking can have more radical implications for the way in which we 
think about nature than is often acknowledged.  
    This thesis then went on to suggest an alternative way of thinking about nature in 
Heidegger’s works. It demonstrated that Heidegger’s nature should not be seen as describing 
any particular material qualities of beings. Instead of understanding nature as the nonhuman 
environment, nature should be thought of as describing how all beings appear to us as beings. 
There cannot, however, be a final answer to the question of what nature in Heidegger’s 
thinking stands for. Instead, what we can find in his thinking are ways of questioning nature, 
questioning that which allows beings to appear to us as beings, without arriving at an answer.    
    This thesis also looked at how we can protect nature if nature is no longer equated with the 
nonhuman environment. If nature does not refer to the spontaneous growth and flourishing of 
a certain class of natural beings, then talking about protecting nature does not help us in 
thinking about how to best prevent environmental degradation. Instead of protecting nature 
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through protecting the environment, we can now learn to question the unfolding of nature by 
learning to overcome technological thinking, a kind of thinking that aims to find different 
ways of representing beings so that these beings can be organised efficiently. We can resist 
technological thinking by learning to dwell in the fourfold of the earth, the sky, the gods and 
the mortals. This thesis, therefore, interprets the earth and the sky differently to the green 
literature on Heidegger. In these green readings of the earth and the sky, these concepts are 
understood as describing that which allows for the growth and flourishing of a set of natural 
beings. But this thesis no longer equated Heidegger’s earth and sky with parts of a nonhuman 
nature. The earth and the sky are now thought of as the unfolding of phusis. Heidegger does 
not provide us with any final answers to the question of what these terms mean and we 
should not try to seek these answers. Instead, we should think of his description of the 
fourfold as a poetic description that can show us the way towards questioning dwelling. We 
learn to dwell on the earth and under the sky when we do not think of things in terms of 
efficiency, when we allow for the gathering of the fourfold and for the appearance of things 
as they are.  
    This means that protecting nature in my grandparents’ garden is not related to questions of 
how to best take care of the Finnish countryside and how to best take care of the apple trees 
growing in the garden. Instead, it is related to questioning how the garden appears to me as a 
garden, to how I can learn to stay with the apples that grow in the garden, to dwell and to be 
at home there. I do not learn to dwell in a garden amidst apple trees when I am avoiding 
controlling the unfolding of this environment. I learn to dwell in the garden when I allow the 
garden to appear to me as a garden and when I let the apples be apples, when I do not think of 
the walk in the garden as a resource, done for the sake of something else. This also means 
that nature can be experienced in places that are not conventionally thought of as being 
natural. I can also learn to dwell amidst the apples when I am sharing an apple pie with 
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friends if I do not think of this gathering in terms of efficiency, or if I do not think of this 
gathering as a means for achieving something else. To learn to dwell, we should attempt to 
pay attention to that which allowed the gathering to appear to us as such, to the summer that 
nourished the apple trees, to our friendships, to the flavours of apple pies. We should allow 
all of these to come together in this gathering, and through this, allow for the appearance of 
the gods, allow the gathering to appear as something special and important. 
    This thesis also explored how we can investigate Heidegger’s notion of technological 
thinking and dwelling without falling back to the rural nostalgia that is evident in the 
examples that he gives of dwelling in the fourfold. The thesis looked at how cultures, for 
Heidegger, are not static and homogenous but constantly changing and evolving. Learning to 
dwell, then, does not mean a return to the past and to old ways of doing things, excluding 
dissenting voices from the homeland. Instead, it requires finding new ways of dwelling and 
being that evolve and change, but yet are always in part conditioned by what came before. 
The thesis also demonstrated how resisting technological thinking and learning to dwell does 
not imply the rejection of technological devices. Although Heidegger himself was suspicious 
of modern technology and of dwelling amidst technical devices, his philosophy offers tools 
for thinking about dwelling amidst these modern technical devices in ways that perhaps even 
Heidegger himself did not recognise. What is important is not the technological nature of the 
device itself, but the kinds of ways of engaging with the world that these devices encourage. 
Although technical devices might invite us to resort to technological thinking when engaging 
with beings, treating them as resources, it is not impossible to start engaging with these 
technical devices in different ways, and to start reflecting on how these technical devices, too, 
make up the world in which we can learn to dwell. This thesis also illustrated what it might 
mean to dwell in urban areas and how we might learn to question nature in the urban, even in 
areas where there are only a few trees in sight and little evidence of what we might 
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traditionally think of as belonging to nature. So dwelling does not only have to involve 
practices such as sharing apple pies with friends, which remind us of older, traditional ways 
of doing things. Dwelling can also occur in a crowded, morning rush-hour train as we are 
commuting to work, as the train quickly moves past all the gardens with apple trees that we 
may merely glimpse.  
 
Nature in Green Politics 
This way of thinking nature allowed for a new way of approaching the role it plays in green 
politics. In this new interpretation, protecting nature is no longer associated with protecting 
the environment. When we are concerned with environmental problems, we should not talk 
about these problems in terms of protecting nature. And similarly, when we are discussing 
anthropocentrism, when we are discussing extending the moral community to include beings 
that are not humans, nature should not feature in these discussions. The fact that a certain set 
of beings has been framed as natural through different political and ideological interests 
should not play a part in us deciding whether these beings should be accorded intrinsic value.  
    But none of this means that nature cannot play a role in green politics. This thesis 
suggested thinking of green politics as having two different kinds of goals, the goal of 
protecting nature and the goal of protecting the environment. Protecting nature should 
therefore be seen as one of two goals that green politics has. Protecting nature is about 
resisting Heidegger’s technological thinking, resisting thinking of things that we encounter as 
something that we can control and use as a resource. It is about paying attention to how 
beings can appear to us as beings, and how we can never fully understand how a being was 
able to appear to us as a being in the first place.  
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    Green politics cannot directly tell us how we should question these beings and there are no 
political actions that can be undertaken that would result in us automatically overcoming 
technological thinking and learning to question nature. Instead, resisting technological 
thinking must always take place in the form of our own personal journeys of questioning the 
unfolding nature. But green politics can aim to practise the kind of politics that makes this 
kind of questioning easier. The thesis suggested that clues to what this could entail can be 
found from the sphere of urban planning. Urban areas that have mixed uses and where the 
usage of these spaces is not tightly regulated and controlled make it easier for people to think 
of their surroundings in terms of something other than a resource.  
    It is also important to note that although the thesis has been concerned with the role that 
the concept of nature plays in green politics, the purpose has not been to suggest that nature 
could only be questioned from within green thinking. Because protecting nature has now 
been divorced from protecting the environment, we can question and protect nature in many 
different ways, for example, through art or through exploring urban place making. Green 
thinking is one way of approaching the question of nature where questioning nature can sit 
well with the second goal of green politics, the goal of protecting nature. Neither has the 
purpose of the thesis been to suggest that reading Heidegger is the only possible way of 
questioning nature. There are many different paths we can take towards protecting nature and 
indeed, Heidegger encourages us to look for our own ways of questioning nature (see e.g. 
WCT: 146; WHD: 158-9).  
 
Contributions 
This thesis makes two contributions to the existing literature. The main contribution is made 
to the literature on green politics by gaining a better understanding of what the concept of 
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nature refers to in this literature and why it seems to be such an important concept. By 
explaining that protecting nature should not play a part in the practice of environmental 
politics, the thesis demonstrated how we should discuss environmental degradation without 
making any references to nature, without talking about the destruction of nature, without 
talking about the complicated relationships that we share with nature or without talking about 
according intrinsic value to nature. Because nonhuman nature does not exist, what comes to 
count as nature in these debates is always a result of the assertion of political interests or 
ideologically motivated framings of parts of the environment as natural. Talking about nature 
here only serves to make discussing how we might best take care of our environments more 
difficult by demanding that certain areas of the environment should be privileged because 
certain interests have framed these areas as natural. Taking this idea of nature out of the 
debates on the environment allows for a better focus on existing environmental problems that 
extend to areas that we do not conventionally think of as natural but that are still worthy of 
investigation (see e.g. Light, 2001).  
    But the thesis divorced nature from environmental politics by explaining that this concept 
of nature should not be wholly abandoned, and that it should still play a role in thinking about 
green politics. This, I hope, can allow many who are interested in protecting the environment 
to stop using the concept of nature to think about environmental degradation because it 
demonstrates that even if the idea of nature should not play a role in thinking about 
environmental destruction, there can still be a place for protecting nature in green politics. 
This exploration of the concept of nature also opens up avenues and new ways of thinking 
about how to protect nature. The dangers of conflating the protection of nature with the 
protection of the environment are pointed out, for example, by Vaden (2010: 7), who 
criticises the Finnish radical deep ecologist Pentti Linkola for forgetting his earlier reflections 
on a poetic Finland when he began to concentrate on preventing the destruction of the 
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environment. So here, the goal of protecting nature was forgotten as Linkola began to focus 
more environmental destruction. The introduction of protecting nature as a goal in its own 
right, separate from fighting environmental degradation, thus can allow us to pay more 
attention to it. 
    This way of thinking about nature has, for example, allowed me to make better sense of 
what is at stake in protecting the environment, and to reflect on what makes the apples in my 
grandparents’ garden important for me, why I think that they should be protected. It has 
allowed me to get over nature when thinking about protecting the environment while still 
being able to talk about nature and pay attention to it. This has had a positive impact on my 
thinking about environmental degradation and nature. When I was a child, I was very 
concerned about environmental degradation. I remember sitting on the back seat of a car as 
my parents were driving back to Helsinki from my grandparents’ house, looking at the forests 
out of the window and thinking about how much of the surrounding forests would be 
destroyed in the future, and if there will still be something that I can call nature left. I had a 
sense that all of this was inevitable, that there was nothing that I could do about it, other than 
watch this destruction happen.  
    I am still very concerned about environmental degradation, and the more that I read and 
study, the more concerned I get. But in some ways, reflecting on the question of nature has 
made me feel that there is more to be done about this than I had previously acknowledged. I 
no longer think of protecting the environment and nature as something that should aim to 
keep the environment in its natural state. Even if the Finnish forests change, and they will 
change, and even if with the proliferation of environmental problems, there are still new 
avenues we can pursue to protect and take care of our environments. The question is, then, 
what kinds of new environments are created and how we can learn to take care of these. This, 
as explored in previous chapters, is the kind of point made by De-Shalit (2000) who 
274 
 
encourages us to investigate environmental problems that exist with us currently, and not to 
stay inactive and passive in the face of environmental destruction because we are yearning of 
some green, utopian communities.  
    Thinking about the concept of nature also introduces a host of other concerns. These are 
concerns over how we can learn to dwell in the fourfold and resist technological thinking, 
how we can protect nature, how we can continue to dwell in a world that is changing, and 
where our traditions and different ways of doing things are also constantly transforming. 
Thinking about nature encourages us to reflect on these issues by demonstrating how they 
cannot be addressed by trying to exist in harmony with a nonhuman nature but constitute a 
sphere of inquiry that is separate from taking care of the environment, and how Heidegger’s 
philosophy can provide us with one way of beginning to question nature. 
    There are, however, many debates on green politics that this thesis has not touched upon. 
The aim here has not been to solve any debates in green politics, but rather, to give new tools 
for thinking about these debates. I have not attempted to answer the question of which one is 
better, the rules-based approach to ecocentrism that concentrates more on preventing 
environmental degradation, or deep ecology that puts more emphasis on cultivating a sense of 
place and on dwelling. Neither have I touched upon the question of whether we should aim to 
extend the moral community to include nonhumans and how we should go about doing this. 
These questions remain open. However, by thinking about the role that the concept of nature 
plays in green politics, I hope to have provided some tools which can help answer them by 
demonstrating how the question of nature does not play a role in answering questions 
concerning the kinds of political structures that can best take care of our environments. 
    It is also important to highlight that although I have claimed to be looking into the role that 
the concept of nature plays in green politics, the purpose here has not been to make big 
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generalisations about what the whole of green politics is about. Even at the end of this thesis, 
I have not attempted to produce a definitive statement of what all of green thinking is about. 
Not all the greens show concern for nature in the way that has been discussed in this thesis. 
There is, for example, little concern for nature, as it is understood in this thesis, in 
Eckersley’s account of ecocentrism that investigates extending our moral communities to 
include nonhumans and with the kinds of political structures that can best accomplish this. 
There are also those who focus on the sacrifices that we must make to address the 
environmental crisis and are less concerned with the sense of place that questioning nature 
can bring about (see e.g. Maniates and Meyer, 2010). But there are plenty of those who do 
focus on nature. This thesis explored, for example, Curry’s (2006) emphasis on questioning 
the mysteries of the unfolding on nature, Sagoff’s (1996) account of paying attention to the 
places in which we live, and Barry’s (2012) attempts to describe a sustainable, low-carbon 
society that is also good for human flourishing. It is these kinds of approaches to green 
politics that I hope this thesis can help make sense of. 
    The second contribution that this thesis makes is to the literature on green interpretations of 
Heidegger’s philosophy. This literature often assumes that the references to the earth and the 
sky in Heidegger’s work must refer to the literal sky and to the literal earth, that the 
references to nature must refer to the nonhuman environment, and to protect the earth, the sky 
and nature, we must allow them to unfold in ways that are appropriate to them. This 
conclusion is often seen as such an obvious one to draw that it needs no further thinking. But 
by investigating the idea of truth in Heidegger’s work and the role that the earth plays in the 
happening of truth closely, the thesis demonstrated that the earth cannot be understood in 
terms of that which allows for the biological growth of plants. Heidegger’s thought cannot 
have impact on protecting the environment, this inquiry is never taken for the sake of 
protecting the environment. Although learning to dwell on the earth might seem like 
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something that allows us to interact with our environments in a harmonious manner, it can 
never be guaranteed to have any environmentally friendly outcomes. This thesis thus 
presented a new way of thinking about these concepts, and demonstrated how Heidegger’s 
thought can have much more radical implications for thinking about the concept of nature 
than is often recognised. 
    Finally, although I have claimed to present an answer to the question of the role that the 
concept of nature should play in green politics in the thesis, this does not mean that the 
concept of nature has now become an unproblematic concept, and that the problems in 
discussing the concept of nature that have been discussed in the thesis would no longer arise. 
The question of how we engage with the powerful narratives of naturalness, with the social, 
political, cultural and ideological factors that come to label something as natural still remains. 
The task of knowing when we are dwelling, allowing things to appear in the fourfold as the 
things that they are, and when we are fighting for preserving a particular way of ordering 
things because an environment has been labelled as natural still remains difficult. It is still 
easy to think of gathering apples and eating apple pies with friends in the autumn as tuning 
into some natural rhythms of life given to us by an unchanging nonhuman nature.   
    These problems do not only apply to places that we might conventionally think of as being 
natural but also apply to urban places. This can be elaborated by returning briefly to Jane 
Jacobs’ position on urban planning that was discussed in the last chapter. Jacobs suggests 
planning urban spaces in a way that does not regulate their usage too much but allows for the 
mixed use of urban spaces. But even in this discussion of urban spaces, there still lies a 
danger of appealing to some idea of naturalness and to some natural order of things. It is as if 
in Jacobs’ account there exists some natural balance in the city, and if we refrain from 
controlling and regulating the city, if we allow people to organise their being in the city 
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themselves, we can allow for the spontaneous emergence of this natural balance (see e.g. 
Allen, 1999: 62; Massey, 1999: 110). 
    There are no easy ways to address these concerns, these troubles will exist as long as we do 
not insist on stopping talking about nature altogether. All I can say in response to these 
concerns is that I am aware of these dangers, and we need to remain careful when we 
continue to talk about nature. At the same time, the kind of thinking about nature that has 
been undertaken in this thesis can help avoid some of these dangers by drawing attention to 
them. If it is so difficult to stop talking about nature, as seems to be suggested by the fact that 
the word ‘nature’ often finds its way back into the green writings even after its usage has 
been criticised, if this idea of nature finds its way back into our thinking again and again, then 
I think it is better to be able to say what nature is. This way, it is easier for us to pay attention 
to how we talk about nature, and easier to avoid the problems that talking about nature often 
leads us to. 
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